Showing posts with label Hu Jintao. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hu Jintao. Show all posts

8/28/2012

Merkel marks ‘special’ China relationship

Chinese President Hu Jintao had met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Los Cabos on  June to discuss bilateral ties and other issues of common concern.


Πηγή: FT
By Gerrit Wiesmann in Berlin and Kathrin Hille
August 28 2012

Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, will visit China this week to celebrate what her officials see as Germany’s “special relationship” with the Asian heavyweight.

But she will be ducking the sensitive question of whether Chinese solar-power equipment makers are selling products below the cost of production and forcing global rivals to their knees.

Ms Merkel will meet Hu Jintao, China’s president, and Wen Jiabao, the country’s premier, bringing along seven German ministers for something that will almost resemble a joint cabinet meeting with 13 Chinese counterparts.

The chancellor will then visit Tianjin on Friday with a group of German executives, where she will tour the Chinese assembly plant of Airbus, the European aircraft maker, and witness the signing of a big order, if talks finish in time.

With trade between the two export economies topping €150bn last year, German officials see Thursday’s “government consultations” – which involve more members of the ruling elites than the strategic and economic dialogue that China holds with the US – as an expression of a relationship which they say Beijing has with no other EU player, including the European Commission.

Trade has led to investment, although Berlin officials note that the €1.2bn which Chinese companies have invested in Germany pales beside the €26bn that German companies have put in to China. The eurozone crisis, and the shockwaves it has sent across the global economy, has increased the need for communication.

“Chinese officials feel Brussels is failing to deliver a consistent, decisive policy message,” says Jonathan Holslag of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies think-tank. “For an authoritative voice, they turn to [EU] member states”.

With François Hollande only installed as president of France in May, and the UK’s David Cameron less involved in the struggles of the single currency bloc, the German chancellor is the go-to European leader for China, says Jonas Parello-Plesner of the European Council for Foreign Relations think-tank.

“The Chinese want to hear from the horse’s mouth what’s going on with the euro crisis – they view Merkel as the one with the purse,” he says. “It is a watershed moment for German diplomacy.”

In that context, Ms Merkel’s reticence to address claims that Chinese manufacturers are “dumping” solar equipment on the world markets is all the more surprising. The US government imposed punitive import tariffs on solar equipment from China this year, and the European Commission is considering whether it should follow suit.

Officials in Berlin say Germany has “no option of acting” until the Commission makes a decision. They are also aware of the danger of a trade war with China – which could see Germany’s carmakers, for example, suffer retribution for steps to shore up a small solar sector.

“But we have no indications we’re moving towards trade war,” one official says. “We’re very optimistic we’ll find a good solution.”

The solar issue comes as Berlin’s relations with China face scrutiny from others in the EU. Ms Merkel’s visit takes place just weeks before a China-EU summit, which has left some experts wondering who is representing who.

“Somebody has to show leadership, and she is showing it. But in the design of the EU, this role should have been played by the institutions and such leadership by a big member, however benign, will raise fears,” Mr Parello-Plesner says.

German officials insist that Ms Merkel’s diplomacy will “complement” that of Brussels. “We have a very strong interest in ensuring that the excellent relations between China and Germany do not develop at the expense of China-EU relations,” says one German diplomat in Beijing.

Insisting that Germany would be speaking for Europe as a whole, German officials say Ms Merkel will discuss the course of the European debt crisis, aware that Beijing’s currency reserves make it a major player on the global financial markets.

Officials hope “broad and deep” Sino-German ties will permit an “open discussion” about the civil war in Syria. One hope is to prise China from Russia’s side in blocking UN Security Council action against Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president. “We’re talking about a mature relationship,” says one official in Berlin.



9/22/2011

China steps up condemnation of U.S. over Taiwan arms

A soldier stands guard at the Mashan observatory in Kinmen, one of Taiwan's offshore islands, August 22, 2011.


Πηγή: Reuters
By Chris Buckley
Sep. 22 2011


China stepped up its condemnation of the United States on Thursday for selling arms to Taiwan saying they could disrupt military exchanges, a warning that is likely to unsettle, but not derail, ties with Washington.

Arms sales are one of several irritants in the Sino-U.S. relationship which include Washington's decision to challenge Chinese duties on U.S. poultry products and U.S. pressure on China to loosen controls on its currency.

China's Foreign Ministry has already lambasted the Obama administration for telling Congress that it plans a $5.3 billion upgrade of Taiwan's F-16 fighter fleet, and Beijing warned that the step would damage Sino-American military and security links.

