Showing posts with label crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crisis. Show all posts

3/13/2016

Greece is worst EU country for young people, report says



Πηγή: ekathimerini
11 March 2016

Greece is the worst country in the EU for the young, according to the first Europe-wide Index of Intergenerational Fairness launched by UK-based think tank the Intergenerational Foundation, which warns things could get even worse if action is not taken immediately.

The report cites youth unemployment, the country’s rapidly aging population, pension spending and a high old-age dependency ration as the reasons why Greece’s youth is much more worse off compared to fellow EU members. It ranked much lower than any other member of the 28-nation bloc in 13 social and economic indicators.

“These findings should act as a wake-up call to policymakers. Younger generations are being systematically disadvantaged. We cannot expect the young to carry the burden of an aging population if we do not give them the education, training, skills and opportunities required to become economically active citizens. It is therefore in all generations’ interests to prioritize spending on the young,” said IF co-founder Angus Hanton.

3/24/2015

Poverty and Homelessness in Athens: Governance and the Rise of an Emergency Model of Social Crisis Management



By Vassilis Arapoglou and Kostas Gounis
March 2015


ABSTRACT

This paper presents findings from the study “Caring for the homeless and the poor in Greece: implications for the future of social protection and social inclusion”. First, we offer an overview on the types of existing provisions for the homeless and the poor in Athens. Second, a wider concern of this paper is to discuss whether changes in social and urban policies in Greece enhance or inhibit access of the poor to secure housing, employment, and good quality of care. We identify key elements of an ‘emergency’ model for managing the social crisis associated with the sovereign debt crisis and austerity, offer some interpretation about the processes of its formation, and highlight its criticisms and alternatives suggested by service providers and civil society organizations.

Greece: Solidarity and Adjustment in Times of Crisis


By Tassos Giannitsis and Stavros Zografakis
March 2015


Abstract

This report attempts to examine the impact of the crisis and crisis policies on incomes, inequality and poverty in Greece. Based on extensive income and tax data, it investigates changes in incomes, direct, indirect and property taxation and their incidence between 2008 and 2012-13, their impact on pre- and post-tax inequality and the resulting social reclassifications within the Greek society. The report is distinguishing income by sources at the deciles level, including the top 1% and 0.1%, household and individual income while focusing also on the sub-groups of the ‘same households’ and the ‘same individuals’. Furthermore, the analysis combines unemployment and income data and uses an ‘index of despair’ reflecting the pressure felt by households hit from salary drop and unemployment. The findings suggest that pauperisation hit large parts of the society, that policies had very differentiated effects on different groups and that, therefore, average values obscure contrasting changes in inequality regarding particular sub-groups, that during the crisis all income classes comprise winners and losers and last, but not least, that many macro-variables and social indicators were the result of a deficient crisis management approach and ideological inflexibility coupled to established political interests, making the exit from the crisis more complicated and painful. The findings of this analysis should be assessed in the light of the severe economic depression caused by the Troika‘s policies.


2/16/2014

Council of Europe report: 10 austerity imposed human rights abuses in Greece


Πηγή: The Press Project
Feb 16 2014

Commissioner Muiznieks of the Council of Europe presents a report detailing the ways that austerity and “reforms” imposed by the international lenders have caused human rights abuses across Europe. TPPI presents the report’s findings of abuses occurring in Greece due to austerity.
Spending cuts and structural reforms imposed by Greece’s lenders under the policy of austerity may have lead to the country posting a primary budget surplus this year, but they have come at the expense of basic human rights according to the Council of Europe.


The Strasbourg based watchdog released a report yesterday titled “Safeguarding human rights in times of economic crises” (full report in pdf) which makes clear that by making fiscal consolidation through immediate austerity the overriding policy priority in countries such as Greece, citizens’ rights to work, healthcare and education have been severely impacted. Unsurprisingly, it is the most vulnerable members of society who are most affected.

“The EU governments have forgotten their obligation to protect their populations against the financial institutions,” said the Commissioner for Human Rights Nils Muiznieks yesterday when presenting the report. He said that one of the goals of the report was to, “put human rights back in the agenda of the governments.”

Below are the ten main areas in which human rights have been significantly eroded due to austerity policies in Greece:

Council of Europe Report on Austerity in Greece:

1. Labour rights: Exploitation of workers, trafficking and mistreatment of migrants
In Greece, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association found repeated and extensive interventions into free and voluntary collective bargaining and an ‘important deficit of social dialogue’. High unemployment tends to weaken workers’ bargaining power, leading to high worker vulnerability and lower economic growth rates.(16) Labour exploitation, including child labour, human trafficking and mistreatment of migrant workers, has been a constant concern of experts as demand for cheap labour increases, economic conditions deteriorate and fewer public authorities are available to conduct labour inspections or offer child protection services.

2. Pension reform: Increase of vulnerability and risk of poverty for the elderly
Many governments have chosen to reform pension systems, potentially deepening the increasing vulnerability and risk of poverty among older persons. In Greece, for example, the ECSR observed in its decision on a collective complaint that pension reform measures would “risk bringing about a large-scale pauperisation of a significant segment of the population”.22

3. Homelessness: Spreading among migrants, young, women, families
The crisis has been identified as a key driver of expanding homelessness in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK. New groups of homeless have emerged, with homelessness spreading among migrants, young people, women and families.

4. Health cuts: Long term impact on public health
Cuts in health-related spending have affected the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health. In Greece, the EC, ECB and IMF have demanded that public spending on health should not exceed 6% of GDP, with a potentially long-term impact on public health.

5. Infringements of the freedom of expression and excessive force
The severity of austerity measures alongside the frequent failure to consult with the people affected has provoked large-scale demonstrations especially in Spain, Portugal and Greece. Concerns have been raised about the use of excessive force against demonstrators and infringements of the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly. Harsh reactions to social unrest may engender mistrust in the democratic system.36

6. Unemployment: ‘Scarring’ consequences for the young
The correlation of spiralling unemployment among young people under 25 with the crisis years is undisputed. Over half of all young people are officially unemployed in Spain, Portugal and Greece, with little improvement expected until 2016. The rate of young people not in employment, education or training (NEET) has increased by around 1% since 2008 region-wide, and by 4% and 6% in Spain and Greece respectively, with severe and long-lasting “scarring” consequences for these young people.54

7. Unconstitutionality: Budgetary measures vs European Social Charter and the national laws
Likewise, the ECSR, with reference to commitments made by Greece to the Troika, made it clear that “states parties…should – both when preparing the text in question and when implementing it into national law – take full account of the commitments they have taken upon ratifying the European Social Charter”. It follows that states carry the primary burden for proving that any proposed austerity measures are in line with their standing human rights obligations. Recent domestic jurisprudence in Latvia, Portugal and Lithuania illustrates the normative superiority of constitutionally protected human rights principles over unjustified budgetary measures.

8. Lack of analysis on the effects of austerity
In recent decisions related to collective complaints about pension rights from Greece, the ECSR has highlighted the failure of the government to conduct the minimum level of research and analysis on the effects of austerity measures and assess in a meaningful manner their full impact on vulnerable groups in society in consultation with the organisations concerned. The duty to consult stakeholders applies to EU institutions as well through Article 11(2) and (3) of the Treaty on European Union, which states that “[EU] institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society. The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent.”

