Showing posts with label Portugal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Portugal. Show all posts

4/04/2020

EU approves coronavirus state support for Portugal, Poland, Greece


Source: CNAFILE PHOTO: European Union flags fly outside the European Commission headquarters in Brussels
April 4 2020

BRUSSELS: The European Commission has approved a series of multi-billion-euro state support packages for Greece, Poland and Portugal to help soften the economic impact of the coronavirus through grants and loan guarantees.

The Commission, which enforces EU anti-trust regulation, loosened its rules last month to allow EU governments to support businesses and banks after factories began to fall quiet and Europeans were ordered to stay home to stop the virus spreading.

In a series of statements late on Friday and on Saturday, the Commission approved a 13-billion-euro state aid programme for the Portuguese economy, a 22-billion-euro plan of state guarantees for Poland and a 2-billion-euro scheme for Greece.

The schemes were judged not to distort EU competition.

"This Polish guarantee scheme will help Polish businesses affected by the current coronavirus crisis cover their immediate working capital and investment needs," Commission Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager said in a statement.

For Portugal, Vestager said the 13 billion euros would "enable Portugal to provide direct grants and public guarantees on loans to help small-and-medium-sized companies and large companies cover investment and working capital needs".

The Greek scheme allows for state guarantees on working capital loans, Vestager said.


2/27/2013

Greece and Spain helped postwar Germany recover. Spot the difference

People exchanging food for tickets in 1923 Germany. 'Many, including Keynes, argued that [reparations imposed on Germany following the Versailles treaty] led to the rise of the Nazis and the second world war.

Πηγή: The Guardian
By Nick Dearden
Feb 27 2013

Sixty years ago, half of German war debts were cancelled to build its economy. Yet today, debt is destroying those creditors.

Sixty years ago today, an agreement was reached in London to cancel half of postwar Germany's debt. That cancellation, and the way it was done, was vital to the reconstruction of Europe from war. It stands in marked contrast to the suffering being inflicted on European people today in the name of debt.

Germany emerged from the second world war still owing debt that originated with the first world war: the reparations imposed on the country following the Versailles peace conference in 1919. Many, including John Maynard Keynes, argued that these unpayable debts and the economic policies they entailed led to the rise of the Nazis and the second world war.

By 1953, Germany also had debts based on reconstruction loans made immediately after the end of the second world war. Germany's creditors included Greece and Spain, Pakistan and Egypt, as well as the US, UK and France.

German debts were well below the levels seen in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain today, making up around a quarter of national income. But even at this level, there was serious concern that debt payments would use up precious foreign currency earnings and endanger reconstruction.

Needing a strong West Germany as a bulwark against communism, the country's creditors came together in London and showed that they understood how you help a country that you want to recover from devastation. It showed they also understood that debt can never be seen as the responsibility of the debtor alone. Countries such as Greece willingly took part in a deal to help create a stable and prosperous western Europe, despite the war crimes that German occupiers had inflicted just a few years before.

The debt cancellation for Germany was swift, taking place in advance of an actual crisis. Germany was given large cancellation of 50% of its debt. The deal covered all debts, including those owed by the private sector and even individuals. It also covered all creditors. No one was allowed to "hold out" and extract greater profits than anyone else. Any problems would be dealt with by negotiations between equals rather than through sanctions or the imposition of undemocratic policies.

Perhaps the most innovative feature of the London agreement was a clause that said West Germany should only pay for debts out of its trade surplus, and any repayments were limited to 3% of exports earnings every year. This meant those countries that were owed debt had to buy West German exports in order to be paid. It meant West Germany would only pay from genuine earnings, without recourse to new loans. And it meant Germany's creditors had an interest in the country growing and its economy thriving.

Following the London deal, West Germany experienced an "economic miracle", with the debt problem resolved and years of economic growth. The medicine doled out to heavily indebted countries over the last 30 years could not be more different. Instead, the practice since the early 1980s has been to bail out reckless lenders through giving new loans, while forcing governments to implement austerity and free-market liberalisation to become "more competitive".

As a result of this, from Latin America and Africa in the 80s and 90s to Greece, Ireland and Spain today, poverty has increased and inequality soared. In Africa in the 80s and 90s, the number of people living in extreme poverty increased by 125 million, while economies shrank. In Greece today, the economy has shrunk by more than 20%, while one in two young people are unemployed. In both cases, debt ballooned.

