Showing posts with label Grexit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Grexit. Show all posts
2/19/2018
The right kind of Grexit
https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-economy-bailout-eurozone-the-right-kind-of-grexit/
6/27/2015
Rhodium Group » Greece: The Confrontational End-Game Is Here
Now that Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has alienated the European Commission, which is his government’s only potential ally in the creditor group known as the Troika—European Commission, European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF)—no credible bridge-builders are left to save Athens from itself. Further confrontation and escalation seem most likely (60 percent).
Tsipras’s angry denunciation of the Troika’s most recent proposals as “unacceptable, extreme, and illogical” effectively rules out concessions on his part. Striking a deal acceptable to the Troika would now be tantamount to performing the dreaded Greek political “somersault,” always denounced by Tsipras and Syriza.
The IMF’s appropriate decision to pull out of negotiations in Brussels this week makes it politically impossible for Chancellor Angela Merkel to give Greece a better deal. Greece may be able to meet its next payment to the IMF in late June by cobbling enough cash together by not paying suppliers and confiscating working capital at state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local governments. But without an enforceable deal with Athens, an eventual nonpayment to the ECB in July now looks increasingly likely.
Such a nonpayment, as discussed previously, would scale back emergency lending to the Greek banking system, precipitating a banking holiday or immediate controls on access to the €133.7 billion in bank deposits,1 dooming the summer tourist season and plunging the economy into a severe recession, with obvious political impact on Syriza itself.
Default cannot be declared without a political decision by the IMF Board or the ECB, which the Obama administration and the IMF Board dominated by the Europeans would likely oppose. Instead, Greece’s creditors are likely to sit back and watch political turmoil engulf Greece.
Sorry to say, Syriza deserves such a fate. It has never presented a credible alternative set of reforms and policies to the proposals it has rejected. Had Syriza struck a deal in March by agreeing to a goal of a primary surplus of 1 percent, it would have been able to get through 2015 with extra money to spend. Agreeing to a 1 percent primary surplus target now would require more fiscal consolidation than a few months ago, as the economy has been allowed to deteriorate dramatically.
Syriza’s diplomacy in Europe (and beyond) has only isolated Athens further. Combining leftist rhetorical antiausterity with a right-wing nationalist coalition partner, and making overtures to Russia and Vladimir Putin, have not delivered one euro to its books. Even fellow far leftist parties around Europe now avoid Syriza and its model. Tsipras’threatening assertion that a Greek bankruptcy “would be the beginning of the end for the eurozone” and roil markets in Spain and Italyis seen as noncredible trash talk. It has only played into the hands of German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who correctly said recently that Greece had removed any doubt that its own conduct is to blame for its predicament.
Three scenarios appear possible in this situation.
Spread the Blame. Theoretically Tsipras could submit a package acceptable to the Troika to the full Greek Parliament, inviting the opposition to help secure its passage. Such a step would release Troika funds in a matter of weeks and normalize the country’s financial system. Tsipras could remain prime minister in this scenario, despite the economic costs, though it would divide Syriza. Any such deal would also require more intrusive creditor inspections, undercutting Syriza’s nationalist credentials. Another crisis would be likely within a few months.
Unless, as part of this scenario, Tsipras reconfigures his governing coalition to include more centrist parties (or perhaps a national unity government), it is difficult to see the longer-term benefits of this solution.
Consult the People Directly. The Greek government might call a national referendum on a deal acceptable to the Troika in order to legitimize the political somersault its acceptance would represent. Any referendum would be de facto about whether the Greek people are willing to put up with the costs of staying in the euro. Such a referendum taking place in another accelerating economic emergency would most likely be approved (98 percent). But Greece’s economy would deteriorate in the weeks running up to the vote.
Syriza’s governing majority would almost certainly splinter in the process, with some MPs campaigning for and others against the referendum passing, so it is far from obvious whether Tsipras would have a governing parliamentary majority afterwards. As in the previous scenario, holding a referendum without also reconfiguring the governing coalition seems of limited long-term value.
Early Elections. Calling new parliamentary elections would be logical but unpredictable, and Syriza would probably be thrown out. On the other hand, with the main opposition New Democracy still led by the unconvincing former prime minister, Antonis Samaras, Tsipras might be able to convince voters that he remains their best option. New elections could empower some of the newer centrist parties. Given the ultimately risk-averse nature of aging electorates, however, a dramatic strengthening of the anti-euro fringe parties in KKE on the left and Golden Dawn on the right does not appear likely. There is therefore no real reason to fear new elections, due to the very small risk of “an even more extreme outcome.”
Through leadership control of electoral lists, new elections might produce a less radical group of Syriza MPs, but its smaller coalition partner ANEL (Independent Greeks) might falter in the voting. An election would thus result in prolonged haggling over formation of a government, causing more economic suffering. Once again, such a scenario would devastate the critical summer tourism season.
What are the options and costs for the euro area of these choices?
First, the deteriorating Greek economy will—eventually—require additional funding in the short term and likely a deeper further restructuring of the euro area’s Greek debt. Syriza has already cost other euro area taxpayers a lot.
Second, Tsipras’ failed personal diplomacy will have caused the scales to fall from the eyes of Merkel and French president Francois Hollande. They have no real incentive to spend domestic political capital to strike a deal advantageous to Greece to coax him toward the political center, now that it is increasingly obvious he is not even a closet centrist but largely seems to agree with the left wing of his party. The euro area thus has no real choice but to seek regime change in Athens.