9. Pressure on human rights structures
Currently, NHRSs are often forced to do more with less under budgetary pressure. Demand for NHRS services has increased, while many institutions have simultaneously experienced budget and staff cuts, the closure of regional offices or mergers into less-focused structures. For example, NHRSs in Greece, Ireland, Latvia and the UK have faced cuts in their budgets and staff which may hinder their effectiveness. Dwindling human and finan cial resources and uncertainty over future resources are putting NHRSs in a difficult position as regards ensuring easy access for vulnerable groups to their services and advancing more ambitious, forward-looking projects such as monitoring budget measures. Stable resource allocation for these critical institutions should be maintained during the crisis and any moratorium on recruitment in the public sector should not apply to them.

10. Media freedom: curtailing freedom of expression
Media freedoms have endured setbacks in the context of austerity measures, including in countries where fiscal contraction has been deepest. Public and private media have suffered staff and salary cuts and the closure of outlets, including the temporary closure of the Greek public broadcaster. Not only do these cutbacks contribute to worsening existing problems of decreasing media diversity, they also threaten the effective operation of a fundamental pillar of democracy. The ability of journalists to perform their essential educational and watchdog roles has been impaired, curtailing freedom of expression and the right to be informed.

Aside from the erosion of human rights, the report also makes clear that the politics of austerity are failing on their own terms, causing record levels of unemployment that make a true economic recovery a far-off prospect. “After three years of austerity, these chosen measures have not yet achieved their stated aims,” the report concludes.

In short, from the outset of the crisis saving the banks was more important to Europe’s leaders than safeguarding human rights and the effects of this policy decision are now becoming apparent.


Greece grapples with soaring numbers of abandoned children and babies

A protester runs to escape from riot police during clashes over austerity measures at Syntagma square, central Athens, Wednesday, June 29, 2011. 

Πηγή: Washington Post
BY ANTHEE CARASSAVA
Feb 14 2013

ATHENS — First came the rising rates of homelessness. Then, the explosive growth of suicides. Now, four years into a devastating financial crisis, Greece’s youngest citizens are falling through the cracks of the country’s disheveled society.

Either deserted at maternity wards days after their birth, bundled inside pillowcases, or packed in cardboard boxes dumped on the doorsteps of churches, clinics and charity centers, abandoned babies are turning up all over the country.

Hard statistics are difficult to come by. But in a telling tale of the trend and an admission of the devastating effects of austerity on young children, Health Minister Adonis Georgiadis told parliament recently that the number of abandoned infants had soared by 336 percent alone in the state’s flagship pediatrics hospital since the start of the financial crisis.

Four other children’s hospitals and maternity clinics in the capital, home to half of Greece’s population of 11 million, showed similar spikes. State orphanages and charity centers, meantime, are teeming with unwanted children — many of them neglected and increasingly malnourished since the economy skid off the fiscal cliff in 2010, sinking Greece deep into a recession.

“It is the most tragic human consequence of the [financial] crisis,” says Stelios Sifnos, Director of Social Work and Research at the SOS Children’s Villages charity. “There is urgent need for action.”

“We’re talking about children here, not cars,” he adds.

Social care has never been a forte of the Greek state. In fact, whatever semblance of it that did exist ahead of the financial crisis, now stands hollow, leaving the country’s family-first society to mitigate social plagues like abandonment and neglect.

“The question,” says Kostas Yannopoulos, founder of the Smile of the Child charity, “is how much more the Greek family can endure — if at all.”

“Just the other day I had a mother with nine children — from infants to teenagers — begging me to take them all in because she no longer had the means to cope.”

That same week, Yannopoulos and his aides, who care for more than 330 children in a bevy of hostels set up across the country, scrambled to accommodate a baby whose 35-year-old father had taken a gun to his head after losing his job. His wife, also unemployed, was left distraught, unable to take care of their 8-month-old girl.

Days prior, a local prosecutor ordered social workers to place another baby girl into the care of a state children’s hospital after neighbors of the impoverished family spotted the child neglected, having been bitten by roaches and rodents.

For generations, most abandoned babies and neglected children came from battered neighborhoods, abusive parents and drug-infested homes. They still do so today, only now the scope of the problem, the severity of the cases, and the lack of social services have been amplified by austerity and growing middle-class poverty.

“This is no longer a plight of the poor,” says Ilias Zagoreas, the capital’s leading district attorney handling cases involving minors. “The line has been clearly crossed.”

In 2013 alone, Mr. Zagoreas said, his office dealt with more than 1,000 cases of abandoned and neglected minors, mainly babies, in Athens and the port city of Pireaus. That’s 30 percent more than 2012, but significantly less than the overall extent of the problem.

“While I am obligated to look into each and every case and complaint,” he explained, “my ability to do so has been limited because of state budget cuts. So, if I once had the ability to send two social workers a week to probe a case, that same procedure, now, may take four to five months because of cutbacks in personnel.”

Meantime, Zagoreas warns, the child in question is “in peril.”

Since the start of the financial crisis, more than 1,000 families have asked SOS Children’s Villages alone to place children in their homes. “That’s an amazing 1,000 percent rise from the 42 cases recorded ahead of the crisis,” Sifnios said.

With unemployment nearing 30 percent, incomes crushed by 25 percent, and bank accounts depleted by unrelenting taxation, child advocates, social workers and judicial officials fear that the country’s prolonged austerity will put families under further strain, pushing greater numbers of young children to the sidelines of neglect and abandonment.

Struggling families, though, are fighting back, trying to keep their units intact.

Recently, as I walked through the gloomy green corridors of a public pediatrics ward, peeking at the rows of unwanted newborns, I noticed a mother cradled next to her two babies in a separate hospital room. With the consent of a prosecutor, the mother and her husband placed their 18-month daughter and four-year old son in the care of the hospital for financial reasons.

Since then, both parents have been alternating shifts, looking for work by day, spending time with their children and sleeping beside them at night.

For a nation as proud and family-centred as Greece, the plight of such families strikes a collective nerve. But underfunded and understaffed, hospital administrators seem unsympathetic.

“I do not have the luxury to use up resources and personnel on healthy children,” says Manolis Papasavvas, director of the Aglaia Kyriakou Children’s Hospital, in Athens. “This isn’t a hostel, it’s a hospital, and a hospital is no place to rear a child.”

Health minister Georgiadis said a special hostel will open in March to relieve state hospitals of the added task of tending to deserted children. Repeated requests for clarifications went unheeded, and children’s agencies already seem skeptical of the plan.

“The fear is that they [health ministry planners] may sweep this plague under the rug, relocating the infants without addressing the root of the problem and coming to the aid of struggling families before they are broken and children are abandoned,” Sifnios of the SOS Children’s Village.

“If this does not happen… then the Greece of today is setting itself up for an angry and resentful generation in the future.”


12/10/2013

Greece's Dismal Demographics


Πηγή: New York Times
By: Nikos Kostandaras
Dec 9 2013

ATHENS — The Greeks are in a struggle for survival. And the odds are piling up against us. The fight is not only on the economic front, as we try to meet our commitments under an international 240-billion-euro bailout deal that has resulted in greatly reduced incomes, higher costs and taxes, and an overriding sense of insecurity. The danger is even more basic: Deaths are outnumbering births, people are leaving the country, and the population is aging so fast that in a few decades Greece may be unable to produce enough wealth to take care of its people and may cease to be a viable nation state.

“People tend to overlook the importance of the population, even though everything begins with it,” says Michalis Papadakis, professor emeritus of statistics and social security at the University of Piraeus, who has spent his life studying the issue. “Demographic reduction undermines defense capabilities, it cuts down the work force and obstructs business.”

He noted that 2011 was the first year in which the number of Greece’s residents dropped (with deaths exceeding births by 4,671). According to the European Union’s statistical service, in 2012 deaths in Greece outnumbered births by 16,300, while 44,200 more people left the country than moved to it.