China considers Taiwan a breakaway province to be reunified with the mainland eventually, and by force if necessary.

"The Chinese military expresses its utmost indignation and strong condemnation of this action that gravely interferes in China's domestic affairs and damages China's sovereignty and national security interests," a Ministry of Defense spokesman, Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng, said on the ministry's website (www.mod.gov.cn).

The U.S. offer -- which includes sales of advanced air-to-air missiles, laser- and GPS-guided bombs and radars -- would "create serious obstacles to the development of ordinary exchanges between our two militaries," said Geng.

China opposes U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on the grounds they sabotage Beijing's plans for reunification. Washington says it wants Beijing and Taipei to determine their future peacefully, and that it is obliged by law to help the island defend itself.

Chinese authorities were probably still weighing just how to punish the United States and would be closely watching domestic opinion, said Sun Zhe, a professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing who specializes in U.S. policy.

"This could be a spiraling response that can be adjusted up or down," Sun said.

"When it comes to arms sales to Taiwan, the (Chinese) public is strongly against and the central government will have to take into account public opinion or risk being criticized as too weak."

But despite Beijing's anger, tensions appear unlikely to match last year's, when Chinese outrage over an earlier U.S. arms offer to Taiwan added to several disputes that roiled relations with Washington for many months.

This year both sides have sought to keep relations on a steadier path ahead of 2012, when U.S. President Barack Obama faces re-election and China's Communist Party undergoes a leadership handover.

Obama, who chose the upgrade rather than offer new planes, and Chinese President Hu Jintao will have chances to meet in coming months at regional summits and the G20 meeting in France, which is likely to discourage lingering tension.

Asked whether last year's threat to sanction U.S. companies involved in weapons sales to Taiwan still applied, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei did not give a direct answer.

"Whoever engages or participates in activities or actions that harm China's sovereignty and territorial integrity will certainly encounter the resolute opposition of the Chinese people," he told a news briefing.

Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney deplored Obama's decision to upgrade the jets rather than sell Taiwan new ones as "yet another example of his weak leadership in foreign policy."

He has also called China a cheater and vowed to slap tariffs on Chinese imports and label Beijing a currency manipulator if it didn't move quickly to float its currency.

The People's Daily, the main paper of China's ruling Communist Party, warned the United States that it has a big economic stake in ties with China.

"American politicians are totally mistaken if they believe they can, on the one hand, demand that China behave as a responsible great power and cooperate with the United States on this and that issue, while on the other hand irresponsibly and wantonly harm China's core interests," said the paper.

The U.S. upgrade of Taiwan's 145 F-16s will give them much the same capabilities as late-model F-16 C/Ds that Taiwan has sought for years without success, Washington officials said.

The United States was likely to approve selling those newer F-16 fighters later, said I-Hsin Chen, a professor of American studies at Taiwan's Tamkang University, noting the risks to pilots flying aging planes and China's growing air strength.

"If other nations in this region think that the U.S. is not fully fulfilling its security commitment to Taiwan, they would also be afraid that some day they would be abandoned," he said.


9/03/2011

Greece, a European hub for China



Πηγή: Defencegreece
September 3, 2011


According to a recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on China’s new Balkan strategy, Beijing sees Greece as a modern gateway linking Chinese factories with consumers across Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.

More specifically, according to the report:

Communist China did not assume a direct role in the volatile Balkan region until the late 1970s. Despite robust cooperation with Albania, mainly built upon a shared opposition to Soviet claims of world communist leadership, it was not until the summer of 1978 that Beijing articulated a coherent policy to deal with Southeastern Europe.

For a post-Mao leadership, the Balkan region had then become an important element in a broad diplomatic offensive meant to secure a foothold in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, open up to the Third World, and forge valuable relationships with nations which could help modernize the Middle Kingdom. In effect, China severed ties with Enver Hoxha’s Albania to develop tighter economic, political, and personal bonds with Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia and Nicolae Ceauşescu’s Romania.

However, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia prevented China from sustaining strong links with Southeastern Europe. As the Balkan region is returning to stability, the time has come for Beijing to invent a new strategy and spread its influence through increased trade, clean energy investments, and embryonic political alliances.

To increase commercial exchanges with Southeastern Europe, China has made considerable investments in Greece. Since the onset of the country’s debt crisis, Beijing has been playing a proactive role by supporting the purchase of Greek bonds, announcing plans to double its annual trade with Athens to USD 8 billion by 2015, and setting-up a special Greek-Chinese shipping development fund of USD 5 billion.