Such a hard line would drive home the costs of Syriza’s failures to the Greek electorate, in the hope that new elections would deliver a new government in Athens, even if the cost is a deep recession from the ensuing deposit controls and financial chaos.
Would the Greek population then vote for parties more friendly to the euro area? Most likely, yes. The prospect of Greeks punishing Syriza for its deceitful promise to end austerity and reforms while other Europeans pay their bills is not guaranteed, of course. But Greeks are not likely to look kindly at leaders putting euro membership at risk.
The risk of a Greek crisis spreading contagion to other parts of Europe remains low. A regional recovery is under way, and the ECB is heavily intervening in bond markets. Syriza does not seem to have understood the hollowness of its threats to bring Europe down with it. In some ways there has never been a better time for Brussels, Paris, Berlin, and Frankfurt to nail a recalcitrant member state like Greece than now. The risks associated with more lasting instability in Greece will arise only as the end of the ECB’s asset purchase program draws closer in September 2016. The ECB’s exit from its quantitative easing (QE) bond purchases will become more tricky, as markets may at that time price new risks into other euro area bonds, however.
What are the risks of the so-called Grexident—something going wrong and Greece exits the eurozone and adopts a new currency in this confrontational scenario? Not zero for sure, but actually very close to zero. Introducing a new currency is no trivial matter, especially for an incompetent government like Syriza, but the threat of massive capital flight would likely stop the process before it started. As discussed before here, Greek public sector workers and retirees are not likely to accept being paid in a piece a paper (IOU) signed by Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis. And certainly the foreign suppliers of essentials like food, medicine, and energy to the Greek economy would balk.
The most likely “Grexident scenario” is therefore not a new Drachma, but Montenegro—i.e., Greece becomes just another relatively poor unilaterally euroized non-EU Balkan economy. In Montenegro, the euro has been the only legal tender since 2002. But Montenegro has no access to the ECB or the EU budget and has a GDP per capita of just over €5,000—less than a third of Greece’s. Whatever the appeal to national dignity, the Greek electorate is not likely to allow such a calamity. Of course, the Greek people might democratically choose to become much poorer. But even this extremely unlikely scenario (2 percent) would not necessarily doom the euro area. Other euro members would suffer large financial losses (from loans to Greece and the losses on now-defaulted Greek collateral held by the ECB), which is the main political reason that departing from theEuropean System of Central Bankswould invariably mean also an exit from the European Union. Electorates elsewhere in the euro area would demand it. Such large and certain financial losses might, however, be acceptable, though it would obviously be irresponsible of Merkel and Hollande to even allow the slightest risk of a euro collapse.
Many academics and non-European central bankers assume that a “Grexident” would destabilize the euro and encourage more countries to drop out, turning Europe’s common currency into just another fixed exchange rate regime. Euro area politics would work to prevent such a development, however, because the remaining 18 members and their central bank would move to make it impossible for more members to quit. The economic devastation within Greece resulting from an exit from euro area institutions (but not as mentioned the euro currency itself) would by itself dissuade other countries from following its example. More likely, the remaining 18 members would opt for a new integrationist “Euro Area Treaty” for themselves. Such a salvaging effort would be difficult, but the experience of the last five years suggests that euro area countries would pull together and save their union. Had Greece been pushed out of the euro area, instead of leaving voluntarily against the will of other members, a new drive for euro area integration would probably fail.
More such integration could include conversion of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into a euro area budgetary entity with limited direct taxation powers. The ECB could decide to exit QE only by selling some longer-dated sovereign bond holdings back to the market as outright eurobonds, rather than as individual country bonds.
These steps add up to the likelihood of Europe pushing Greece to make the hard decisions about what they really want.
9/08/2012
Greece may pass new troika test but bailout seen on the rocks
Πηγή: CNBC
By Reuters
Sept 7 2012
ATHENS - Greece hopes a major state sell-off this autumn will persuade international inspectors arriving on Friday to keep the country's aid lifeline open despite scant progress on reforms promised in return for the cash.
The so-called troika of the International Monetary Fund, European Commission and European Central Bank will assess Greece's progress towards targets set under its bailout before deciding next month whether to pay out a 31 billion euro loan.
The two-month-old conservative-led coalition government is cobbling together more budget cuts for 2013-14 to convince the inspectors, and rushed to announce a raft of successes this week, including progress on netting tax evaders.
But Greek government officials concede they have made little headway with structural reforms agreed under the 130 billion euro bailout, and which are vital to turning the economy around, and say at least one selloff is needed to turn the tide.
"We have fallen behind and time has been lost, partly because of the repeat election," a senior government official told Reuters on condition of anonymity.
"We hope to have a quick win this autumn, a major privatization to send a message abroad and shift sentiment," he said, hinting it might be state betting firm OPAP <OPAr.AT>.
Greece's partners are increasingly reluctant to put up cash for a country that has not met the terms of its 130 billion euro aid deal and which threatens to bring down the whole euro zone.
They have welcomed Prime Minister Antonis Samaras's switch from fierce opponent of the bailout to its main champion but have yet to agree to give him the extra time he wants to achieve targets during what he has called Greece's "Great Depression."
"The climate has changed as far as our intentions are concerned but our partners remain to be convinced about our actions," the government official said. "The prime minister has lit a fire under ministers to deliver."
