Showing posts with label Beijing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Beijing. Show all posts

7/27/2012

China's Military Moment

A window of opportunity is closing in the South China Sea. Will Beijing strike?

Πηγή: FP
By JIM HOLMES
July 26 2012

Beguiled by undersea oil and gas deposits and the weakness of fellow claimants to the Paracel Islands, China launched a naval offensive to seize the disputed archipelago. To justify its actions, Beijing pointed to history -- notably Ming Dynasty Adm. Zheng He's visits to the islands in the 15th century -- while touting its "indisputable sovereignty" over most of the South China Sea.

Chinese vessels carrying amphibious troops and operating under fighter cover from nearby Hainan Island engaged a South Vietnamese flotilla bereft of air support. One Vietnamese destroyer escort lay at the bottom of the South China Sea following the daylong battle. China's flag fluttered over the islands.

The skirmish was real -- and the date was Jan. 17, 1974.

History may not repeat itself exactly, but it sure rhymes. Back then, China exploited South Vietnamese weakness to seize the Paracels. Now, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has announced plans to station a military garrison at Sansha, a newly founded city on the 0.8 square-mile Woody Island in the Paracels. Formally established on July 24, Sansha will act as China's administrative center for the Paracel and Spratly islands and adjoining waters.

This is the latest move in China's campaign to consolidate its claim to all waters and islands within a "nine-dashed line" that encloses most of the South China Sea, including large swaths of Southeast Asian countries' exclusive economic zones (EEZs). This month, a Chinese frigate ran aground in the Philippine EEZ after reportedly shooing away Filipino fishermen. That incident came on the heels of a late June announcement that PLA Navy units would commence "combat-ready patrols" of contested waters.

Beijing is reaching for its weapons once again. Unlike in 1974, however, Chinese leaders are doing so at a time when peacetime diplomacy seemingly offers them a good chance to prevail without fighting. I call it "small-stick diplomacy" -- gunboat diplomacy with no overt display of gunboats.

Chinese strategists take an extraordinarily broad view of sea power -- one that includes nonmilitary shipping. In 1974, propagandists portrayed the "Defensive War for the Paracels" (as the conflict is known in Chinese) as the triumph of a "people's navy," lavishly praising the fishermen who had acted as a naval auxiliary. Fishing fleets can go places and do things to which rivals must respond or surrender their claims by default. Unarmed ships from coast-guard-like agencies constitute the next level. And the PLA Navy fleet backed by shore-based tactical aircraft, missiles, missile-armed attack boats, and submarines represents the ultimate backstop.

Beijing can solidify its hold within the nine-dashed line by dispatching surveillance, fisheries, or law-enforcement ships to protect Chinese fishermen in disputed waters, stare down rival claimants, and uphold Chinese domestic law. And it can do so without overtly bullying weaker neighbors, giving extraregional powers a pretext to intervene, or squandering its international standing amid the anguish and sheer messiness of armed conflict. Why jettison a strategy that holds such promise?

Because small-stick diplomacy takes time. It involves creating facts on the ground -- like Sansha -- and convincing others it's pointless to challenge those facts. Beijing has the motives, means, and opportunity to resolve the South China Sea disputes on its terms, but it may view the opportunity as a fleeting one. Rival claimants like Vietnam are arming. They may acquire military means sufficient to defy China's threats, or at least drive up the costs to China of imposing its will. And Southeast Asians are seeking help from powerful outsiders like the United States. Although Washington takes no official stance on the maritime disputes, it is naturally sympathetic to countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Some, like the Philippines, are treaty allies, while successive U.S. administrations have courted friendly ties with Vietnam.

Chinese leaders thus may believe they must act now or forever lose the opportunity to cement their control of virtually the entire South China Sea. More direct methods may look like the least bad course of action -- whatever the costs, hazards, and diplomatic blowback they may entail in the short run.

China's motives have remained remarkably constant over the decades. Indeed, the map on which the nine-dashed line is inscribed is an artifact from the 1940s, not something dreamed up in recent years. Chiang Kai-shek's government published it before fleeing to Taiwan, and the Chinese communist regime embraced it.