Many European Union countries face a similar demographic problem and the Union as a whole is aging fast. But whereas European Union and national officials are looking for ways to deal with an aging population, in Greece the battle for economic survival is so overwhelming that no one has time for the bigger picture. In the urge to cut spending and stop borrowing, the Greeks have not been able to do the things that might have encouraged people to have children.

For instance, other countries — wealthy Germany, for one — are focusing on boosting youth employment, keeping people in the work force beyond today’s retirement age, and finding ways to balance commitments to family and work. But in Greece, even though the retirement age was raised to 67 from 65, efforts to cut down public and private sector employees over the past three years have pushed an estimated 150,000 people into retirement before their time (for a total of some 2.7 million pensioners). Unemployment is at 27.3 percent (1.4 million people), with over 60 percent of those under 24 without jobs. Those who do have work are getting less pay and facing higher taxes — and they don’t know what tomorrow will bring. Even immigrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan, who came seeking a better life, are moving on.

In 2012, the number of employed people in Greece was 3.8 million, while pensioners and the unemployed totaled 4.1 million, out of a population of 11,062,500. Fewer and fewer people are shouldering the burden of keeping the country on its feet. The 25 percent drop in Greece’s gross domestic product since 2008 reflects the reduction in people’s incomes as well as the state’s need to get as much out of them as possible, leaving few with disposable income, and forcing others to draw on their savings to meet their obligations.

Several European countries face challenges posed by their citizens’ living longer, having fewer children and moving abroad. It is not just countries plagued by high debt, like Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain, that are suffering. The problem of higher medical and pension costs for an aging population is a product of widespread prosperity and high standards of health and social security — joys that countries like Greece discovered only after joining the European Union. In Ireland, a high rate of emigration in 2012 was offset by a high birthrate. Elsewhere, immigration offset low birthrates. In Greece, though, an already low birthrate and emigration, including highly skilled graduates like doctors and engineers, resulted in a drop in population.

Mr. Papadakis, the demographer, says that though there is no reported research on this yet, there is a trend toward people marrying later and then delaying having their first child. The most recent Greek statistical service figures show the number of weddings dropping from 59,212 in 2009 (the year in which the impact of the crisis first became evident) to 55,099 in 2011.

Marilena Kapidaki, an obstetrician, says that among her clients, people who married usually decided to have children but appeared to be limiting themselves to one child. “I would not be surprised if the fertility rate has dropped even further during the crisis,” she says. The latest statistics, from 2011, showed a fertility rate of 1.4 in Greece, well below the 2.1 needed to replenish the previous generation. “A lot has changed since 2010,” Dr. Kapidaki says.

Even without statistical confirmation, the trend is evident. Some maternity hospitals have shut down wings and turned them over to other medical specialties, while many schools in the provinces and on the islands have only a handful of students. In village after village, the elderly outnumber locals and immigrants of working age.

The most frightening figure is a Eurostat projection which estimates that, in 2050, 32.1 percent of the Greek population will be over 65, compared with 16.6 percent in 2000. And this projection was made in 2007, before the crisis hit Greece’s population. We were still living high, before widespread unemployment, hasty retirement and the emigration of those with the skills to succeed abroad. New projections will most likely be much worse.

And yet, Greece has two mighty reasons for hope. It has a dynamic and prospering diaspora, mainly in the United States and Australia; and its European Union membership is a pillar of support today but, with its open borders, also a potential source of immigration. If we in Greece can hold the country steady through the crisis, and work toward optimism and opportunity for ourselves, then people will come.


12/06/2012

For Greece, Oligarchs Remain Obstacle to Growth

Lavrentis Lavrentiadis embezzled money from a bank he controlled, prosecutors say.

Πηγή: New York Times
By RACHEL DONADIO and LIZ ALDERMAN
Dec 6 2012

ATHENS — A dynamic entrepreneur, Lavrentis Lavrentiadis seemed to represent a promising new era for Greece. He dazzled the country’s traditionally insular business world by spinning together a multibillion-dollar empire just a few years after inheriting a small family firm at 18. Seeking acceptance in elite circles, he gave lavishly to charities and cultivated ties to the leading political parties.

Lavrentis Lavrentiadis, who took control of Proton Bank in 2009, paid $65 million to avoid prosecution. Nonetheless, he and 26 others were charged with fraud and other counts in March.

But as Greece’s economy soured in recent years, his fortunes sagged and he began embezzling money from a bank he controlled, prosecutors say. With charges looming, it looked like his rapid rise would be followed by an equally precipitous fall. Thanks to a law passed quietly by the Greek Parliament, however, he avoided prosecution, at least for now, simply by paying the money back.

Now 40, Mr. Lavrentiadis is back in the spotlight as one of the names on the so-called Lagarde list of more than 2,000 Greeks said to have accounts in a Geneva branch of the bank HSBC and who are suspected of tax evasion. Given to Greek officials two years ago by Christine Lagarde, then the French finance minister and now head of the International Monetary Fund, the list was expected to cast a damning light on the shady practices of the rich. Instead, it was swept under the rug, and now two former finance ministers and Greece’s top tax officials are under investigation for having failed to act.

Greece’s economic troubles are often blamed on a public sector packed full of redundant workers, a lavish pension system and uncompetitive industries hampered by overpaid workers with lifetime employment guarantees. Often overlooked, however, is the role played by a handful of wealthy families, politicians and the news media — often owned by the magnates — that make up the Greek power structure.

In a country crushed by years of austerity and 25 percent unemployment, average Greeks are growing increasingly resentful of an oligarchy that, critics say, presides over an opaque, closed economy that is at the root of many of the country’s problems and operates with virtual impunity. Several dozen powerful families control critical sectors, including banking, shipping and construction, and can usually count on the political class to look out for their interests, sometimes by passing legislation tailored to their specific needs.

The result, analysts say, is a lack of competition that undermines the economy by allowing the magnates to run cartels and enrich themselves through crony capitalism. “That makes it rational for them to form a close, incestuous relationship with politicians and the media, which is then highly vulnerable to corruption,” said Kevin Featherstone, a professor of European Politics at the London School of Economics.

This week the anticorruption watchdog Transparency International ranked Greece as the most corrupt nation in Europe, behind former Soviet states like Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. Under the pressure of the financial crisis, Greece is being pressed by Germany and its international lenders to make fundamental changes to its economic system in exchange for the money it needs to avoid bankruptcy.

But it remains an open question whether Greece’s leaders will be able to engineer such a transformation. In the past year, despite numerous promises to increase transparency, the country actually dropped 14 places from the previous corruption survey.

Mr. Lavrentiadis is still facing a host of accusations stemming from hundreds of millions of dollars in loans made by his Proton bank to dormant companies — sometimes, investigators say, ordering an employee to withdraw the money in bags of cash. But with Greece scrambling to complete a critical bank recapitalization and restructuring, his case is emblematic of a larger battle between Greece’s famously weak institutions and fledgling regulatory structures against these entrenched interests.

Many say that the system has to change in order for Greece to emerge from the crisis. “Keeping the status quo will simply prolong the disaster in Greece,” Mr. Featherstone said. While the case of Mr. Lavrentiadis suggests that the status quo is at least under scrutiny, he added, “It’s not under sufficient attack.”

In a nearly two-hour interview, Mr. Lavrentiadis denied accusations of wrongdoing and said that he held “a few accounts” at HSBC in Geneva that totaled only about $65,000, all of it legitimate, taxed income. He also sidestepped questions about his political ties and declined to comment on any details of the continuing investigation into Proton Bank.

Sitting in the office of his criminal lawyer last month, relaxed, smiling and dressed in a crisp blue suit and red-and-blue tie, Mr. Lavrentiadis said he found it puzzling that he had been singled out in reports about the Lagarde list when other powerful figures appeared to evade scrutiny.