The troika will examine in minute detail a plan to slash the budget by an additional 11.5 billion euros in the next two years, mostly by reducing state salaries and pensions, a move sure to prompt protests from a public already fed up with cuts.
LITMUS TEST
Painful as these measures are, however, Greek officials have acknowledged they will not be enough to restore fiscal health and allow Athens return to international bond markets in 2015.
With Greece's economy now seen shrinking by about 7 percent this year, far more than the 4.5-5 percent envisaged when that target was set, Athens is eyeing cuts of about 13.5 billion euros just to offset the impact from lower tax revenues.
Leading a shaky coalition with two leftist parties which have yet to approve the cuts, Samaras is striving to convince the public this is the last round of austerity. One in four Greeks is out of a job and violent street protests are common.
Apart from appointing new heads to the privatization agency, no tangible progress has been made on promised changes such as liberalizing markets and professions or cutting staff at state companies, which poke a huge hole in the budget.
"Samaras must take on his own constituents, such as lawyers and pharmacists, that is his litmus test," a troika source told Reuters on condition of anonymity. "The adjustment is so difficult because it is based on poverty, not on cutting profit margins."
The severity of the recession means lenders are likely to forgive a small deviation from 2012's 7.3 percent of GDP budget deficit target, officials said. Risks to the rest of the euro zone may also convince partners to turn a blind eye to Greece's shortcomings and waive through enough cash to keep it afloat.
"I suspect some fudge will be agreed in the end but I doubt it will guarantee Greece's place in the euro," said Ben May of Capital Economics. "It will be a bit of a roller coaster ride."
Lenders paid only part of a June loan installment and Athens had to seek ECB permission to sell more T-bills in order to repay an expiring bond in August - a type of bridging exercise it may employ again.
Partners will eventually have to decide whether to give Greece - which has so far secured 240 billion euros in EU and IMF bailout funds - more cash, time or an interest rate cut to escape a collapse that could also bring down Italy and Spain.
"I think in the end it's inevitable the bailout plan will break down and it's irrelevant who puts the nail in the coffin - Greece or its partners. The key issue is when," said May.
8/26/2012
Merkel tries to calm storms over Greece, ECB policy
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| German Chancellor Angela Merkel poses for photographers after the television recording of the ''ARD Sommerinterview'' in Berlin August 26 |
By Noah Barkin and Paul Carrel
August 26 2012
Angela Merkel tried to calm a growing storm over euro zone crisis strategy on Sunday after the Bundesbank likened ECB bond-buying plans to a dangerous drug and a conservative ally of the German leader said Greece should leave the currency bloc by next year.
The comments, from central bank chief Jens Weidmann and a senior figure in the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), Alexander Dobrindt, point to mounting unease in Germany with the policies being used to combat the three-year old debt crisis.
Domestic criticism has narrowed Merkel's room for maneuver at a time when Greece is in dire need of more aid and policymakers are scrambling to prevent contagion from enveloping big countries like Spain and Italy.
Two days after Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras visited Berlin and made an impassioned plea for politicians there not to talk up the possibility of a Greek euro exit, Merkel herself sent a warning to allies who have said the euro zone would be better off without its weakest link.
"We are in a very decisive phase in combating the euro debt crisis," Merkel told public broadcaster ARD in an interview. "My plea is that everyone weigh their words very carefully."
Dobrindt, whose party is preparing for a regional election in Bavaria and the federal vote next autumn, told top-selling German daily Bild he expected Greece to leave the euro zone in 2013. His comments drew a swift rebuke from Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle who said "bullying" of euro members must stop.
In addition to Greece, policymakers have been sparring over European Central Bank President Mario Draghi's plans to buy up the bonds of Spain and Italy.
The ECB is assuming a greater role in the crisis while governments negotiate legal and political hurdles to coordinating a longer-term response. The bank's Italian head is expected to detail his plans after a September 6 meeting of its 23-member governing council.
Merkel gave her tacit support to Draghi on a trip to Canada earlier this month and reiterated in the ARD interview that she believed the ECB's policies were in line with its mandate to ensure stable prices in the bloc.
ADDICTIVE
But Weidmann, a former economic adviser to Merkel, said in a front-page interview in influential German magazine Der Spiegel that the bond buys could violate rules against the ECB providing outright financing to governments.
"Such a policy is for me close to state financing via the printing press," Weidmann told Spiegel. "In democracies, it is parliaments and not central banks that should decide on such a comprehensive pooling of risks."
Financing governments has long been a taboo for Germany. Weidmann's predecessor as Bundesbank chief, Axel Weber, quit last year in protest at the ECB's existing, but now dormant, bond-buying scheme - the Securities Markets Programme (SMP).
"We should not underestimate the risk that central bank financing can become addictive like a drug," Weidmann said.
The Bundesbank retains substantial influence within Germany and on financial markets due to its inflation-fighting credentials but, as just one of 17 constituents at the ECB, it is unlikely it could scupper Draghi's plan.
Asked in the television interview whether she supported Weidmann, Merkel praised him for speaking out about his doubts and said she saw strong Bundesbank influence within the ECB as positive. But she took care not to voice any support for his criticism of Draghi's policies.
Central bank sources told Reuters on Friday that the ECB is considering setting yield band targets under the new bond-buying programme to allow it to keep its strategy shielded and avoid speculators trying to cash in.
Weidmann said setting such yield band targets was a "sensitive notion" but rejected suggestions that he was isolated on the ECB Governing Council in having such reservations.
"I hardly believe that I am the only one to get a stomach ache over this," he said.