The priority of an indebted government today is to repay its debts, whatever the amount of the budget these repayments consume. In contrast to the 3% limit on German debt payments, today the IMF and World Bank regard debt payments of up to 15-25% of export revenues as being "sustainable" for impoverished countries. The Greek government's foreign debt payments are around 30% of exports.

When debts have been "restructured", they are only a portion of the total debts owed, with only willing creditors participating. In 2012, only Greece's private creditors had debt reduced. Creditors that held British or Swiss law debt were also able to "hold out" against the restructuring, and will doubtless pursue Greece for many years to come.

The "strategy" in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain today is to put the burden of adjustment solely on the debtor country to make its economy more competitive through mass unemployment and wage cuts. But without creditors like Germany willing to buy more of their exports, this will not happen, bringing pain without end.

The German debt deal was a key element of recovering from the devastation of the second world war. In Europe today, debt is tearing up the social fabric. Outside Europe, heavily indebted countries are still treated to a package of austerity and "restructuring" measures. Pakistan, the Philippines, El Salvador and Jamaica are all spending between 10 and 20% of export revenues on government foreign debt payments, and this doesn't include debt payments by the private sector.

If we had no evidence of how to solve a debt crisis equitably, we could perhaps regard the policies of Europe's leaders as misguided. But we have the positive example of Germany 60 years ago, and the devastating example of the Latin American debt crisis 30 years ago. The actions of Europe's leaders are nothing short of criminal.



8/29/2012

'Troika' in Lisbon amid fears Portugal could need a new bailout


Πηγή: The Independent
By RUSSELL LYNCH
August 29 2012

Portugal faced fresh scrutiny from international lenders over its €78bn (£62bn) bailout yesterday amid mounting concerns that the nation could need "tens of billions" extra in funds.

Inspectors from the troika of the European Union, European Central Bank and the IMF are making their fifth visit since the nation called for an international rescue in April last year to decide whether to grant the next €4.3bn tranche of funding.

Lisbon is broadly on track with the austerity measures demanded in return for the funds, but the nation's economy is in the grip of its worst recession since the 1970s, slumping 1.2 per cent between April and June. Experts now doubt the government can meet its growth target next year and fear that Portugal's deficit could be closer to 6 per cent this year – well above Lisbon's 4.5 per cent target.

Under the terms of its deal Portugal is supposed to return to international debt markets in a year's time. But the country's benchmark 10-year borrowing costs are still worryingly high, standing at more than 9 per cent and in effect shutting it out of bond markets.

Grant Lewis, head of research at Daiwa Capital Markets Europe, said that an extension of the current deal could run into "tens of billions".

The arrival of the troika in Lisbon comes as Spain – which requested a €100bn rescue for its debt-laden banks in June – saw more bad news on its own economy. Spain's output has now fallen 1.3 per cent in the past year, worse than previous estimates of a 1 per cent fall.

Nick Spiro, the head of Spiro Sovereign Strategy, said: "The difference between Spain and Portugal is that Portugal is moving in the right direction and Spain is not. Portugal has won credibility, while Spain has lost it."



4/18/2012

FDI into Ireland, Greece and Portugal before and after the EU bailout


Πηγή: FDI Intelligence
By Ailbhe McLoughlin
April 18 2012


Ireland, Portugal and Greece have had varying levels of success in attracting FDI since their eurozone bailouts.

Out of the three countries to have received EU bailouts – Ireland, Portugal and Greece – Ireland is the only one to have enjoyed an increase in recorded FDI since the financial crisis began in 2008. Data from greenfield investment monitor fDi Markets  shows that Ireland recorded 77% more projects in 2011 than it did in 2007. Conversely, Portugal recorded 63% fewer projects in 2011 compared to 2007 and Greece recorded 20% fewer.

In 2007, Ireland's financial services sector enjoyed a significant level of investment from UK-based banks, including Royal Bank of Scotland and its subsidiary Ulster Bank. Since the financial crisis, however, investment from such UK-based institutions has decreased. In 2011, a number of investments from US-based banks such as Citigroup and Bank of NY Mellon helped Ireland's FDI levels recover. Fund administrators and financial consultancies have also helped plug the gap left by UK-based institutions, with Switzerland-based deVere Group and global hedge fund administrator HedgeServ both investing in Ireland.