Now as then, the map visually expresses China's interests and aspirations. Oil and natural gas deposits thought to lie in the seabed obsessed maritime proponents -- most notably Deng Xiaoping, the father of China's economic reform and opening project. Fuel and other raw materials remain crucial to China's national development project three decades after Deng launched it.

The motive of averting superpower encirclement has also influenced Chinese strategy. By the late 1970s, Deng had come to believe that the Soviet Union was pursuing a "dumbbell strategy" designed to entrench the Soviet navy as the dominant force in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. The Strait of Malacca was the bar connecting the two theaters. To join them, Moscow had negotiated basing rights in united Vietnam, at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. Beijing believed it had to forestall a Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. Indeed, the PLA undertook a cross-border assault into Vietnam in 1979 in large part to discredit Moscow as Hanoi's defender.

Beijing may view the 2007 U.S. maritime strategy -- the official U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard statement on how the sea services see the strategic environment and intend to manage it -- as a throwback to Moscow's dumbbell strategy, predicated as it is on preserving and extending American primacy in the Western Pacific and the greater Indian Ocean. Chinese strategists fret continually about American encirclement, especially as the United States "pivots" to Asia. For China, it seems, everything old is new again.

Nor should we overlook honor as a motive animating Beijing's actions. Recouping China's honor and dignity after a "century of humiliation" at the hands of seaborne conquerors was a prime mover for Chinese actions in 1974 and 1979. It remains so today. The China seas constitute part of what the Chinese regard as their country's historical periphery. China must make itself preeminent in these expanses.

Expectations are sky-high among the Chinese populace. Having regularly described their maritime territorial claims as a matter of indisputable sovereignty, having staked their own and the country's reputation on wresting away control of contested expanses, and having roused popular sentiment with visions of seafaring grandeur, Chinese leaders will walk back their claims at their peril. They must deliver -- one way or another.

And they have the means to do so. China has amassed overpowering naval and military superiority over any individual Southeast Asian competitor. The Philippines possesses no air force to speak of, while retired U.S. Coast Guard cutters are its strongest combatant ships. Vietnam, by contrast, shares a border with China and fields a formidable army. Last year, Hanoi announced plans to buttress its naval might by purchasing six Russian-built Kilo­-class diesel submarinesarmed with wake-homing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. A Kilo squadron will supply Vietnam's navy a potent "sea-denial" option. But Russia has not yet delivered the subs, meaning that Hanoi can mount only feeble resistance to any Chinese naval offensive. That's still more reason for China to lock in its gains now, before Southeast Asian rivals start pushing back effectively.

So a window of opportunity remains open for Beijing -- for now. Chinese diplomacy recently thwarted efforts to rally ASEAN behind a "code of conduct" in the South China Sea. Washington has announced plans to "rebalance" the U.S. Navy, shifting about 60 percent of fleet assets to the Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters. But the rebalancing is a modest affair. More than half of the U.S. Navy is already in the theater, and the rebalancing will take place in slow motion, spanning the next eight years.

Nor will the four-vessel U.S. littoral combat ship flotilla destined for Singapore (the first one isscheduled to arrive next spring) right the balance in Southeast Asia. These are not vessels designed to do battle against the likes of the PLA Navy. But having established the principle that most of the U.S. Navy should call the Pacific and Asia home, Washington can always speed up the rebalancing process, shift more forces, and even negotiate base access in or around Southeast Asia. Beijing knows that.

Beijing may have concluded that patient diplomacy will forfeit its destiny in the South China Sea. In Chinese eyes, it's better to act now -- and preempt the competition. The lesson of 1974: Timing is everything.


9/15/2011

287,000 commit suicide in China each year



Πηγή: Xinhua
08/09/2011


BEIJING, Sept. 8 (Xinhua) -- About 287,000 people commit suicide each year in China, accounting for 3.6 percent of the country's annual deaths, according to official statistics.

Seventy-five percent of suicide cases occur in rural areas, three times the number of suicides committed in cities, according to statistics posted on the website of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention.

"China's suicide rate reflects a trend that is different from other countries," said an article posted on the website.