Dobrindt was more direct, saying Draghi risked passing into the history books as the "currency forger of Europe".
STICKING TO COMMITMENTS
With the 'troika' of the EU, ECB and International Monetary Fund preparing to return to Greece to assess the plight of the euro zone's weakest link, Austria's chancellor said Athens should get more time to repay its debts, provided it sticks to reforms.
"I see quite a good chance that we will arrive at an outcome with Greece that the Greeks stick to their agreements with the EU but in return get more time for the repayment," Werner Faymann told newspaper Oesterreich.
"The most important thing is that the Greeks stick to the reforms and savings targets agreed with us. If that is guaranteed, I am in favor of a delay in the repayment," he said, adding that the delay could be two or three years.
But Germany's finance and economy ministers both reaffirmed their opposition to any easing of the timeframe for Greece, stressing that giving it more time would mean giving it more money. Samaras has said he needs more time but not more cash.
Samaras elicited no promises from Merkel or from French President Francois Hollande, whom the Greek leader met in Paris on Saturday. No final decisions on Greece are expected before the troika delivers its report in October.
Merkel said she had come away from her talks with Samaras convinced that he was serious about the Greek reform drive, but made clear that the pressure on Athens was extremely high. "Every day counts," she said.
8/14/2012
Greece Needs To Leave The Euro Before It Gets An Exit Order - Think Tank
Πηγή: eFXnews
August 13 2012
It would be more effective for Greece if it makes its euro exit in its own hands instead of waiting to be politically kicked out, said Douglas McWilliams, chief executive officer of the Centre for Economics and Business Research.
In an interview with Bloomberg TV, Mr. McWilliams argued that Europe is only playing a blame game with Greece, while it is actually looking for its exit from the monetary union.
"With Greece, we are actually nearing the end of the process; it is only a matter of who takes the blame of what happens," he added.
Mr. McWilliams believes that the major European institutions such the European Central Bank and the European Commission have already prepared for such an exit as they get more convinced that the Greek situation is completely unsustainable.
Editor's note: According to the CEBR's last report euro is to break up by 2013 as the severe adjustment measures will be unacceptable to electorates in Southern Europe as growth in Southern Europe will be below 1.5% in every year to 2015.
8/08/2012
S&P cuts outlook on Greece's rating from stable to 'negative'
Πηγή: Todays Zaman
By AP
August 8 2012
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services on Tuesday lowered its outlook on Greece's long-term credit rating, saying that the financially troubled nation will likely need further aid from its international lenders amid a worsening economy and delays implementing harsh austerity measures.
The ratings firm downgraded Greece's long-term sovereign credit rating outlook to "negative" from "stable." Its rating remained at "CCC," well into "junk" status. Greece's economy is worsening, so it will likely need as much as 7 billion euros ($8.7 billion) in additional financing, or 3.7 percent of its gross domestic product, from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, S&P said.
The move to lower the outlook reflects the possibility that S&P will downgrade Greece's rating if the nation fails to get additional funding from other eurozone countries and the IMF. The country has been relying on such loans since high interest rates pushed it out of bond markets in 2010. In return, it has imposed harsh austerity, slashing pensions and salaries, repeatedly hiking taxes and increasing the retirement age. The firm projects that Greece's gross domestic product will shrink by 10 or 11 percent over this year and next. The European Union and IMF have assumed GDP will slow only between 4 percent and 5 percent during that period.
Greece has received two bailouts totaling 240 billion euros from other eurozone governments and the International Monetary Fund after bond investors would no longer lend it money at affordable rates. In return for the money, Greece is supposed to cut its budget deficit and reform its economy. However, the economy has continued to contract and the new government of Prime Minister Antonis Samaras has said it wants more time to meet some of the conditions. Even so, S&P anticipates that Greece's government will find it difficult to make the additional cuts required to satisfy the conditions to get its next slate of funding from the EU and IMF. "We see the likelihood of shortfalls, owing to election-related delays in the implementation of budgetary consolidation measures for the current year, as well as the worsening trajectory of the Greek economy," S&P said. A cutoff of bailout money could lead to Greece defaulting on its remaining obligations and possibly leaving the euro currency.
The ratings firm downgraded Greece's long-term sovereign credit rating outlook to "negative" from "stable." Its rating remained at "CCC," well into "junk" status. Greece's economy is worsening, so it will likely need as much as 7 billion euros ($8.7 billion) in additional financing, or 3.7 percent of its gross domestic product, from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, S&P said.
The move to lower the outlook reflects the possibility that S&P will downgrade Greece's rating if the nation fails to get additional funding from other eurozone countries and the IMF. The country has been relying on such loans since high interest rates pushed it out of bond markets in 2010. In return, it has imposed harsh austerity, slashing pensions and salaries, repeatedly hiking taxes and increasing the retirement age. The firm projects that Greece's gross domestic product will shrink by 10 or 11 percent over this year and next. The European Union and IMF have assumed GDP will slow only between 4 percent and 5 percent during that period.
Greece has received two bailouts totaling 240 billion euros from other eurozone governments and the International Monetary Fund after bond investors would no longer lend it money at affordable rates. In return for the money, Greece is supposed to cut its budget deficit and reform its economy. However, the economy has continued to contract and the new government of Prime Minister Antonis Samaras has said it wants more time to meet some of the conditions. Even so, S&P anticipates that Greece's government will find it difficult to make the additional cuts required to satisfy the conditions to get its next slate of funding from the EU and IMF. "We see the likelihood of shortfalls, owing to election-related delays in the implementation of budgetary consolidation measures for the current year, as well as the worsening trajectory of the Greek economy," S&P said. A cutoff of bailout money could lead to Greece defaulting on its remaining obligations and possibly leaving the euro currency.