The growing levels of investment in Ireland’s software and IT sector have also helped bolster the country's FDI levels. Again, it is the US-based firms that have invested most heavily. Online auction site Ebay, search engine Google and social networking site Twitter have all all established or expanded their presence in the country.

Before the financial crisis, in 2007, Greece experienced FDI investment across a diverse range of industries, but particularly in the energy sector. In the same period, Portugal attracted a broad range of investments, with companies such as Finland-based communications corporation Nokia, Spain-based bank Santander and France-based automotive company PSA Peugeot-Citroën all investing in the country.



3/04/2012

Are The Markets And Politicians Underestimating The Impact Of A Disorderly Greece Default And Eurozone Exit?


Πηγή: Forexpros
By The National Bank of Canada
March 4 2012

For the first time since the beginning of the eurozone debt crisis, there is growing belief among a number of politicians and analysts that Europe would be able to weather the impact of a disorderly Greek default and exit from the eurozone, or, more specifically, that the contagion effect on countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy would be limited. Taking this position would have been nearly unthinkable not so long ago. This new line of thinking is exemplified by the following public statements made by certain high profile European politicians and business leaders:

“The costs are much less than a year ago. We have bolstered our emergency funds. And we have a budget pact, with additional measures to bring down budget deficits. The risks of contagion have strongly decreased.” (Dutch Finance Minister Jan Kees)

“It’s not the end of the world if someone leaves the eurozone.” (European Commission Vice-President Neelie Kroes)

“It might be something which would allow Greece to get a new start … to create an economy that can create jobs.” (Luxembourg Finance Minister Luc Frieden)2 The risk from Greece leaving the eurozone has “lost much of its horror.” (German Economy Minister Philipp Roesler)

Greece would have better chances of economic recovery if it left the eurozone. (German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich)

Franz Fehrenbach, chief executive of industrial company Bosch, Klaus-Peter Mueller, chairman of Commerzbank AG, and Wolfgang Reitzle, CEO of industrial gases producer Linde AG, are but three examples of German business leaders that have publicly come out in favour of Greece exiting the eurozone.

Even Wolfgang Schauble, the foreign minister of Germany, arguably the country’s second most powerful politician after Chancellor Merkel, is now in favour of letting Greece default and exit the eurozone.6 For now at least, the markets appear to share these optimistic views. Unlike 2011 when every new turn in the eurozone debt crisis sent markets into a panic, this year the markets appear to have become increasingly complacent to events in the eurozone. For example, they barely reacted to the riots in Greece or the difficultly the European Union (EU) had in agreeing to the conditions for the latest Greek bailout package. There are indeed more reasons to be confident about the eurozone debt crisis than before:

The European Central Bank (ECB) has provided the banks with ultra-cheap financing, thus heading off a potential bank crisis.

Foreign bank exposure to Greece has dropped significantly and sovereign debt yields have markedly declined in Spain and Italy.

Some also feel the markets have regained their sanity in not according Greece, which accounts for less than 2% of the EU’s GDP, too much importance.

Despite these positive factors, we still continue to believe that the markets are underestimating the economic and geopolitical implications of a disorderly Greek default and eurozone exit. In chronicle order, they include:

1. Holders of Greek debt would be forced to take an 80%-90% haircut.

2. Creditor countries would be compelled to honour the guarantees they made on the bailout fund and recapitalize the ECB. This is after having long assured their citizens this scenario would never occur, adding momentum to the growing backlash against the EU’s governing parties and political elites.

3. European banks would be exposed to even higher levels of public and private sector losses. In addition to having bailed out heavily indebted countries, they would be forced to bail out politically unpopular bankers as well.

4. The markets would immediately move on to the next weakest link in the chain: Portugal. Investors, fearing a default, would start dumping Portuguese debt on a large scale.

5. The capital controls implemented by Greece following its bankruptcy and eurozone exit would be taken as a stark warning by the Portuguese and others to withdraw their cash from their banks while they still could (a replay of what happened in Greece). This panic would be reinforced by the sight of cars and boats beings searched at Greek ports and borders in an effort to prevent Greeks from sneaking euros out of the country.