“My question is, ‘Why me?’” he said. “I’m the scapegoat for everything.”

In the interview, Mr. Lavrentiadis depicted himself as an outsider and upstart, an entrepreneur in a small country dominated by old families who frown on newcomers. “I am not from a third-generation aristocratic family,” he said repeatedly.

Indeed, by some lights, Mr. Lavrentiadis fell in part because he rose too quickly and then failed to secure enough of the right friends to protect him, a perception he did not dispute.

“Why me, something that is clean, and why not something that has bigger problems?” he said. Pressed on who might be responsible for his troubles, he smiled enigmatically. “I could tell you thousands of names,” he said, “but it’s not my style.”

Mr. Lavrentiadis’s mettle was forged early, when he took the reins of his family’s chemical supply firm, Neochimiki, in 1990, after the death of his father. Bright and charming, and stricken with rheumatoid arthritis, he quickly enlarged the company and stormed into the Greek business world in 2003, when he listed the company on the Athens Stock Exchange. In 2008, the Carlyle Group, one of Wall Street’s largest asset management firms, paid more than $970 million for a stake in Neochimiki.

Over the next four years, Mr. Lavrentiadis built an empire that included holdings in pharmaceuticals, banks, a soccer team and works of art. He also took stakes in print and electronic news media outlets, following a pattern in which magnates own virtually every nongovernmental news media outlet in the country. But the veneer began to crack soon after the financial crisis hit. Carlyle lost more than $65 million on Neochimiki and accused Mr. Lavrentiadis of overstating its financial health. Cash was bleeding from a range of other business holdings.

In December 2009, four months before Greece sought a foreign bailout, Mr. Lavrentiadis bought a controlling stake in Proton Bank, which had expanded rapidly after acquiring a small bank called Omega in 2005. Omega’s board members included Mr. Lavrentiadis; the father-in-law at the time of Evangelos Venizelos, now the Socialist Party leader; and a brother of a former prime minister, George Papandreou.

Regulators now charge that from the moment Mr. Lavrentiadis took over Proton, he began looting it to prop up his failing businesses and those of a network of what appear to be shell companies. In 2010 alone, a total of $925 million — more than 40 percent of Proton’s commercial loans — were made with virtually no credit checks to his firms or to shell companies he had sold to associates, according to an audit by Greece’s central bank, first reported by Reuters.

His problems burst into the public realm in mid-2011, when Greek financial prosecutors charged him with embezzling the $65 million, following investigations into suspected money laundering.

Several months earlier, however, lawmakers had quietly passed a law that allowed suspected wrongdoers to avoid prosecution if they repaid the money they were accused of stealing in certain crimes. The idea, legislators said, was to speed resolution of cases in Greece’s notoriously slow courts. Mr. Lavrentiadis quickly paid back the $65 million to Proton and claimed immunity.

Then in March, a financial prosecutor charged him and 26 others with fraud, embezzlement, forming a criminal gang, money laundering and breach of faith stemming from loans believe to have been issued by Proton Bank. The $65 million repaid by Mr. Lavrentiadis in a bid to secure immunity is regarded by prosecutors as only a part of the more than $915 million in bad loans that prosecutors say Proton floated to dormant companies.

In the interview, Mr. Lavrentiadis confirmed that he had returned the $65 million but declined to say under what circumstances. He dismissed the Bank of Greece report as not “objective,” and said prosecutors had not yet called him for questioning or detailed the charges against him personally, beyond those against the 27 as a group. “I trust Greek justice,” he said.

Despite the fraud accusations against him, Mr. Lavrentiadis was still the beneficiary of questionable government actions. In July 2011, Mr. Venizelos, then the finance minister, authorized a $130 million deposit of government money to Proton for a single day, he says to avoid a calamitous collapse. The action was approved by the Greek central bank but was in defiance of a ruling by Greece’s General Accounting Office that it was illegal. The $130 million, plus interest, was returned to the government, Mr. Venizelos said in written answers to a list of questions.

“It was absolutely necessary to preserve Proton — not Lavrentiadis — in order to save huge amounts of public money,” added Mr. Venizelos, who resigned as finance minister in March. A month after the $130 million transfer, Mr. Venizelos was co-writer of a law that retroactively granted the finance minister full power to bail out banks with public money, regardless of the recommendations of other state institutions.

Mr. Venizelos said the law was necessary because “Greece had not had a clear legislative framework that could allow it to handle public deposits in crisis situations.” But legal experts said it was part of a broader pattern in Greece where actions by influential figures are later smoothed over with new legislation that eliminates any questions of illegality.

Mr. Lavrentiadis declined to comment on his ties with Mr. Venizelos, beyond saying, “I never asked a favor.”

In October 2011, Proton was nationalized. “I was shocked,” Mr. Lavrentiadis said, adding that he did not believe the bank’s finances merited the move. In March, he challenged the decision in the Supreme Court and is awaiting a ruling.

Asked if the Proton case was evidence of a regulatory system that was working or one that had failed, Mr. Lavrentiadis smiled. “It’s a regulated market without rules,” he said of Greece. “You can interpret it however it’s to your benefit.”



11/04/2012

Germans stop shipment of life-saving cancer drug to Greece as Euro crisis deepens

Life-saver: Erbirux is given intravenously and has been proven to be effective on various types of cancer

Πηγή: MailOnline
Nov 3 2012

The spiralling decline of the Greek economy took an even more brutal turn today with the news that German pharmaceuticals firm Merck KGaA has ceased deliveries of a life-saving cancer drug to Greek hospitals.

The drug, Erbitux, is an effective treatment for both colorectal cancers and head and neck cancers

A number of industrial giants have shied away from accepting orders from the crisis-hit Greeks.

Another German-based pharma giant, Biotest, suspended shipments to Greece because of unpaid bills in in June of this year.

Matthias Zachert, Merck's chief financial officer, told the German newspaper paper Boersen-Zeitung that publicly-owned hospitals in several euro-zone countries had been struggling to pay their bills.

But the German company, which also manufactures the Seven Seas brand of dietary supplements as well as medical pharmaceuticals, has singled out Greece - and this one drug - as a special case.

'It only affects Greece, where we have been faced with many problems. It's just the one product," Herr Zachert said in an interview.

In some other countries affected by the Euro crisis, for example Spain, central government has stepped in to make up the shortfall in hospital funds.

The drug giant says that hospitals in several southern European companies have had problems with settling their accounts
That has improved things, even though the situation should still be regarded as critical for the coming years' Zachert said.

A spokesman for the company stressed that Erbitux - also known as Cetuximab - is still available for private purchase in Greece.



10/01/2012

Germany told to 'come clean’ over Greece


There were reports that Berlin is so worried that a Greek crisis would spin out of control that it is ready to back the next €31bn payment to Athens under its EU-IMF Troika rescue
Πηγή: The Telegraph
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Sept 30 2012

German Chancellor Angela Merkel must “come clean at long last” and admit that Greece will need help for another seven or eight years, the German opposition leader said over the weekend.

“The Greeks must stand by their commitment, but we must give them time. We cannot tighten the screws any futher,” said Peer Steinbruck, the Social Democrat candidate for chancellor. He said the political and economic fall-out from Greek ejection from the euro would be devastating and must be avoided.

The plea came amid reports that Berlin is so worried that a Greek crisis would spin out of control that it is ready to back the next €31bn payment to Athens under its EU-IMF Troika rescue, despite failure to comply with the terms. Wirtschaftswoche, a German news magazine, said Greece’s parliament merely needs to vote on a list of detailed reforms.