8/01/2012
What Happens to Greece’s Gold when They Exit the Eurozone
Πηγή: GoldSeek
By Julian D. W. Phillips
August 1 2012
Will Greece Exit the Eurozone?
With Germany’s leaders telling us that the exit from the Eurozone by Greece no longer holds terror for them, we understand that they are prepared for such an eventuality. As the E.U. leader’s representatives went to Greece this week to see the progress on the implementation of structural reforms and the austerity measures, it became clear to all that while we must wait for the results from them, Greece is failing in its efforts and further financing will be held beck for now, at least. Adding to the woes in Greece, there is little agreement within their Parliament. The Greek government is itself a broad mix of conservatives and Socialists.
In turn, the leaders of the European Commission, theInternational Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, known as the troika, are increasingly divided among themselves. That is creating even more uncertainty as Greece and the rest of Europe head for yet another showdown, renewing doubts about how long Athens can remain within the Eurozone.
Greece’s lenders say they will not finance the country any further unless it meets its goals. But many experts say that the targets were never within reach and that pushing three increasingly weak Greek governments to comply has only profoundly damaged the economy. The belief in many quarters including in the Finance Ministry in Germany is that the exit of Greece from the Eurozone is almost certain now.
Officials from the troika overseeing the Greek bailout, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission in Brussels, say privately that they doubt the country will be able to meet its official target of bringing its debt down to 120% of economic output by 2020. Greece must make the €3.1 billion in bond payments to the central bank on Aug. 20.
The European Commission reaffirmed that the next tranche of aid to Greece would probably not be disbursed until September, putting the country at greater risk of running out of money to pay salaries and pensions.
At the end of last week, the European Central Bank cut off a crucial source of cash for Greek banks, saying that it would stop accepting Greek government bonds as collateral for low-cost loans until the E.U. completes its report, which is not expected until late August at the earliest. Greek banks must now borrow from the Greek Central Bank at a higher interest rate, from a fund with limited means; if it runs out Greece would have to start printing drachmas.
The IMF, which indicated in March it won’t commit more money to Greece, will make a decision on its next disbursement in late August at the earliest based on the troika’s findings, said two fund officials familiar with the situation in recent days. The IMF has signalled to European officials that it will stop paying further rescue aid to Greece, bringing the country closer to insolvency in September. It’s “already clear” to the E.U. that Greece won’t reach the 120% target. Missing the targets means Greece would need between €10 billion and €50 billion in additional aid, a potential outcome that the IMF is not prepared to accept. The possibility that Greece could exit the 17- member monetary union has been voiced this year by European officials who consider the fallout from such a scenario would be the lesser evil against a seemingly perpetual crisis.
Greece’s economy shrank 3.5% in 2010 and 6.9% in 2011 and is expected to contract 7% this year, a decline reminiscent of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Unemployment is at 22.5% and expected to rise to 30%, while Greece’s main retailers’ association warned on Monday that sales were expected to drop 53% this year.
Greece, which held consecutive elections in May and June as public opposition to spending cuts grew, risks running out of money without the disbursement of €4.2 billion due last month as the first instalment of a €31 billion transfer.
The statements above and the increasingly ‘anti’ stance against Greece brings its exit to center stage. So it is sensible to look at what happens to it 111 tonnes of gold it holds in its Gold and Foreign Exchange reserves currently.
Where’s Greece’s Gold?
The 111 tonnes of gold owned by Greece is in one of three central banks and perhaps spread throughout the three. These banks are the Bank of England, the Banque de France and the U.S. Federal Reserve. We are of the opinion [the Bank of International Settlements would never disclose the facts] that Greece’s gold was first used in some of the over 500 tonnes of gold/currency swaps executed two years ago and unwound last year by the B.I.S.
We believe, further, that these swaps were undertaken by nations finding it difficult to raise new loans at reasonable interest rates. The gold/currency swaps were undertaken as part of the collateral creditors required to facilitate new loans. As such their value went far beyond the market price of the gold involved.
When Greece required a generous bailout from E.U. creditors we were led to believe that part of the collateral, to be forfeited on default, was the 111 tonnes of gold owned by Greece. It is this gold that is now in danger of being lost to the nation now.
The fact that it is not in the country has allowed it to be possessed by central banks outside the country that would not hesitate to hand the gold over, on default by Greece.
Why a Nation’s Gold is Not Held at Home
It may come as a surprise that the bulk of the world’s central banks do not hold their nation’s gold in vaults at home. It has been this way for most of the last century. While the reputations of the three central banks are impeccable, nevertheless, with the world in the financial state it is in now, it seems a matter of prudence that gold should not be in the possession of foreign central banks. After all when push comes to shove, possession is nine tenths of the law.
This became a worry last year to Venezuela who is not the darling of the U.S. at the moment. Its gold was held in several central banks, including the bank of England. President Chavez, on the advice of his central bank decided to repatriate Venezuela’s gold. It was a cumbersome exercise but it was done and is now held in Venezuela out of the reach of those unhappy with its nationalization policies. After all there is always a case to be made for creditors whose assets have been seized to be given recourse to the country assets held outside the country. This is an increasing danger in a world where the value of sovereign debt is in doubt in so many countries.