6. In an effort to limit the contagion, the EU would be forced to put together a second bailout package for Portugal.

7. The bailout fund and/or the ECB would have to purchase significant amounts of Spanish and Italian bonds to prevent their yields from spiking. Given its heavy exposure to Portugal, Spain would be particularly impacted.


Bank Exposure

8. The collapse of Greece, the economic downturn in the EU and domestic public pressure would cause Irish and Portuguese governments to increase pressure for partial loan forgiveness. This would fly in the face of pledges made by Germany, France and other countries that the partial debt reduction given to Greece was a one-off event.

9. A bankrupt Greece would still require significant financial assistance because the drachma would not immediately be accepted as a form of payment by other countries. Greece would thus need assistance from the EU/IMF to pay for imports of food, medicine and energy, as well as recapitalize its banking system. Having their tax dollars still being sent to Greece even after it has defaulted would further anger the citizens of creditor countries.

10. The demand for more funds to calm the markets would coincide with record levels of opposition by the citizens of creditor countries to further bailouts. Opposition to bailouts would rise from over 60% in countries such as Germany and Netherlands to over 80% after the collapse of Greece. After all the time and money spent in the futile attempt to save Greece, there would be very little public support to begin the process all over again with Portugal and other countries.

11. Support for formerly marginal anti-EU parties on the extreme left and right would surge, causing coalition governments to collapse in Finland and the Netherlands.

12. The Greek collapse and worsening of the European economic environment would cause Italy, Spain and even France to openly challenge the wisdom of the German-driven austerity approach. They would likely forge a coalition to pressure Germany to ease up its policy of aid in exchange for harsh austerity measures. This would make it all the more difficult for EU countries to find common ground.

Conclusion

To summarize, the demands for even more funds to contain the impact of a Greek bankruptcy and eurozone exit would run into an unprecedented level of political opposition that would strain and, in some cases, lead to the collapse of governing coalitions. The divisions between the major EU countries would also widen, seriously impeding the EU’s ability to effectively deal with the crisis. The political climate would be even further poisoned by the economic downturn the European Union finds itself in, a situation many Europeans blame Germany for worsening by its push for the implementation of harsh austerity measures.

The dilemma facing Germany is particularly difficult. Chancellor Merkel’s government approved the latest bailout in the face of severe public opposition (62% of Germans, in a recent poll, opposed this measure). Germany’s constitutional court, meanwhile, warned that any rescue fund exceeding Germany’s national budget – estimated to be 306 billion euros for 2012 – could threaten economic stability and violate Germany’s constitution. Germany is currently on the hook for 211 billion euros of the bailout fund (a figure it promised not to go beyond). If Germany agreed to finance further bailouts in the event of Greek collapse, there is a risk that Germany’s liability would surpass 306 billion euros. This would not only have legal ramifications, but it would also ignite a massive political backlash.7 A similar political backlash would occur in other countries such as the Netherlands, Finland and Austria.

The following picture is a recent front page headline from Bild, Germany’s largest newspaper, urging politicians to vote against a second bailout package for Greece worth about 130 billion euros (which did get approved). This headline is reflective of the growing public opposition in Germany to further bailouts. One can only imagine what this headline would be saying if Germany was asked to provide even more funds to help stabilize the eurozone following a Greek collapse.


9/20/2011

EU: Economy enters 'dangerous phase'

Protests in Rome over the austerity cuts, the latest in a series of protests across Europe


Πηγή: BBC
By Kabir Chibber
Sep. 20 2011


Three nations in the eurozone - the 17 nations that use the euro - have been recipients of bailouts as attempts to solve the crisis keep stalling.

Italy became the latest to feel the domino effect of the markets when its debt rating was lowered, the latest in a series of downgrades.

Greece, Spain, the Irish Republic and even Cyprus have also had their ratings cut this year. The future of the euro is being questioned in a way it never has since 1999.

Which countries have fallen, and which are feared to be next?

GREECE

The problem: Greece's huge debts, about 340bn euros (£297bn; $478bn).

In late 2009, after months of speculation and sovereign debt crises in Iceland and the Middle East, Greece finally admitted its debts were the highest in the country's modern history.

Since then, a 110bn-euro bailout was passed by the eurozone last year and a second bailout of roughly the same size was agreed earlier this year - but not yet passed.

Most observers remain highly sceptical of Greece's ability to ever repay its huge mountain of debt. Talk persists of an unprecedented default or of Greece leaving the eurozone.