It cited warnings from a top EU official that “domino-effect” dangers are too great to allow the ejection of Greece from EMU. Authorities across the world – including the Bank of England – fear a surge of capital flight from Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy if the sanctity of monetary union is violated.

Diplomats say concerns go beyond financial damage. Both EU and US officials are worried that the fragile security system of the Western Mediterannean could start to unravel if Greece is alienated and withdraws from Nato under populist leaders in the future.

Washington has put intense pressure on Chancellor Merkel to accept a compromise that keeps Greece firmly anchored in the European bloc. Her ministers haves toned down their rhetoric in recent days.

François Heisbourg from the International Institute for Security Studies said an acrimonious Greek exit would be “extremely challenging”, leading to instability in the Balkans and opening the door to Russian meddling.

The apparent Troika deal gives Greek premier Antonis Samaras a chance to prove he can deliver an austerity package of €13.5bn, mostly cuts in pensions, benefits, and top civil service pay. His three-party coalition agreed on the “main points” in bruising talks last week.

Mr Samaras told the New York Times that there is “absolutely zero risk of Greece leaving the Euro” but he also said that lack of EU help would mean the “end of Greece”.

Payment of the next tranche may lift one cloud hanging over the markets but Greece’s drama has been eclipsed by events in Spain, where Catalonia’s drive for independence has rocked the country. The tense mood has not been helped by calls from top figures in Madrid for deployment of the Civil Guard to crush separatists.

Moody’s is expected to downgrade Spanish debt to junk status this week, which would make it harder to lure back global investors. The country is in limbo until premier Mariano Rajoy decides whether to request a rescue from the EU bail-out fund and sign a memorandum giving up fiscal sovereignty.

Analysts say the decision by Germany, Holland, and Finland to renege on a June summit deal to recapitalise Spanish banks directly may have hardened his will to resist. Paul de Grauwe from London School of Economics said the move by the AAA trio is a “disgrace”.



9/25/2012

Greece's disappearing middle class (CNN vid)



Πηγή: CNN
Sept 25 2012






Greece shows dangers of cuts in health during crisis

European Health Forum Gastein

Πηγή: Austrian Times
Sept 25 2012

In times of economic crisis health service budgets are often slashed dramatically at exactly the time that money worries are meaning more people are ending up sick.

This scenerio has been proven time and again - most recently in Greece where the state health service has seen staff numbers plunge and the money for equipment, medicines and clinics falling at a time when patient numbers have increased dramatically.

In cash-strapped Greece that meant hospital admissions were up 25 percent - but at the same time hospital budgets have been cut by 40 percent leaving shortages of medicine and staff.

The department of health reports that suicides are up 40 percent as well - with budgets for mental health care and drug dependents axed.

Doctors of the World, a charity that runs health clinics, said Greece in 2012 had all the characteristics seen in big cities in the Third World, people with no shelter, starving people and people looking for doctors and medicine.

And according to experts meeting next month at the 15th European Health Forum (EHFG) in Gastein - Greece may not be alone for long.

After decades of rising prosperity, the spectre over Europe is of a continuing financial crisis which will mean austerity in public health spending.

With health care representing 10% of GDP in the EU, and providing one of the largest sources of employment, it is a problem that needs tackling now say the event organisers.

EHFG's founder-president Dr Guenther Leiner said the financial crisis was very real - but also presented opportunities.

He said: "We have held, at the EHFG, fruitful debates on how limited resources could be used more sensibly and effectively." But he said talk alone was not enough and added: "It is high time that these be implemented on a political level."

The EHFG will bring together some 600 participants including some of the most influential figures in 50 countries in Europe, as well as Russia, Taiwan, and the SEE countries. Those taking part include Austrian health minister Alois Stöger, EU Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy John Dalli and the Regional Director for the WHO Europe Zsuzsanna Jakab.

Debates will focus on the health consequences of political responses to the financial crisis, and how - despite this - sustained improvements in both health and economic growth might be achieved.

Other areas to be discussed are the prospects for public health in 2050, sustainable health systems, personalised medicine, non-communicable diseases, health communication, and global governance.

Workshops will examine in detail such issues as vaccination and innovative approaches to improve trust and uptake, and the often disruptive role of social media; aligning the pharmaceutical industry with social needs; improving nutrition in Europe with flour fortification; health reform in practice; solutions to chronic disease; or the epidemic of kidney disease.

EHFG President Dr Leiner added: "The great virtue of the EHFG, and what has made its international reputation over these 15 years, is that we address real issues, and look for practical solutions."

The congress Crisis and Opportunity - Health in an Age of Austerity takes place at Bad Hofgastein in Salzburg from October 3 to 6, 2012.

8/11/2012

Arms imports and the Greek debt: "The intriguing story of huge weapons sales and the Greek debt crisis…"


Πηγή: The Daily Organ
By Paul Haydon
August 12 2012

Last week Czech Prime Minister Petr Nečas made the usual grim diagnosis about the debt crisis in Greece.The country was in dire need of structural reforms, he said, both to its economy and society.

Leaders across the continent have been making similar criticisms, with Sarkozy and Merkel warning the Greek government last month that it wouldn’t receive new bailout funds unless it fully implemented austerity measures. And despite the significant debt swap agreed on recently, any EU bail-out remains conditional on the country implementing a further round of budget cuts.

Yet one area of the Greek budget doesn’t seem to have received such scrutiny, its huge military spending. The reason is simple, France and Germany still account for the vast majority of arms sales to Greece.

Admittedly, Greek military spending has been reduced massively over the last few years, although not nearly as much as government expenditure on healthcare, pensions or social welfare. However it still spends the most in the EU as a percentage of GDP, and remains one of the biggest weapons importers in the world.

Moreover, in 2010 when the first bail-out package was being negotiated, the Greeks spent €7.1bn on its military, compared with €6.24bn in 2007, with £1 billion spent on French and German weapons, plunging it even further into debt. Many suspect that this is no co-incidence, and that the rescue package was explicitly tied to burgeoning arms deals. In particular, there is evidence of pressure from France to buy six frigates, whilst Germany was content to sell off some faulty submarines.

The fact that Greece, a relatively small and democratic country with not much in the way of global ambitions, should spend so much on its military is fairly perplexing.

In 2006, as the financial crisis was looming, Greece was the third biggest arms importer after China and India. It has a standing army of 156,000 men, more than the UK which has 6 times its population, and still has a compulsory military service of 9 months. Over the last 10 years its military budget has stood at 4% of GDP, over $1500 per person. If Greece is in need of structural reform, then its oversized military would seem the most logical place to start.

In fact, if it had only spent 1.7% like a typical EU country over the last 20 years, it would have saved 52% of its GDP.

Of course, the supposed threat from Turkey is always used as a justification by Greece for its profligate arms spending. However, this argument just doesn’t hold up on several grounds. Firstly, both countries are part of NATO and share a number of mutual allies, not least the US, and so all-out war between the two is highly unlikely to occur.

Secondly,Turkey has proposed on several occasions a mutual reduction in arms spending, something Greece has repeatedly refused to do. Finally, despite all this relations between the two countries have markedly improved in recent years, making such a massive military build up seem even more unnecessary. All Greece’s military spending seems to achieve is to antagonise the situation and goad Turkey into an arms race.

So why has Greece continued to spend such huge amounts on its army? It’s not altogether clear, although it may well be due to populist pressure on the previous right-wing government not to appear soft in the ongoing tensions with Turkey over Cyprus.

What is certain is that the French and German arms industries have gained a lot from Greece’s extravagant spending. In the five years up to 2010, Greece purchased more of Germany’s arms exports than any other country, buying 15 per cent of its weapons. Over the same period, Greece was the third-largest customer for France’s military exports, and its top buyer in Europe, with 12 per cent. The Netherlands also has been a significant exporter.