One of the key reasons for holding gold is to be able to sell it to provide the nation with access to international trade and loans, when its creditworthiness and its currency are unacceptable outside the country. By holding the gold outside the country that gold may well have been appropriated by other nations. We have seen of late this happen to Iran, all of whose foreign assets have been frozen with attempts being made to freeze its oil exports. Whether justified or not, the vulnerability of a nation’s assets should be a factor considered by the government and central bank of every nation. To allow their assets to be vulnerable to seizure is an act of imprudence to say the least.
Should Greece forfeit its gold as a consequence of its default, then it will be, we expect, at market prices only. The ability to use its value far above its price by way of collateral in gold swaps to facilitate loans and lower interest rates will have been lost entirely. We believe that it is part of a central banker’s duty to handle their nation’s assets to the full benefit of the nation. That requires that the gold be in its own possession not in the hands of others who may seize it because of a policy disagreement no matter how serious it may be perceived.
If Greece Leaves Then What Next?
Greece will, we believe have to leave the European currency entirely, just as Argentina did in the nineties. After all, the massive loss of creditworthiness will necessitate a devaluation of the currency. That won’t happen by continuing to use the euro. A glance at history shows that in this case it is possible that a value of 50% of the Euro be attributed to the Drachma. In addition there will have to be a block put on capital exports from Greece. After that we would expect to see a “Financial Drachma” [ort whatever name the Greek central bank gives it] in addition to a “Commercial Drachma” instituted in Greece as Capital and Exchange Controls are put in place to protect what’s left of the financial viability of Greece.
The “Commercial Drachma” would be used for normal trade activities of import and export of good and for tourism. The “Financial Drachma” would be for capital flows both in and out of the country. We may well go into more detail once these events have happened, but for now let’s leave it as a currency that could easily fall by another 30% against the “Commercial Drachma” [say 35% of the exchange rate value of the euro]. In another article, we may well paint the huge advantages to Greece of operating such a system.
In addition we may well see a system of “debt Conversion” being instituted within Greece to incentivize investment into Greece for infrastructural development and other projects that would benefit the nation.
7/28/2012
Is “Grexit” at hand?
Πηγή: The Economist
July 28 2012
ON HIS visit to Athens this week, José Manuel Barroso, the head of the European Union (EU) Commission, brought a stern warning for Antonis Samaras, the new prime minister of a precarious right-left coalition government. Greece has only a couple of weeks left to convince its creditors that it can put economic reforms back on track. Should its latest plans for making €14.5 billion ($17.6 billion) of spending cuts over the coming two years be judged unrealistic, the next €31.2 billion loan tranche will again be held back.
If that happens, Greece would be unable to finish recapitalising its big banks. Without credit, the economy will seize up. Pensions and public-sector salaries would not be paid. A “Grexit” from the euro could occur within weeks. The worry for Greeks is that with Spain and Italy coming under attack in financial markets, some euro-zone members may be tempted to sacrifice Greece.
Two previous Athens governments have failed dismally since mid-2010 to implement reforms agreed on with the Commission and the IMF, thanks to widespread official corruption and a lack of political will. Mr Samaras opposed the first Greek bail-out while in opposition; he still wants, at some point, to renegotiate parts of the second.
Yannis Stournaras, the technocratic finance minister, has the difficult job of persuading Greece’s creditors that his government can do better than its predecessors. The troika of officials from the EU, IMF and European Central Bank were especially dismayed by a looming €3 billion gap in privatisation revenues this year, as well as by the lack of progress in cutting jobs in the public sector.
Just after the troika arrived, on July 25th, Mr Stournaras announced new bosses for the privatisation agency. And Antonis Manitakis, the public-administration minister, declared that five public-sector entities would be shut immediately and another 16 merged. Their 5,250 employees would retire or be transferred to other jobs. That is still far short of the 15,000 dismissals in 2012 agreed to by the previous government. Annual savings would be a modest €40m. Mr Manitakis promises another 180 mergers, with much bigger savings, within weeks. The civil service union is already threatening to strike. Will Mr Barroso and the troika think it is enough?
6/14/2012
OTE becomes latest 'Grexit' trade
Πηγή: IFR
By Christopher Whittall
June 14 2012
Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), a perfectly healthy Greek company, has become the weapon of choice for investors betting that Greece will leave the euro by the year-end. Five-year credit protection on the company has tripled since March, as investors use its CDS as a proxy.
Although rated B/B– by S&P and Fitch, respectively, OTE is viewed by most analysts as fundamentally sound. It is 40% owned by Deutsche Telekom, generates around a third of its revenues abroad, and should have sufficient liquidity to tide it over the next few years. But it is also based in the country that has been the bane of financial markets for the past two years.
“OTE is the only liquid Greek CDS out there, so people are trading it as a proxy for Greece leaving the euro,” said Michael Hampden-Turner, credit strategist at Citigroup. “Some are convinced that its fundamentals are strong and it will survive short-term. But the majority feel that if Greece were to exit, then OTE would almost certainly default too, which is why it’s trading at recovery levels,” he said.
Five-year OTE CDS reached a record wide of 3,846bp on May 18, up from 1,254bp in mid-March, shortly after Greece pulled off the largest sovereign restructuring in history by shaving around €100bn off its national debt.