Because of the interconnectedness of the European economy, this would cause huge losses for French and German banks.

Thus, though Greece has been bailed out, fears of it running out of money continue to plague investors.

International credit markets remain wary of Greece because of its sovereign debt rating.

Ratings: Greece is now considered to be "junk" by the ratings agencies, meaning it has a very high chance of defaulting. S&P has cut its debt seven times since 2009, from A to CC, the third-lowest rung on its rating scale.

S&P: CC

Moody's: Ca

ITALY

The problem: Italy has the highest total debt in the eurozone, amid stagnant growth.

In the summer, the country was charged record levels to borrow, which prompted renewed calls to pass spending cuts.

The alternative, selling more debt, was unsustainable at rates that reached 6%.

Rome laid out 60bn euros of austerity measures and aims to balance its budget by 2013, but markets have been concerned over its growing debt load in relation to GDP - the second-highest behind Greece in the eurozone.

If Italy was to be bailed out, few think that the eurozone (or Germany in particular) could actually afford it.

But Italy has the advantage of having most of its debt owed to its own people rather than external investors. This buys it more breathing room than, say, Greece.

Ratings: Italy was last triple-A in 1995. Since then, its rating has been fairly stable near the top of the investment grade rankings.

S&P: A

Moody's: Aa2

SPAIN

The problem: The housing boom turned to bust, leaving the country's banks loaded with bad debt and the highest unemployment rate in the eurozone.

Spain has also seen record borrowing costs recently, forcing its government to adopt numerous austerity measures to get its finances under control.

Spain, like Italy, is considered too expensive a proposition for the eurozone to realistically bail out.

This is why the eurozone has tried to help lower its cost of borrowing, rather than give it loans as it did to its neighbour, Portugal.

Ratings: Last at the highest rating in 1992, the Iberian nation has been cut twice since 2009.

S&P: AA

Moody's: Aa2

FRANCE

The problem: The country's banks bear a heavy exposure to Greek debt.

While France's public finances have not yet been questioned heavily by the market, its banks have seen sharp falls on the stock market.

In September, Moody's downgraded Credit Agricole and Societe Generale after reviewing their exposure to Greek debt.

Credit Agricole and Societe Generale have seen their share prices fall by about two-thirds since February, while BNP has fallen by more than half.

France has also announced plans to cut spending by 45bn euros over the next three years.

Ratings: France was given the top rating by Moody's in 1988, and kept it ever since, despite anaemic growth.

S&P: AAA

Moody's: Aaa

GERMANY

The problem: Most of its neighbours are broke.

Unlike many of its neighbours, Germany enjoyed vigorous economic growth - GDP rose by 3.6% in 2010. Unemployment is lower than before the 2008 crisis.

And the government plans to cut the budget deficit by a record 80bn euros by 2014.

While that growth has slowed, the main problem is that Europe's largest economy is the biggest contributor to the bailout fund used to help stricken nations.

And Germany's banks have a heavy exposure to debt from Greece, Europe's biggest headache.

This means in the event of a Greek default, Germany would probably have to bail out its own banks.

But having taken the lead in bailing out three nations - Greece twice - how many more can the country afford?

Ratings: Following reunification, the country was given the highest possible creditworthiness by S&P in 1992 and Moody's in 1993.

S&P: AAA

Moody's: Aaa

UK

The problem: UK banks have a heavy exposure to Irish debt.

Other than that, the UK has been relatively unscathed, while its eurozone neighbours endure turmoil.

The coalition government has announced the biggest cuts in state spending since World War II.

UK gilts are viewed as one of the safest investments in the world, with the country's borrowing costs falling to recent lows.

But the situation remains precarious. The country's budget deficit was 10.3% last year - this is just behind Greece, greater than Spain's and more than triple that of Germany.

Ratings: In 2009, S&P lowered its outlook on British debt to "negative" from "stable" for the first time since the agency started rating its public finances in 1978. But the triple-A rating has been affirmed since 1993.

S&P: AAA

Moody's: Aaa

IRISH REPUBLIC

The problem: The country's banking system collapsed.

The country's biggest banks were taken under government control in the financial crisis and recapitalised. The cost of doing that has been about 70bn euros.

The Irish received a bailout worth 85bn euros from the eurozone and IMF, then passed the toughest budget in the nation's history.