Females are about 25 percent more likely to commit suicide than males in China, while in developed countries, male suicide rates are three times higher than female suicide rates, according to the article.

A joint survey conducted by the Chinese CDC and the Beijing-based Huilongguan Hospital ranks suicide as China's fifth leading cause of death overall and the leading cause of death for people between the ages of 15 and 34.

About two million Chinese citizens attempt suicide each year, a figure which has increased by 60 percent over the past 50 years, according to the CDC.

The high-profile suicides of government officials and business tycoons have aroused public attention in recent years. At least eight government officials at various levels succeeded in committing suicide last year.

One of this year's most prominent cases was the death of Zhang Haizhong, director of Hanshan District of the city of Handan in north China's Hebei Province. Zhang was found dead in his office on July 10; his death was investigated and ruled as a suicide.


9/14/2011

Europe and China Bound by Mutual Fears

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has offered help to the US and Europe -- at a price.


Πηγή: Spiegel
By Stefan Schultz
09/14/2011

While a hard-up America can only admonish those involved in the euro crisis, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is offering to be the savior. Beijing's price: more political credit and economic power. The EU must not be intimidated, however -- its bargaining position is better than it may seem at first.

A few years ago, critics from the United States and Europe gave their trading partner China a less-than-favorable name: In an insulting bit of latent racism, they dubbed the emerging superpower a "yellow peril." They warned of an army of Chinese minimum wage laborers, who would destroy entire industries in the West -- and with them millions of jobs. They also warned of growing political influence from the East, which could ultimately even lead to an erosion of human rights.

In recent months, the critics have gone quiet -- because they have far more important problems to worry about. Problems with many zeros on the end. At around $15.2 trillion (€11.1 trillion), the US government's debt at the end of 2012 could be as high as the amount of money the country generates in a year.

In Europe, the debt prognosis is hardly any better. Italy: €1.9 trillion (approximately 120 percent of annual economic output); Greece: €472 billion (150 percent). The debt clocks of America and the euro countries are ticking relentlessly, and the slogan "Money rules the world" is being given a new meaning. In record time, it seems the current global balance of power is shifting -- in favor of China.

On Monday, the US government fired an urgent warning towards Europe. The euro crisis threatens global growth, President Barack Obama said. "As long as this crisis is not solved, we will continue to see weaknesses in the global economy." But America itself is alarmingly high in debt; Obama's exhortation seems like cheap campaign rhetoric, a maneuver to divert attention away from his own serious problems.

America Warns While China Promises Salvation

China currently appears in quite a different light: The country has foreign exchange reserves of $3.2 trillion. The government is holding around a quarter of that in euro securities, mostly government bonds, said Daniel Gros of the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels. According to the Financial Times Deutschland newspaper, China has more than tripled its financial commitment in Europe since 2007, and this trend is growing. His country was ready to "extend a helping hand" and to invest more in European countries and the US, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said on Wednesday. China has already bought Greek and Portuguese government bonds, and, according to a report by London's Financial Times this week, debt-ridden Italy has recently wooed Chinese sovereign wealth fund CIC for money.

America can only warn, while China promises salvation: This is the new creed of the global debt crisis. The supposed "yellow peril" has positioned itself as a "white knight" which promises not to leave its trading partners in Europe and America in the lurch.

In return, however, Beijing is demanding a high price -- the Chinese government wants more political prestige and more political power:

Prime Minister Wen has called for more access to American markets, saying the US should be more open for Chinese investors. If China invests more in US companies, new jobs would also be created, he argues. As conciliatory as that sounds, however, the words are poison for President Obama given that high unemployement in the US could ultimately scupper his chances for re-election.

Wen is also demanding that the US lift restrictions on the export of high technology products to China. This would allow America to increase exports and improve its trade deficit. So far, US companies have held back from such a policy for fear their technology would be copied by potential Chinese competiters.

Far-reaching demands have also been made of Europe by Wen: European Union countries, he argues, should at last recognize the world's second largest economy as a market economy. He is hoping for a "breakthrough" to happen as soon as the next EU-China Summit on Oct. 25 in the Chinese city of Tianjin.