“OTE is the only liquid Greek CDS out there, so people are trading it as a proxy for Greece leaving the euro”
One-year CDS – which has become a particular focus, given fears of an imminent Greek departure from the eurozone – now trades at 36 points upfront. In other words, an investor would have to pay €3.6m on day one to buy protection on €10m of notional, with €500,000 of coupon payments due over the course of the year.
Mainstay
Hellenic Telecom has long been a mainstay of the credit index markets. It was in the iTraxx Main Europe Index Series 1 to 14 and iTraxx Crossover Series 15 to 17, with an equivalent of US$1.7bn and US$407m notional outstanding in each set of indices respectively. The net notional of single-name CDS on OTE stands at US$1.14bn, with loans outstanding of US$1.13bn.
At the same time, there are fewer and fewer ways to play a Greek exit without having to resort to expensive and unpredictable proxy trades such as shorting peripheral countries. CDS on Greece itself is still not trading since the contracts were triggered in March (see “Lack of CDS compounds Greek bond pain”) and there are few other reference entities that offer enough liquidity to play with.
Despite trading at such wide levels, dealers report that CDS on OTE is relatively liquid, and that trades of US$5m–$10m pass through the market without too much fanfare.
“There’s a relatively hefty amount in indices and the single-name CDS was always widely traded – so in all, [OTE] has more net notional outstanding than the sovereign had,” Hampden-Turner said.
Good company, bad country
Investors see the company’s fate as inextricably linked with that of Greece, which is set to undergo another round of elections on June 17 following an inconclusive vote in May.
“The equity market is still debating whether OTE will issue a dividend this year,” said Andrew Sheets, head of European credit strategy at Morgan Stanley. “The credit world is debating whether it faces an imminent default. Credit markets are pricing in a great deal of systemic risk that has little to do with the firm’s underlying fundamentals.”
Sheets highlights OTE’s CDS curve (see chart), which shows the market reckons its annual default probability is higher over the next 12 months than it is over the next three years.
“Our economists put the chances of a Greek exit at 35%, which is probably lower than what is implied by CDS on OTE,” he said.
Credit traders believe that OTE should be able to weather a Greek exit, thanks to support from its German parent, although one said it was “50-50” whether it would file for bankruptcy.
“We don’t really know what precedent to go by,” said Sheets. “Deutsche Telekom owns a significant stake in OTE, but when Argentina defaulted, France Telecom and Telecom Italia let their local subsidiary default, despite they themselves being stronger credits.”
6/02/2012
Greece could begin again
Πηγή: LMD
By Costas Lapavitsas
June 2012
Greece is heading for an exit from the euro, and the rest of the eurozone periphery may follow, precipitating a huge change in the EU. After the crisis, Greece could slowly recover.
Greece is approaching the climax of its crisis, and its choices will influence the course of Europe for years. Although Greece represents only 2% of the European Union’s GDP, the impact of those choices will be wide.
The Greek crisis is fundamentally the result of its membership of the eurozone. Greece is paying the price for a belief in the ancient fallacy that possessing “hard” money puts a weak economy on a par with the strong. In reality, “hard” money is more likely to destroy a weak economy, a lesson about to be re-learned in Portugal, Ireland and Spain. Greece is heading for an exit from the euro and the rest of the eurozone periphery is likely to follow, with severe implications for the monetary union. Coping with an exit will require the reintroduction of economic controls, a major retreat from the neoliberal, pro-market approach to economic policy.
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is often presented as a political step in the integration of Europe, a demonstration of solidarity among Europeans. The reality is quite different. The euro is an international reserve currency that can compete against the dollar and serve, first and foremost, the interests of big banks and enterprises in Europe. It is a peculiar form of money, created from nothing by a hierarchical alliance of independent states.
There are two fundamental problems with the construction of the euro, reflecting its peculiar make-up and leading to its failure. The first is the contradiction between monetary and fiscal policy. The monetary space of the EMU is homogeneous, and the European Central Bank (ECB) allows banks to borrow against the same interest rate benchmarks. But the fiscal space of the EMU is heterogeneous, and each state ultimately exercises sovereignty in collecting taxes and spending. The union has attempted to deal with the problem by imposing fiscal discipline via the Stability and Growth Pact, or the much harsher Fiscal Compact. But national sovereignty over fiscal matters has not been abolished.
The second problem is a much less noticed but equally severe contradiction: the monetary space of the EMU is homogeneous but its banking space is heterogeneous. There is no such thing as a “European” bank, only French, German, Spanish and other banks. Even though banks can obtain liquidity from the ECB in the “European” space, they are obliged to turn to their own state when their solvency is in doubt. Banks operate with transnational money, but they are ultimately national.
At the root of both problems lies the absence of a unitary or federal European state. Europe remains a continent of nations overlaid with an economic structure that pretends nations do not matter. Yet nation states have remained integral to the EMU. This reality is fundamental to the eurozone crisis and makes its resolution very hard.
Loss of competitiveness
The true cause of the eurozone crisis is cumulative loss of competitiveness by peripheral countries, not fiscal indiscipline. Germany has won the competitive race within the EMU by keeping its unit labour costs almost flat for nearly two decades. This has led to large current account deficits for the periphery, mirrored by large German surpluses. The deficits were financed for many years by cheap credit because of lax ECB monetary policy, causing the vast indebtedness of the periphery. The peripheral states are to all intents and purposes insolvent.