Since then, the IMF has said the Irish Republic is "showing signs of stabilisation" and there is a sense that the worst has now passed.

Ratings: The Irish Republic held the highest triple-A rating as recently as 2001. S&P has cut it five times since 2009.

S&P: BBB+

Moody's: Ba1


PORTUGAL

The problem: A shrinking economy straining its budget.

The country has been the third to get a bailout, worth 78bn euros. The previous government fell after failing to pass austerity measures, which the subsequent government had passed.

Investors have since moved on to ongoing worries about Greece, Spain and Italy.

Ratings: Portugal has been cut four times since 2009. It was once triple-A, way back in 1993.

S&P: BBB-

Moody's: Ba2


9/05/2011

It’s the Economy, Dummkopf!

WURST-CASE SCENARIO German deputy finance minister Jörg Asmussen, at a vestige of the Berlin Wall.

Πηγή: Vanityfair
By Michael Lewis
September 2011


With Greece and Ireland in economic shreds, while Portugal, Spain, and perhaps even Italy head south, only one nation can save Europe from financial Armageddon: a highly reluctant Germany. The ironies—like the fact that bankers from Düsseldorf were the ultimate patsies in Wall Street’s con game—pile up quickly as Michael Lewis investigates German attitudes toward money, excrement, and the country’s Nazi past, all of which help explain its peculiar new status.


By the time I arrived in Hamburg the fate of the financial universe seemed to turn on which way the German people jumped. Moody’s was set to downgrade the Portuguese government’s debt to junk-bond status, and Standard & Poor’s had hinted darkly that Italy might be next. Ireland was about to be downgraded to junk status, too, and there was a very real possibility that the newly elected Spanish government might seize the moment to announce that the old Spanish government had miscalculated, and owed foreigners a lot more money than they previously imagined. Then there was Greece. Of the 126 countries with rated debt, Greece now ranked 126th: the Greeks were officially regarded as the least likely people on the planet to repay their debts. As the Germans were not only the biggest creditor of the various deadbeat European nations but their only serious hope for future funding, it was left to Germans to act as moral arbiter, to decide which financial behaviors would be tolerated and which would not. As a senior official at the Bundesbank put it to me, “If we say ‘no,’ it’s ‘no.’ Nothing happens without Germany. This is where the losses come to live.” Just a year ago, when German public figures called Greeks cheaters, and German magazines ran headlines like why don't you sell your islands, you bankrupt greeks?, ordinary Greeks took it as an outrageous insult. In June of this year the Greek government started selling islands or at any rate created a fire-sale list of a thousand properties—golf courses, beaches, airports, farmlands, roads—that they hoped to sell, to help repay their debts. It was safe to say that the idea for doing this had not come from the Greeks.

To no one but a German is Hamburg an obvious place to spend a vacation, but it happened to be a German holiday, and Hamburg was overrun by German tourists. When I asked the hotel concierge what there was to see in his city, he had to think for a few seconds before he said, “Most people just go to the Reeperbahn.” The Reeperbahn is Hamburg’s red-light district, the largest red-light district in Europe, according to one guidebook, though you have to wonder how anyone figured that out. And the Reeperbahn, as it happens, was why I was there.

Perhaps because they have such a gift for creating difficulties with non-Germans, the Germans have been on the receiving end of many scholarly attempts to understand their collective behavior. In this vast and growing enterprise, a small book with a funny title towers over many larger, more ponderous ones. Published in 1984 by a distinguished anthropologist named Alan Dundes, Life Is Like a Chicken Coop Ladder set out to describe the German character through the stories that ordinary Germans liked to tell one another. Dundes specialized in folklore, and in German folklore, as he put it, “one finds an inordinate number of texts concerned with anality. Scheisse (shit), Dreck (dirt), Mist (manure), Arsch (ass).… Folksongs, folktales, proverbs, riddles, folk speech—all attest to the Germans’ longstanding special interest in this area of human activity.”

He then proceeded to pile up a shockingly high stack of evidence to support his theory. There’s a popular German folk character called der Dukatenscheisser (“The Money Shitter”), who is commonly depicted crapping coins from his rear end. Europe’s only museum devoted exclusively to toilets was built in Munich. The German word for “shit” performs a vast number of bizarre linguistic duties—for instance, a common German term of endearment was once “my little shit bag.” The first thing Gutenberg sought to publish, after the Bible, was a laxative timetable he called a “Purgation-Calendar.” Then there are the astonishing number of anal German folk sayings: “As the fish lives in water, so does the shit stick to the asshole!,” to select but one of the seemingly endless examples.