However, the US is perhaps the biggest beneficiary, accounting on average for 40% for Greek imports, and has been known to intervene in military spending decisions. In addition, with each new new fighter plane or battleship sold creating yet more sales to regional rival Turkey, it is easy to see why Greece has made such a lucrative market.

In the current context, it is easy to blame all Greece’s troubles on its problems with corruption, tax evasion and its oversized state sector. These are all undeniable issues which no doubt require significant ‘structural reforms.’ Yet, arms imports aside, is Greece really that different from Spain or Portugal, countries also in dire straits but not standing on the brink of collapse?

I cannot help but speculate that if Greece’s military spending had been reined in sooner, at the expense of the French and German arms industries, we might not be facing the crisis we are now. And the Greek people, instead of facing austerity measures which have reduced living standards by 30%, might have been able to take a more moderate and sustainable route to reform.

Paul Haydon is currently studying a masters in European Public Policy at University College London. He has previously worked at the European Parliament, and at a magazine in Shanghai, China. You can read his blog here 

Editor's note:





7/16/2012

The eurozone endgame will begin in Greece

A discount euro shop in Athens. Greece is ‘in the midst of an unprecedented depression, made largely in Brussels'. 

Πηγή: The Guardian
By Costas Lapavitsas
July 16 2012

Greece won't be able to make its austerity policies stick and, as the global depression worsens, will have to leave the eurozone.

The June summit of the eurozone was initially trumpeted as a decisive step towards resolving the crisis. Italy and Spain won agreement to allow European institutions to recapitalise banks and purchase sovereign debt directly.

But once financial markets had a closer look, it became clear that little of substance had been achieved, and the borrowing costs of Italy and Spain again approached forbidding heights. Meanwhile the Spanish government has imposed fresh austerity, breaking its promises to the electorate. And unemployment in the eurozone continues to rise,exceeding 11% on average.

It is now a fair guess that the European Monetary Union (or the eurozone) has crossed the Rubicon and is heading towards breakup or collapse. In the periphery of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain, there is despair at the ever-deepening recession. In France and Italy there is burgeoning opposition to long-term austerity. In Germany there is frustration at feckless southerners.

Disintegration is likely to take a turn for the worse in 2013, as a global slump is in the offing. The large economies of Europe, including the UK, are entering recession largely due to austerity policies. The US economy is veering towards negative territory, as Barack Obama's expansionary policies were never vigorous enough. China is facing a hard landing that will force a re-examination of its growth strategy. The international financial system, meanwhile, remains weak and unreformed.

After three years of festering, truly drastic action is now required. Peripheral countries must abandon austerity as part of a Europe-wide programme to raise productivity, financial institutions must be taken into public ownership, and debt written off. But it is unthinkable that Europe's current political leaders would embark on such changes. Hidebound by neoliberal economics, they will continue with austerity, privatisation and liberalisation. The financial markets have sensed it and are preparing for disaster.

The disaster is likely to start in Greece. The country is in the midst of an unprecedented depression, made largely in Brussels. In 2012 output is likely to contract by 7% to 9%, on top of about 14% in 2008-11. Not surprisingly, the bailout programme is again missing its targets as recession has reduced tax revenues.

Yet the EU is insisting that the country should stick with the failed programme by imposing huge cuts in public expenditure in 2012-14. The aim is to achieve a primary surplus at the earliest date. If the cuts do take place and a global slump does indeed materialise, the Greek economy will contract ruthlessly in 2013, even by 10%. It would be an economic and social catastrophe, especially as unemployment is already at 23%, including 52% for the youth.

The present Greek government, formed out of the establishment parties of New Democracy and Pasok with the addition of the ardent Europeanist Dimar, is incapable of dealing with the crisis. They won the June election by playing on middle-class fears about returning to the drachma and losing savings.

They also cynically promised to renegotiate bailout terms knowing full well that renegotiation was impossible as long as the framework of the bailout was accepted. In practice, they are about to impose the spending cuts demanded by the EU, while liberalising closed professions and selling public assets in the ludicrous hope of boosting growth.

The government is unlikely to survive for long. As depression worsens in the next six months to a year, Greece will again confront the impossibility of sticking with bailout policies.

This time the decision is likely to be final, with profound implications for the ruling elite that took the country into the EMU on a wing and a prayer. The elite is now watching in horror as its strategy is falling apart, and seems incapable of devising an alternative path.

But Greece is unlikely to attempt suicide: at some point it will default on its debts and exit the EMU. There will then be a genuinely new government, perhaps formed by the left, which will navigate the chaos and guide the rebuilding of economy and society. Once Greece has made its move, the unravelling of the EMU will probably start in full earnest.



7/09/2012

Greek Economy To Shrink More Than Forecast, Group Says



Πηγή: Bloomberg
By Paul Tugwell
July 9 2012

Greece’s economy will contract by more than forecast this year as rising unemployment and wage and pension cuts curb domestic demand, the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research said.

The economy will shrink by about 6.9 percent in 2012, the same as in in 2011, and more than its April 2 forecast for a 5 percent contraction, the Athens-based foundation, also known as IOBE, said today in its quarterly report on the Greek economy.

The high rate of decline in consumer demand since the beginning of the year will continue to have a negative impact on the labor market with unemployment for 2012 expected to reach 23.6 percent, according to IOBE. The foundation was headed by Yannis Stournaras until he was named Finance Minister on June 26.

Unemployment in Greece soared to a record 22.6 percent in the first quarter amid a slump deepened by wage and pension cuts and tax increases that are part of austerity measures linked to the country’s international rescue program. Gross domestic product in Greece, which is in its fifth year of recession, shrank 6.5 percent in the first quarter from a year earlier.

Greece will tell its creditors that high unemployment and recession necessitate changes to the country’s international bailout agreement, government spokesman Simeon Kedikoglou said July 3.



7/04/2012

Lunch with Alexis Tsipras, Greece's rising star


Πηγή: CNN
By John Defterios
July 4 2012

The room was filled with a certain buzz and not an empty seat could be found in the grand ballroom. I counted 14 television cameras lined up across the back of the room, and the center table where I was sitting had chief executives representing about a dozen sectors from advertising to power transmission.

A few minutes later a young, dapper man in a cobalt blue suit, matching suede loafers and a crisp white shirt - minus a tie - takes the center seat to my right. All eyes fix their gaze on Greece's rising star, 38 year-old Alexis Tsipras.

With a calm demeanor, but electric smile, the leader of the far left Syriza party and now the official opposition in the Greek parliament greets the host of the conference Daniel Franklin, executive editor of the Economist magazine. He turns and offers the same warm handshake to me and the first public policy address to the Greek business community gets underway.

Moments later, Tsipras takes the stage and wastes little time accusing the newly elected coalition government, made up of leaders from a previous generation, of rolling over in Brussels since it "could not negotiate to obtain oxygen that was given to others without a fight".

Tsipras was referring to the bank recapitalization package outlined at the European Union summit which identified Spain and Italy for direct bonds purchases from the European Central Bank's emergency fund, but noticeably left Greece out of the initial phase. The leader who gained nearly a third of the vote in the second round of elections was just warming up.

"Greece did not gain anything, while Italy and Spain succeeded in cracking the austerity policies," he says, before pausing and tilting his head to the television cameras to deliver the punch line: "When we have a deadly disaster without adequate medicine, the result will always be the same, (heart) failure."