The EU has attempted to fix this with bailout loans. It has also imposed austerity and structural adjustment leading to wage reductions and the crushing of unit labour costs in the periphery. The shift has been violent, particularly in Greece, and the attendant social costs have been enormous. But the policy is hopeless since German costs have remained flat: peripheral countries would have to decrease wages without limit to claw back competitiveness and begin to catch up with Germany. The most likely outcome would be social explosion and the collapse of the eurozone.
The policy failure means that peripheral countries are now even less capable of servicing their debts, and the longer the crisis has persisted, the closer banks have been drawn to their nation states to obtain capital, to secure emergency liquidity assistance and make loans. The banking space of the EMU has become more strongly national as banks have more closely embraced their nation states. The monetary union is disintegrating from within.
Disaster could be forestalled only by major reforms. They would have to include, at the very least, the equivalent of a Marshall Plan to raise productivity and competitiveness in the periphery. Redistribution would be necessary in Germany, with a significant raise in wages. There would also have to be debt forgiveness for the periphery as well as a system of fiscal transfers to ease short-term pressures. The financial system would have to be thoroughly revamped and an overarching European authority created to guarantee its solvency.
Heading for an exit
Not only are these enormous changes unlikely to happen, but for the periphery it is probably too late already. EMU disintegration has brought worsening social unrest and peripheral countries are heading for an exit, Greece first. The bailout policies have pushed the Greek economy into an unprecedented depression: cumulative GDP contraction during 2010-12 is likely to be about 20%, while unemployment might reach 25%. The impact on wages and pensions has been devastating and there is a humanitarian crisis unfolding in cities.
Aggregate demand is extremely weak as investment has been falling for five years and consumption is on a downward path; exports showed some dynamism in 2010-11 but have hit a ceiling in 2012. The debt restructuring in March offered only minimal relief, and public debt remains insupportable in the long run. The troika of the EU, the IMF and the ECB demand further public expenditure cuts of €11-12bn for 2013-14 to achieve a substantial primary surplus. (Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad.)
The destruction caused by “hard” money has spread unevenly across Greek society. The ruling elite has suffered minimal damage, while the impact on wage labour has been devastating. Farmers have also been badly affected, but the gravest threat to social and political order has come from the demise of the middle class, including small and medium businesses, the self-employed and public employees. Not surprisingly, there has been persistent unrest and opposition to the austerity policies, including mass strikes, rallies, civic disobedience and a refusal to pay (tolls, official fees).
The May elections have shown that Greeks overwhelmingly oppose bailout policies, yet wish to stay in the EMU. The country is splitting into two political camps, one coalescing around the rightwing New Democracy, the other around the leftwing Syriza. New Democracy attracts those who have escaped the worst of the crisis, including the ruling elite; Syriza is fast becoming the mass party of wage labour and the impoverished middle class.
Both camps insist that they would like to stay in the EMU, but political instability is intensifying the pressure to exit. Unfortunately, it looks as if Greece will exit in chaotic conditions, and the trigger might be a bank run as depositors finally crack. But the basic elements of an exit are clear.
Organising exit
The first step would be to denounce the terms of the bailout agreements and default on the debt. Greece needs to get out of the vice of austerity, and it must stop chasing its tail by seeking to service an insupportable debt. Greece needs to take over the decision-making process, to confront the crisis and reshape its economy. It then needs to write off debt through an aggressive process, with an audit commission to examine the odiousness, legitimacy and social viability of the debt.
Default ought to be followed by reintroduction of the drachma, suddenly, probably over a weekend, with a short bank holiday. It would be necessary immediately to impose capital controls. The change of currency would cause a storm with monetary, banking and commercial aspects, which should be kept separate as far as possible.
There would be simultaneous use of the drachma, the euro and probably other forms of fiat money issued by the state. This would mean altering the accounting systems of banks and changing the denomination of contracts, which would cause a wave of litigation. The banks would be unable to support their balance sheets as some assets and liabilities issued under non-Greek law would remain denominated in euros. Banks would also lose access to ECB liquidity and would be hit by losses on defaulted public debt, so it would be necessary to nationalise banks immediately, issuing a blanket guarantee for drachma deposits; state guarantees should also be used to support private enterprises exposed to foreign debt. The capacity of the Bank of Greece to generate drachma-denominated liquidity should be re-established immediately.
On the commercial side, the exchange rate of the new drachma would collapse. In the short to medium term a falling exchange rate would boost competitiveness, allowing Greek goods and services to recapture the domestic market as well as expand exports. This is a vital step in reviving the Greek economy and strengthening employment. But in the very short term, there would be shortages of goods in which there is a trade deficit, including oil, medicine and some foodstuffs. It would be necessary to manipulate the exchange rate and use administrative measures to tackle the problem until the current account balance recovered.
The short-term shock of exit is part of the cost of escaping from the trap of the EMU. Greece would subsequently need an extensive programme of redistribution of income and wealth as well as industrial policy to steer its economy towards long-term growth. It would need to restructure its state, cleansing it of corruption.
A Greek exit would be a major event, probably opening the way for other peripheral countries to leave the EMU. The attendant changes would seriously damage the neoliberal institutions and ideology currently dominant in the EU. It is impossible to tell whether the euro would survive, but there is no doubt that Europe would face enormous costs, entering a period of turmoil with unclear outcomes. Much would depend on the organisation and self-confidence of the social layers that have taken the brunt of the failed experiment of “hard” money. But there is no reason why Europe could not move towards growth, with an alternative narrative of unity.
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