Dundes caused a bit of a stir, for an anthropologist, by tracking this single low national character trait into the most important moments in German history. The fiercely scatological Martin Luther (“I am like ripe shit, and the world is a gigantic asshole,” Luther once explained) had the idea that launched the Protestant Reformation while sitting on the john. Mozart’s letters revealed a mind, as Dundes put it, whose “indulgence in fecal imagery may be virtually unmatched.” One of Hitler’s favorite words was Scheisskerl (“shithead”): he apparently used it to describe not only other people but himself as well. After the war, Hitler’s doctors told U.S. intelligence officers that their patient had devoted surprising energy to examining his own feces, and there was pretty strong evidence that one of his favorite things to do with women was to have them poop on him. Perhaps Hitler was so persuasive to Germans, Dundes suggested, because he shared their quintessential trait, a public abhorrence of filth that masked a private obsession. “The combination of clean and dirty: clean exterior-dirty interior, or clean form and dirty content—is very much a part of the German national character,” he wrote.

The anthropologist confined himself mainly to a study of low German culture. (For those hoping to examine coprophilia in German high culture he recommended another book, by a pair of German scholars, entitled The Call of Human Nature: The Role of Scatology in Modern German Literature.) Still, it was hard to come away from his treatise without the strong sense that all Germans, high and low, were a bit different from you and me—a point he made in the introduction to the paperback version of his book. “The American wife of a German-born colleague confessed to me that she understood her husband much better after reading the book,” he wrote. “Prior to that time, she had wrongly assumed that he must have some kind of peculiar psychological hang-up inasmuch as he insisted upon discussing at great length the state of his latest bowel movements.”

The Hamburg red-light district had caught Dundes’s eye because the locals made such a big deal of mud-wrestling. Naked women fought in a metaphorical ring of filth while the spectators wore plastic caps, a sort of head condom, to avoid being splattered. “Thus,” wrote Dundes, “the audience can remain clean while enjoying dirt!” Germans longed to be near the shit, but not in it. This, as it turns out, was an excellent description of their role in the current financial crisis.

The Scheisse Hits the Fan

Aweek or so earlier, in Berlin, I had gone to see Germany’s deputy minister of finance, a 44-year-old career government official named Jörg Asmussen. The Germans are now in possession of the only Finance Ministry in the big-time developed world whose leaders don’t need to worry whether their economy will collapse the moment investors stop buying their bonds. As unemployment in Greece climbs to the highest on record (16.2 percent at last count), it falls in Germany to 20-year lows (6.9 percent). Germany appears to have experienced a financial crisis without economic consequences. They’d donned head condoms in the presence of their bankers, and so they had avoided being splattered by their mud. As a result, for the past year or so the financial markets have been trying and failing to get a bead on the German people: they can probably afford to pay off the debts of their fellow Europeans, but will they actually do it? Are they now Europeans, or are they still Germans? Any utterance or gesture by any German official anywhere near this decision for the past 18 months has been a market-moving headline, and there have been plenty, most of them echoing German public opinion, and expressing incomprehension and outrage that other peoples can behave so irresponsibly. Asmussen is one of the Germans now being obsessively watched. He and his boss, Wolfgang Schäuble, are the two German officials present in every conversation between the German government and the deadbeats.

7/25/2011

Prospects for Europe's "Indignant Revolt"