The demands are not all new -- but China is pushing them with increasing intensity. This is especially shown by the discussion about the recognition of China as a market economy. This would happen automatically in 2016, but for China that is not fast enough, as such a recognition would at a stroke reduce many barriers to trade. In particular, direct investment in Europe would become much easier.

'Euro-Zone Crisis Also Hurting China'

Until now, the debate has been going in just one direction: To recognize China as a market economy sooner, Europe has demanded major concessions on human rights and the protection of intellectual property. China is now turning the tables: Much-needed support during the euro crisis will be available, it says -- if Europeans recognize China as having a market economy.

Europe must not be intimidated, however, because it is China's most important trading partner after the US. "The crisis in the euro zone is also hurting China," said Eberhard Sandschneider of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). "Not only because Beijing is holding a large amount of European debt securities, but also because the country wants to expand into Europe." In addition, Beijing has consistently stressed that the US dollar should be replaced as the key currency by a triumvirate of dollar, euro and Chinese yuan -- and therefore China wants to support Europe.

Thus, Europe's negotiating position is not all that terrible; it has more political leverage than it would appear at first. Not the least of which is the fact that the continent's ominous weaknesses act as a means of putting pressure on China; it might not be an over-exaggeration to say there is a certain balance of horror. If one fails, both fail.

Nevertheless, Europe will have to get used to the fact that China will be increasingly negotiating using the methods of the industrialized Western nations; that is to say, it will use its growing economic clout more and more as a political weapon.

"The behavior of the Chinese government in the euro crisis has become a whole lot more confident," said Sandschneider. "This is the new reality with which Europe and America must deal with constructively."


9/08/2011

Chinese yuan to be convertible with euro by 2015



Πηγή: EUobserver
9 Sep. 2011


China is seeking to make its currency fully convertible by 2015, officials said in Beijing, a move which may help the ailing euro and dollar, which are losing against an under-valuated yuan.

China aims at making the yuan a reserve currency like the euro (EUobserver.com)

Chinese officials told the EU business community in Beijing that the yuan will achieve "full convertibility" by 2015, Davide Cucino, the head of the EU's chamber of commerce in China said in a press conference on Wednesday (8 September).

“We were told by those officials by 2015,” Cucino said, as quoted by the Bloomberg news agency. The process will be a gradual one, he added.

A similar timeline is being floated by Asian currency experts as well. "It's not beyond imagination that the renminbi could become fairly, if not fully, convertible in the next five years," Monish Mahurkar from the Asian Development Bank said during a conference in Hong Kong, Dow Jones reports.

Currently, the Chinese yuan (RMB - remnibi) is held within strict margins by the People’s Bank of China, which sets a rate each morning around which the currency can trade. This policy has for a long time prompted criticism from Europe and the US that the remnibi is under-valued, hurting European exports, among others.

China, the second-largest economy in the world, also limits conversion of the yuan for investment purposes. But by 2015, this may change, allowing the remnibi to become a reserve currency alongside the US dollar and the euro.

Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan is due to meet British chancellor George Osborne on Thursday in London. According to the Financial Times, Wang will back efforts by British banks to establish a yuan offshore trading center in London’s financial district.
Chinese ratings agency

Meanwhile, China’s Dagong ratings agency put forward plans to expand on an international level and strengthen ties with the world’s three largest graders of debt - Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch.

The China Daily newspaper reported that Dagong CEO Guan Jianzhong hopes the planned new agency will obtain a leading position in the rating market within the next five years. The company will be set up branches in Europe, the US, Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, the paper said.

Founded in 1994, Dagong has already had co-operation with overseas ratings agencies in Japan, South Korea and Brazil. On 3 August, Dagong cut its sovereign rating for the US by one notch to A, on a par with Russia and South Africa. Two days later, Standard & Poor's followed suit, cutting America's triple-A rating to AA+ and causing a storm on financial markets.

EU officials have repeatedly criticised the quasi-monopoly of US ratings agencies, whose scathing assessments of euro-countries' capacity to pay back their debt has inflamed markets and contributed to the skyrocketing debt costs for Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain.

But Dagong has made similar moves, even as it maintains higher ratings for the euro-countries than the 'big three'.