More strategically, at the height of the financial crisis, in November 2008, Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a EUR 3.4 billion agreement to allow the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) to upgrade and run part of the country’s chief port in Piraeus. The deal’s entry into force on 1 October 2009 also allowed COSCO to enhance the port’s capacity by building a third pier. The pending construction of a logistics hub in nearby Attica should help attain the goal of tripling operations up to 3.7 million containers by 2015. Ahead of these projects, Beijing has already decided to gradually stop using the ports of Naples and Istanbul to redirect maritime traffic toward Greece.

Furthermore, COSCO is bidding to operate the port of Thessaloniki, linked by rail to the rest of the Balkan Peninsula into Central Europe. The Chinese government is also vying to buy shares of the struggling state-owned Hellenic Railways Organization (OSE), scheduled to go up for privatization in the years to come as part of the massive Greek deficit-reduction plan. Such a move would allow the rapid delivery of Chinese products transiting through Greece.

This planned Chinese takeover of maritime and rail assets intends to transform Greece into a Southern rival for Northern Europe’s Rotterdam. Indeed, the country’s strategic position makes it easier for container ships transporting Chinese goods to travel from East Asia to Europe via the Suez Canal. It also provides an ideal base to reach emerging markets in the Mediterranean Basin and the Black Sea region. In other words, Beijing sees Greece as a modern gateway linking Chinese factories with consumers across Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.


7/22/2011

Chinese Foreign Policy After Hu

Will the upcoming change in Chinese leadership prompt a dramatic shift in China's foreign policy? History suggests it could.

Πηγή: The Diplomat

By Minxin Pei, July 21, 2011


In about a year’s time, a new group of leaders in Beijing will succeed President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. At the moment, analysts are focused primarily on the make-up of the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, the supreme policy making body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Vice President Xi Jinping and Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang, both members of the standing committee now, are assured of succeeding Hu and Wen, respectively. As a result, the guessing game that has engrossed many China watchers is over who will replace the other seven retiring members.

Speculating about top personnel decisions is both risky and not all that interesting. Such decisions are reached through intricate factional bargaining and compromises, and the ultimate outcome is typically not determined until the very end. Worse, handicapping the chances of frontrunners usually distracts us from trying to understand the broader policy implications of leadership transition. We become too preoccupied with the shifting fortunes of factions within the CCP leadership to explore whether leadership change actually affects policy.

So a more fruitful way of getting ourselves prepared for China’s upcoming leadership transition is to look back at history and examine whether the past top leadership changes resulted in significant foreign policy changes, and what explained such major shifts.

Unfortunately, we don’t have a lot of data points here. The CCP has experienced only four leadership transitions: from Mao Zedong to Hua Guofeng (1976), from Hua to Deng Xiaoping (1979), from Deng toJiang Zemin (1994-95), and from Jiang to Hu Jintao (2002). Of the four cases, only the last three should count because Hua, a transitional figure, didn’t have a real chance to remake Chinese foreign policy.

When we look at the three meaningful leadership transitions, the greatest change in foreign policy occurred when Deng took over power in 1979. He normalized relations with the United States, fundamentally reoriented Chinese foreign policy in a pro-Western direction, ended Chinese support for leftist forces around the world, and launched a punitive, albeit costly, war against Vietnam. In addition, he articulated a new strategic principle: Chinese foreign policy is to serve the country’s economic modernization. (His famous dictum on keeping a low profile was prescribed after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, more than a decade later).

The transition from Deng to Jiang in the mid-1990s didn’t bring about a fundamental shift. (Deng was too ill to influence policy by 1994, even though he didn’t die until 1997). Still, there were minor but important adjustments. Jiang moved China closer to the West and accelerated its integration into the West-dominated international system, culminating in the accession into the World Trade Organization at the end of his tenure, perhaps his most enduring legacy.

Another notable shift under Jiang was China’s regional diplomacy. He upgraded China’s ties with Moscow, and opened China’s charm offensive toward ASEAN nations. But, at the same time, Jiang adopted a tougher stance toward Japan and was blamed for the rapid deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties under his watch. On Taiwan, Jiang initially tried to reach out to Taiwan’s new leader, Lee Teng-hui, but Lee’s turn toward a more pro-independence stance in the mid-1990s forced Jiang to take a much harder line.