Πηγή: WAIS
By Jon Kofas, 06/26/11 4:31 am


The popular protests that erupted in spring 2011 in Spain and then spread to dozens of cities throughout Europe have not managed to discourage any government from pursuing neo-liberal, anti-social, anti-labor policies intended to transfer massive income from the bottom and middle sectors of society to the upper income groups.
The situation is the same in Italy and France, in Spain and Portugal as it is in Greece that is in the eye of the austerity storm. Not that anything has changed in Portugal, where masses of protesters have been occupying city squares, any more than it has in Greece which is on the verge of a social revolution. In all cases, the protests are mostly peaceful to the degree that bourgeois journalists and politicians admiringly refer to them as Gandhian. They represent a broad spectrum of the population, and the catalyst is the indignation with the institutional structures that parade as democratic but are in essence authoritarian and serve a small percentage of people.
With each passing day, conditions deteriorate for the majority in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Italy, and to a lesser extent the rest of Europe. Given that the political parties (center, center-left and conservative) have not heeded the cries of the indignant across the periphery and core of Europe, what does this say about the effectiveness of the mass protest movement and its prospects in the next months to a year?
First, it is impossible for any mass movement to succeed in the absence of a coherent ideology. Ideological identity is lacking in the European indignant mass movement. When everyone from right wing to left wing elements expresses an "anti-parliamentary system" position, the question is whether such a movement will become progressive to serve the majority of the population that cries out for true social, economic, and political democracy, or whether some right-wing populist demagogue will use the movement to swing it toward supporting a "Fascist-type" movement.
Second, what the mass protesters agree on?
1. They agree that the existing "liberal democracy" and its institutions no longer serve the majority and it is not democracy. On the contrary, institutions work to the detriment of the majority and the word "democracy" has become a farce.
2. They agree that the political parties that alternate in government--from conservative to center or center-left--serve the exact same institutional interests, to the detriment of the people.
3. They agree that their lives and those of their children are reverting back a few decades, instead of moving forward.
4. They agree that while the economic crisis was created by finance capital, the government is asking them to pay the price by lowering their living standards.
5. They agree that the government is staying in power by using police methods against protesters, but what happens when the police have their salaries cut and they identify with the indignant; and what happens when the armed forces follow the police? Without the police and armed forces behind it, the state will collapse.
Third, the indignant protesters enjoy at least two-thirds of popular support. However, that is not a measure of anything concrete.
1. The "indignant movements" lack political identity as much as they lack an ideology.
2. They lack a road map for going the next step in proposing an alternative to the existing institutions.
3. They lack a road map of how they will arrive at their goal.
4. On the one hand, the European indignant mass protests are grass-roots movements and may reflect true democracy. On the other hand, the danger that they will dissolve is very high because they are heterogeneous. The only catalyst so far is what the protesters oppose, but what happens if/when they announce what they propose as an alternative? The grass roots nature of the movement has allowed right-wing populist elements to take advantage of it, but is that the goal of the indignant masses?
The dangers to EU by the "Indignant Movements":
1. The indignant movements will grow, but in what direction and what form, and what splinter groups may arise from them is an unknown at this juncture. They may hold together in Spain, but not in Greece, they may unite into a single movement in Portugal but split into two polar opposing factions in Spain. They may become part of a larger mass movement that includes trade unions in France, but erupt into spontaneous violent revolt in Greece once the new stabilization measures are announced as part of the second round of IMF-EU borrowing. The unknown poses a threat to EU economic stability, therefore a real possibility of a new recession in 2012.
2. Contrary to Marx and Engels who believed that revolution must necessarily come in the most advance countries, history has demonstrated that revolution comes from dependent economies with weak state structures. Therefore, the EU periphery seems likely to experience social turbulence more likely than northwest Europe.
3. It is entirely possible that it will not be the indignant movements of Spain, Portugal or Greece that will lead Europe into massive changes owing to pressures from below, but Italy, whose public debt and banking system will require well over one trillion euros to stabilize.
4. The success of the indignant movements across Europe, especially in southern Europe, have already eroded the sense of legitimacy that people associate with government and mainstream institutions. The continued erosion of public confidence, and sense of legitimacy that people attribute to their governments and institutions poses a serious threat to a number of European nations. The result may be that political leaders and media in each country try to use nationalism as a means to regain legitimacy and point to "foreign enemies."
5. If indeed the world economy lapses into a double-dip recession in 2012, and if in that cycle China is unable to soften the blow of contraction that the world economy will suffer, the prospect of revolution and perhaps a reaction from ultra-right wing elements in establishing authoritarian/police state regimes is very real.
6. Unconventional form of warfare--terrorism--is one other danger that is very likely arising from the ashes of the "indignant movement" if it fails to have a progressive impact on the political arena. We may very well see a rise of 1970s-style organizations in Europe if society continues along a road to polarization owing to downward social mobility.
JE comments: A delicate question, but is there any talk within the "indignant" movements about moving in the non-Gandhian direction of violence?