Following the 21 July deal on a second Greek bail-out, Dagong said that "the new rescue plan is expected to prevent Greece from unilateral default by 2014, but the solvency of the state thereafter is still not encouraging."

But it welcomed the agreed changes to the eurozone bail-out fund (EFSF), saying that if approved, the measures "will enhance the ongoing credit ratings of other members in the eurozone."


9/03/2011

Global economy in "danger zone": Zoellick




Πηγή: Reuters
By Koh Gui Qing
Fri Sep 2, 2011


(Reuters) - The world economy is stepping into a "new danger zone," World Bank President Robert Zoellick said on Saturday, as growth slows and investor confidence weakens.

Speaking in Beijing, Zoellick urged Europe and the United States to tackle their debt problems, and noted that near record-high food prices and volatile commodity markets are threatening the most world's vulnerable people.

"The financial crisis in Europe has become a sovereign debt crisis, with serious implications for the Monetary Union, banks, and competitiveness of some countries," he said.

"My country, the United States, must address the issues of debt, spending, tax reform to boost private sector growth, and a stalled trade policy."

Turning to China, where he is leading a World Bank study on how the nation can improve its economic growth model, Zoellick was upbeat.

China is "well positioned" to become a "high-income" nation in the next 15 to 20 years, from its status as an "upper-middle income" country now, he said.

The question is whether China can avoid the "middle income trap", where national productivity and income growth stalls after per capita income hits $3,000 to $6,000, Zoellick said.

"If China were to continue on its current growth path, by 2030 it would have an economy equivalent to 15 of today's South Koreas, using market prices," he said.

"It's hard to see how that expansion could be accommodated with an export and investment-led growth model."

Although China is the world's second-largest economy, its per capita gross national income stands at just $4,260, World Bank data showed, less than a tenth of the $47,140 seen in the United States.

Critics have long said China relies too much on heavy investment and exports to drive its economy, and should encourage domestic consumption.

For Chinese consumption to take off, analysts say China needs to cut income taxes, improve healthcare services and labor mobility, and reduce Beijing's share of national income by raising dividend payouts from state firms, among other measures.


8/23/2011

'The West Has Become Very Conceited'

Interview with China's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Πηγή: Spiegel
08/22/2011


In a SPIEGEL interview, China's vice minister of foreign affairs, Fu Ying, 58, accuses Europeans and Americans of perpetuating Cold War stereotypes of her country, rejects allegations surrounding the treatment of artist Ai Weiwei and disputes notions that Beijing would like to rule the world.
SPIEGEL: Madame Fu Ying, few countries are more interesting to the West right now than China -- and few others alarm the West to the same degree, now that you have launched your first aircraft carrier. Why does China need to arm itself to this extent?

Fu Ying: The first aircraft carrier going to sea is a very exciting event in China. It's something the Chinese people longed for. People think it's a natural step in the growth of the Chinese military -- although this so-called aircraft carrier was really just a framework of a second-hand aircraft carrier that we refitted and will only be used for scientific research and training purposes. It's far, far from being a full-fledged aircraft carrier. In that sense, China is well behind other countries, let alone the United States which has had a mature and highly developed fleet of aircraft carriers for a long time now.

SPIEGEL: Are there not more pressing areas where that money could go rather than towards increasing the military budget?

Fu Ying: A number of areas are given greater priority than the development of our defenses. The greatest emphasis is on economic development, the well-being of the people and the sharing of the wealth. My daughter's generation is the first that never experienced hunger in this country. That is unbelievable progress. Your concern about the Chinese military appears to me to be clouded by stereotypes about China based in the Cold War thinking of the division between us ideologically. You feel comfortable with aircraft carrier ownership by your allies, like the United States and France, but you are more concerned if China also has one.

SPIEGEL: How far will China go in terms of defending its interests? In the dispute over the sovereignty of the South China Sea, the tone can at times be quite sharp.

Fu Ying: We, too, are wondering why there is such strong rhetoric, since the countries involved are already engaged in dialogues on the basis of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. But this is a dispute of words, and what matters is that the shipping traffic in the South China Sea remains peaceful and there is no war or conflict going on.