Tsipras skyrocketed to power by promising to tear up the now infamous memorandum that former Prime Minister George Papandreou reluctantly signed with the Troika, made up of the EU, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund. His back against the wall, Papandreou agreed to what are, by any benchmark, draconian austerity measures, including wage and pension cuts of 20-40 percent and a plan - still not delivered on - to slash 150,000 state jobs.

Tsipras is taking a page out of the playbook of the former prime minister's father, Andreas Papandreou, the founder of socialist party PASOK. A passionate firebrand, Papandreou believed in a large state sector and the nationalization of industries from airlines to utilities. At the same time he would constantly tug at the emotions of a very proud, often nationalistic electorate, standing up for example to the Americans on key foreign policy issues.

Papandreou Sr.’s legacy is a lasting one. Greece, according to McKinsey & Company, has the largest state sector in Europe. Nearly one in four work for the government – and not very efficiently, according to the consultancy. It identified a labor productivity gap of 29% versus the EU average, and a whopping 40% versus the U.S. average.

During his speech Tsipras called for an immediate freeze on all salary cuts, to get all Greek citizens at home and abroad "properly registered" to reallocate the tax burden and in collaboration with its southern European partners re-write the memorandum, which he describes as a dead end.

A chief executive sitting to my left at the lunch table says Tsipras is in a sweet spot right now. He can still appeal to his core base - state workers who are members of very powerful unions and disgruntled youth, half of which are without a job - while at the same time tacking to the center of Greek politics to be more palatable to business. He is after all, according to one high profile businessman, a communist at heart who takes inspiration from Chavez of Venezuela and Putin in Russia. The re-packaging has just begun in earnest.

Multiple strategists, commentators and executives I spoke with during the elections and while chairing the Economist Roundtable this week said Tsipras was relieved not to score an outright victory. His party, having garnered only four percent of the vote in 2009, was not prepared for its meteoric rise in popularity and the responsibility of actually governing during a full blown, five year collapse of the economy.

After his formal remarks, Tsipras seeing my notes on the back of the menu card, says in heavily accented english that his speech must have had some value. I managed to have a brief conversation with the opposition leader in between a constant stream of interruptions by businessmen, professors and young followers. They seem to want to mark their cards for the future or genuinely want to touch the man that has captured so much global attention in such a short period of time.

I ask Tsipras how he would navigate negotiations with the Troika if he was already the leader. He says the debt-to-GDP level of 165% is too high - and that getting to 120% by 2020, as outlined by the Troika, is not acceptable. Too much pain on the Greek working class - for very little gain - is the message.

But would Tsipras ask to cut the debt in half to stay in the eurozone and not reduce the size of the state, as he promised during the campaign? The opposition leader adroitly avoids a direct answer and fields another request from an admirer who wants to latch on to this rising star. He is, it seems, determined to take measured steps and plant his feet firmly on the ground in the rough-and-tumble world of politics, and not to be a shooting star that flames out before his time.



7/03/2012

Theatre takes Socrates's teachings on tour of crisis-hit Greece

With Socrates’s help, Simonides said, Greeks might be able to admit their limitations. 

Πηγή: The Guardian
By Lizzy Davies
July 2 2012

Amid the debt crisis, many Greeks have come to despise their leaders, mistrust their media and resent the stern teachings of Brussels bureaucrats. Now some are turning to a rather different kind of wise man for help: an Athenian who doled out self-help tips while railing against the hypocrisies of society and the state – and whose lessons live on more than 2,400 years after his death.

Convinced of Socrates's particular relevance to contemporary Greece, the creators of a one-man theatrical performance of The Apology, Plato's account of his teacher's doomed but powerful trial defence, have brought the show to Athens.

"We call it Socrates Now. Why? Because we feel that more than anybody else he is relevant right now," said Yannis Simonides, the star of the Elliniko Theatre production. "He has always been relevant, he has always been essential. But now, why?" Because, Simonides said, his pearls of wisdom were peculiarly useful today.

"[He said]: 'Know thyself.' And we are at a time where we must look into ourselves, examine ourselves, before we examine anybody else or judge anybody else. We have to have a sense of our responsibilities, of our rights and our responsibilities. Of what we are, what we offer but also where we went wrong, and examine that and acknowledge it," he said.

"The other thing he says is: 'I know one thing; I don't know anything.' Now, a wonderful dimension of the Greeks is that they always know everything: 'Let me tell you about Europe! Let me tell you about the Greeks! Let me tell you about the Germans! This is a conspiracy!' That is part of our explosive, extraordinary nature."

But it is not always useful, he said. And with Socrates's help, Simonides said, they might be able to admit: "'I really should not say I know everything; I should consider. I may know very little.'"

The 65-year-old has been doing the show for years, in locations as diverse as Oxford, Dubai, Montevideo and New York. This year he and the Elliniko decided to commit themselves to staying in Greece. For the past week, and until Saturday, he has been performing outdoors at the University of Athens Museum, just below the Acropolis. The show will tour the country until the end of the year, with performances near the parliament building planned for the autumn.

"We looked at each other and said: 'We need to be here, we need to engage, we need to contribute a tiny bit,'" Simonides said. After every performance he remains on stage for a discussion with the audience, during which they can ask questions and debate the meaning of Socrates's words.

Simonides, who grew up in Greece but has lived in the US for decades, hopes spectators will feel inspired to act. "The essence of Socrates is not to teach us how to think but to teach us how to act, how to live. How can we apply this right now? How can we lay down our arms?

"Whether we are Greeks versus Greeks, whether we are Greeks versus Europeans, whether we are the poor versus the banking system, whether we're fascists versus leftists, we are human beings, we are citizens of the same city, whether it is the city of Athens or the city of the world. Let us, you and I, the fascist and the leftist, sit down and see, by asking each other some questions, by asking each other what is on our mind, how we could conceivably find a common place. Because, without finding it, we're going to go down."



7/02/2012

To Save the Euro, the Eurozone Governments Must Stand By Greece


Πηγή: Wall Street Pit
By Marshall Auerback
July 1 2012

George Soros probably understands the nature of the immediate problem facing the Eurozone (namely, the accelerating bank run which, amongst other things, potentially exposes Germany to trillions of contingent euro liabilities). But even Soros reflects the prevailing – and mistaken – view that Greece might need to become the sacrificial lamb required to save the euro. He said as much in a recent interview in Der Spiegel. Questioned about his proposal to rescue the European Monetary Union via a Debt Reduction Fund, Soros was asked whether this measure could also save Greece.

Soros: Unlikely. Rescuing Greece would require an enormous kind of magnanimity and generosity. The situation there has simply become too poisoned. I think that by standing firm and not compromising on Greece, Angela Merkel would be in a better position to persuade the German public to be more generous toward other nations and distinguish between the good guys and bad guys in Europe –(our emphasis)

Policy makers, market practitioners, indeed anyone like Soros, who keeps saying, “Well, we might have to sacrifice Greece ‘pour decourager les autres’” fail to recognize that this type attitude actually exacerbates the fatal flaw in the euro’s architecture and makes its ultimate demise more likely, not less. The same issues that confront the euro zone today would intensify in the event of a Greek exit. As Yanis Varoufakis has noted “the lack of a constitutional (or Treaty-enabled) process for exiting the Eurozone has a solid logic behind it. The whole point of creating the common currency was to impress the markets that it is a permanent union that will guarantee huge losses to anyone bold enough to bet against its solidity.”