SPIEGEL: The Americans clearly have doubts about your intentions. Pakistan is believed to have provided China with access to the wreckage of the high-tech US helicopter that crashed during the operation against Osama bin Laden. Are you in a position to confirm whether this is true?

Fu Ying: Both China and Pakistan have denied this rumor. I think the most important thing is the question of whether China and the US are enemies. Are we going to be in a war? Are we preparing for a war against each other? We certainly don't see it that way. It is not very friendly that the US maintains a weapons embargo against China. We have no intention to threaten the US, and we don't see the US as a threat to us. The West tends to place China in the framework of the Cold War. This puzzles China a lot.

SPIEGEL: Many Germans, while respecting China's development, see your country more as a rival than a partner. Is that something that you can understand?

Fu Ying: I'm grateful you raised that point because it is something that has been on my mind for a long time. If you fundamentally accept that China's growth has lifted countless people in the country out of poverty, then you also have to agree that China has done things right. One must also accept that there can be a different political system. The countries in the West think they have the only system that works and they have narrowed down "democracy" to a multi-party election system, which works well for some countries, most of the time, but as we are now seeing with the latest financial crisis, they sometimes experience difficulties too. The West has become very conceited. At the end of the day, democracy alone cannot put food on the table. That's the reality.

7/22/2011

Chinese Foreign Policy After Hu

Will the upcoming change in Chinese leadership prompt a dramatic shift in China's foreign policy? History suggests it could.

Πηγή: The Diplomat

By Minxin Pei, July 21, 2011


In about a year’s time, a new group of leaders in Beijing will succeed President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. At the moment, analysts are focused primarily on the make-up of the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, the supreme policy making body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Vice President Xi Jinping and Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang, both members of the standing committee now, are assured of succeeding Hu and Wen, respectively. As a result, the guessing game that has engrossed many China watchers is over who will replace the other seven retiring members.

Speculating about top personnel decisions is both risky and not all that interesting. Such decisions are reached through intricate factional bargaining and compromises, and the ultimate outcome is typically not determined until the very end. Worse, handicapping the chances of frontrunners usually distracts us from trying to understand the broader policy implications of leadership transition. We become too preoccupied with the shifting fortunes of factions within the CCP leadership to explore whether leadership change actually affects policy.

So a more fruitful way of getting ourselves prepared for China’s upcoming leadership transition is to look back at history and examine whether the past top leadership changes resulted in significant foreign policy changes, and what explained such major shifts.

Unfortunately, we don’t have a lot of data points here. The CCP has experienced only four leadership transitions: from Mao Zedong to Hua Guofeng (1976), from Hua to Deng Xiaoping (1979), from Deng toJiang Zemin (1994-95), and from Jiang to Hu Jintao (2002). Of the four cases, only the last three should count because Hua, a transitional figure, didn’t have a real chance to remake Chinese foreign policy.

When we look at the three meaningful leadership transitions, the greatest change in foreign policy occurred when Deng took over power in 1979. He normalized relations with the United States, fundamentally reoriented Chinese foreign policy in a pro-Western direction, ended Chinese support for leftist forces around the world, and launched a punitive, albeit costly, war against Vietnam. In addition, he articulated a new strategic principle: Chinese foreign policy is to serve the country’s economic modernization. (His famous dictum on keeping a low profile was prescribed after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, more than a decade later).

The transition from Deng to Jiang in the mid-1990s didn’t bring about a fundamental shift. (Deng was too ill to influence policy by 1994, even though he didn’t die until 1997). Still, there were minor but important adjustments. Jiang moved China closer to the West and accelerated its integration into the West-dominated international system, culminating in the accession into the World Trade Organization at the end of his tenure, perhaps his most enduring legacy.

Another notable shift under Jiang was China’s regional diplomacy. He upgraded China’s ties with Moscow, and opened China’s charm offensive toward ASEAN nations. But, at the same time, Jiang adopted a tougher stance toward Japan and was blamed for the rapid deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties under his watch. On Taiwan, Jiang initially tried to reach out to Taiwan’s new leader, Lee Teng-hui, but Lee’s turn toward a more pro-independence stance in the mid-1990s forced Jiang to take a much harder line.