As Varoufakis argues, a single exit suffices to punch a hole through this perceived solidity. It goes back to the fundamental flaw cited by Peter Garber at the time of the euro’s inception. As long as there was no perceived probability of euro exit by any euro nation, the established transfer system coupling private markets with European system of Central Bank support (Target 2, ELA, ECB repos) would function like any other monetary system in a single nation state. However, Garber recognized that if there arose the prospect of a euro exit and, therefore, a devaluation risk for holders of deposits in the banks domiciled in the country slated for exit (e.g. Greece or Spain), the European monetary system would be exposed to a bank run. Under the EU treaty capital mobility was guaranteed. Under the common currency deposit transfers from domestically domiciled banks in countries at risk of euro exit (e.g. Greece, Spain) to banks domiciled in other euro nation states (e.g. Germany, Netherlands) was costless. Faced with any non-negligible perceived risk of a euro exit and thereby a devaluation loss, rational market participants should move all their deposit funds from the banks domiciled in the country at risk of euro exit to banks domiciled in nations at the Eurozone’s unassailable core.

In the United States we have 50 states and one central bank. Likewise in other Federal systems such as Canada and Australia. In all cases, there are fund transfers across states. And these are permanent institutional arrangements. It is highly likely that West Virginia or Mississippi will remain long term recipients of Federal transfer payments, even if they remain “uncompetitive” vis a vis, say, Texas or California.

But there cannot be any prospect of a secession of a state that will bring with it its own devalued currency. Hence, there is no incentive for deposit flights from banks in one state or region to another. Therefore, private markets, with a little help from the Fed, will close the financial circuit to the extent there are such fund transfers. The European Monetary System was supposed to work that way. And as long as no one worried about any country leaving the euro, it did. But once the risk of euro exit on Europe’s periphery raised its ugly head, the euro system became completely different. Peter Garber argued that, given such a perceived prospect, the euro system was a perfect mechanism for a deposit run. And once doubts arose in 2009 about a possible euro exit by Greece and Ireland, a deposit run began – and in earnest.

Openly discussing the possibility of a “Grexit” then, simply exacerbates the current problem. It is akin to cutting an artery to demonstrate that one is serious about “discipline” and self-sacrifice”, whilst failing to realise that cutting that artery could well cause the entire patient to bleed to death. And whether it’s Greece which withdraws (or is booted out), or Italy, or Spain, very few people have, as Simon Johnson recently noted:

gotten their heads around dissolution risk. Here’s what it means: If you have a contract that requires you to be paid in euros and the euro no longer exists, what you will receive is unclear.” Why would that dissolution risk be mitigated if Greece were to exit the Eurozone?

Today, the euro is slowly but surely bleeding a death via the bank deposit runs that are now afflicting much of the periphery and gradually extending further into the core. Commenting on Frank Veneroso’s analysis of the bank run, my colleague Randy Wray argued:

Euroland is now in the midst of a massive run on periphery bank deposits. If you think about it, anyone who still has a Euro deposit in any bank other than a German bank is either a philanthropist or a fool. Moving deposits to German banks is a sure bet: if Germany leaves the EMU depositors will get appreciating Marks, and if Germany remains in the EMU depositors have the safest Euro deposits available.

Why take a risk that Italy or Spain or Greece will leave the EMU, default on Euro-denominated deposits, and redenominate them into a depreciating currency?

Paradoxically, the only way to alleviate this perception is for the European authorities to stand by its weakest member, in order to enhance the perception of the euro’s permanence as a monetary union. That means the line in the sand must be drawn in Greece, not Spain or Italy, as politically unpalatable as that might be to the German public.

Yes, Germany could leave, but as Berlin’s own Finance Ministry noted recently, it would be incredibly costly: An internal report from the finance ministry in Berlin was leaked by Der Spiegel indicating that a breakup of the euro would lead to a 10% contraction in the German economy in the first year with the number of unemployed nearly doubling.

It is also worth noting that although much of the flight deposit funds are going into German banks, under the ECB rules Germany’s loss exposure is limited to its 28% participation in the ECB. Were Germany to exit the euro, it would abrogate the Treaty. Its banking system, including the Bundesbank, might be exposed to almost all of such losses rather than the mere 28% under the current euro system. Which led to a very interesting comment by an Italian reader of Wray’s blog:

My life savings still reside in several Italian banks, partly due to a sliver of optimism but mainly because I fear that if / when the sh*t really hits the fan, and a large share of Greeks, Italians and Spaniards have already transferred their savings to German banks, that Germany will pass a law expropriating funds received from the periphery in order to help pay for the unfathomable costs of the end of the Euro.

Now wouldn’t that be even more foolish that keeping everything in Italy?

A scary thought and perhaps unfathomable. But so much of what has already happened in the Eurozone crisis would have seemed unthinkable just a few months before. And the Italian commentator here poses a legitimate question. The answer to him is, “Yes, leaving money in an Italian bank is one possible response to a threatened expropriation by Germany of funds leaving the periphery in order to pay their counterparty claims as creditor. But the other possibility is to take your money out of the Eurozone altogether.”

Capital flight out of the Eurozone would put the crisis in a different order of magnitude than has hitherto been the case, and would clearly expose once and for all that we have a euro design problem, not a disease of public sector profligacy. Why? Because it would almost certainly expose Germany to risks as well as the other member nations.

Were the crisis to manifest itself as a general loss of confidence in the euro (as opposed to a problem of a major bank run in the Eurozone periphery), we should ultimately expect to see widespread portfolio preference shifts out of the euro, causing a much bigger decline than has hitherto been the case. In many respects, a weaker euro is just what the doctor would order for the EMU nations, as it would provide a growth outlet via the export channel were the currency to fall enough on a trade-weighted basis. But it might be viewed undesirably by the ECB, given its desire to retain a modicum of anti-inflationary credibility (however misconceived that might be) and, more to the point, could well heighten the sense of panic which has hitherto been lurking just underneath the surface of Europe’s banking system.

This has been a most extraordinary silent bank run. We haven’t seen queues of people in front of loads of banks, desperately struggling to withdraw their money, but the Target 2, ELA and ECB repo activity all point to accelerating deposit flight. The biggest beneficiaries have hitherto been the German banks, but a generalized loss of confidence in the euro could well mean that the next wave of panic leads to outflows from the Eurozone altogether, which would likely be reflected via a sharply falling euro exchange rate. Given that the ECB is doing all in its power to keep the run from being a subject of public discussion (to do otherwise would likely exacerbate it), it is also likely doing what it can to maintain a strong or, at least, stable euro exchange rate, to prevent the bank run from erupting wide into the open.

Why isn’t the euro falling? In the aftermath of last July’s U.S. debt ceiling wars, central banks were diversifying out of dollars into euros despite Europe’s woes. However, recently a number of Asian central banks, such as the People’s Bank of China, have acknowledged being heavy sellers of euros. And the Commitment of Traders data continues to suggest that market speculators are net short the euro as well.

If specs in futures markets are massively short, as the COMEX data now seems to be indicating, and central banks are not buying euros, what could possibly be supporting the euro several big figures above where it was in mid-2010 when conditions in Europe were not nearly as bad? Perhaps the ECB itself? Or the ECB in combination with the Federal Reserve via the latter’s dollar swap facilities?

If this week’s summit does not provide a comprehensive solution to Europe’s bank run (as now seems unlikely), the ECB will likely move more aggressively in terms of supporting the continent’s tottering banking system (it is already lowering collateral requirements for both Spain and Italy, and has probably done likewise for Greek banks for the past several months via the ELA). Operationally, it can do this until the cows come home, but as more market participants (and, indeed, other central bankers) come to recognize the precarious position of the Eurozone commercial banking system, and the corresponding risks associated with holding one’s money in any euro-domiciled bank (including Germany) the euro could fall substantially. At a minimum, the ECB must stop the rot by persuading the markets that there will be no sacrificial lambs. To show the euro’s essential permanence, it must hold the line with Greece, not treat Athens like a forced amputation designed to save what’s left of a seriously ill patient.