Tactics for frigates for the Greek Navy

Source: ES&T

July 27 2020

By Hans Uwe Mergener

The purchase of two frigates in France for the Greek navy appears to be bursting. According to French media reports, even top-level interventions have not given the deal a boost.

It is primarily about the acquisition of two frigates of the Belh @ rra class (export designation of the design by Naval Group, referred to in France as "FDI" - Frégate de Défense et d'Intervention) with armament (here MdCN - Missile de Croisière) Naval, cruise missile, from MBDA). The business is expected to amount to 2.5 to three billion euros. A letter of intent is said to have been drawn in October 2019 (Defense News). Greece is now questioning this.

Paris had been working on a structured and long-term partnership with the Greek maritime industry for some time. It was launched earlier this year. A center of excellence for innovations in naval warfare was to be created in Greece with French support. "We want Greece to be at the center of European naval innovation," said Hervé Guillou, the then long-serving CEO of the Naval Group. A cooperation plan presented by Naval Group at the French Embassy in Athens on February 13, 2020 (ES & T reported) provided for cooperation with a number of Greek companies. There were talks of over twenty companies in Greece with which Naval Group, Thales and MBDA wanted to enter into commitments. On the scientific side, partnerships have been entered into with three universities - the Technical University of Athens (energy, composite materials), the University of Patras ((flight) drones) and the University of Crete (robotics, manufacturing 4.0). An intergovernmental agreement should finalize the collaboration later this year.

Paris and Washington vie for Athens

The success achieved back then was questionable for a long time. Transatlantic offers were launched to convince Athens to buy a warship in the United States. During his visit on October 5 and 6, 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo signed an additional protocol to the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, which had been in place since 1990, and which will give American armed forces wider and easier access to Greek bases. The usual practice so far that this agreement has to be renewed annually has been abandoned. Pompeo's visit broke the standard pattern of visits by senior US diplomats in recent years who visited both Athens and Ankara to achieve "balance". Observers see this as a new security policy positioning for Washington, which is moving away from Ankara.

For its part, the USA wanted to engage in compensation transactions in Greece. In addition to the establishment of a helicopter training center in Central Greece (Volos) and the provision of drones, helicopters and a connection to the American F-35 program - after the exclusion of Turkey - are said to have been up for discussion, the latter (partially) financed by US funds Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS), which enables the sale of weapons, armaments and military services (e.g. training) to foreign governments. At that time, experts said that Lockheed Martin should have lured with four units of the Littoral Combat Ship. The offer included the delivery of four ships for the price of two - at least two billion euros. A connection with the four Littoral Combat Ship, whose retirement date (March 2021) the US Navy has just made public, is not unreasonable - but it has not been confirmed either.

In addition, Washington went the way of industrial ties in the maritime sector. American investment (lead: United States International Development Finance Corporation - an independent agency of the United States government that finances privately organized development projects) is expected to revive the Greek shipbuilding industry. The New York private equity firm Onex has already managed two Greek shipyards out of the economic crisis: Nerion and Elefsina.

Despite field advantages - Parisian handicaps

Also in view of the transatlantic advances, Athens initially maintained its intentions to cooperate with France. They work together in various European programs (including PESCO). Greece supports France in Emasoh and has promised at least a personal participation. Paris is opposed to Ankara on maritime law issues, such as Turkish exploration efforts in the Cypriot economic zone and Turkish territorial claims in the Mediterranean. In the EU, France bears a lion's share of Greece's debt in the forecast total of 338.55 billion euros in 2024 (data from statista.com), or - according to French media - 40-50 billion euros.

According to reports by the French “La Tribune”, there are serious doubts as to whether both deals - the governmental agreement on in-depth cooperation and the purchase of frigates - will come about at all. By the end of summer, the parties had originally planned to contractually deliver the first frigates in 2024 - that meant a construction period of around 40 weeks - and in 2026 for the second unit.

Greek Finance Minister Christos Staïkouras is said to have postponed the project by ten years. A meeting between French President Emmanuel Macron and Greek Prime Minister Kyriákos Mitsotákis on the sidelines of the EU summit on the EU budget and the Corona-related economic stimulus program (July 24-27) could not have given impetus to the planned armaments cooperation.

According to the French reading, given the budgetary constraints of Athens, the price tag is the obstacle. The Greeks, it is rumored, find the price for the two frigates too high, criticized contractual terms and financing clauses. An Athens newspaper reports that Greece can only bear annual payments of 300 million euros. Another source puts the Greek offer, with reference to French sources, at 1.4 billion euros.

Alternative scenarios are already being discussed in the Greek media. This involves the modernization of the four Meko frigates of the Hellenic Navy (a type of warship from thyssenkrupp Marine Systems). Another option would be four new multi-purpose frigates from the U.S. that could be delivered by 2025. Both projects could be implemented in Greece - an immense advantage over the French variant.

In June, an agreement to build seven corvettes based on designs by Israel Shipyards (Haifa) was announced at Onex shipyard Elefsina. According to Greek press releases, the 72-meter-long and approx. 800-tonne displacing Themistocles corvettes are intended to unite the know-how of Greek, Israeli and American industry. Onex and Israel Shipyards intend to appear internationally with the design. A strategic industrial partnership agreement was signed on June 16.

The three-thousand-ton corvette, the European Patrol Corvette (EPC), presented by Naviris, the joint venture between Naval Group and Fincantieri, is also said to play a role in Greek considerations. Greece is one of four EU member states participating in this PESCO project, the aim of which is to develop a prototype for a new class of warships in order to fulfill a large number of tasks and missions with a modular and flexible approach.

The alternatives have the common advantage that a high proportion of the added value could take place in Greece. The extent to which this, along with the financing, will be decisive for the decision will soon become clear.

For France, which stood up for Greece, the failure of the agreed cooperation meant a setback. To avoid this supposed "defeat" (La Tribune), Paris has launched a charm offensive. Florence Parly, the French Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian would now try to get their Greek counterparts back to the negotiating table, La Tribune said.

Outside of the EU, Greece maintains close political and economic ties with the United States and China. China holds 51 percent of the shares in the port of Piraeus through the state shipping company COSCO. The Bank of China opened a branch in Athens in November 2019. Since April 2019, Greece has been a 17th EU member of the Chinese initiative "Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries", which deepened relations between the two countries. This makes it clear that the Greek considerations could have a completely different background, which should draw the attention of the EU states.

China Expresses Concern Over US Defense Blueprint

U.S. Army soldiers from Stryker Brigade Combat Team stand in line after a live fire drill during joint exercises with South Korea.

Πηγή: VOAnews
Jan 7 2012

Chinese state media are expressing concern over the latest U.S. defense plan, warning that it could damage U.S.-Chinese relations.

The Communist Party-affiliated Global Times newspaper quoted a Chinese defense expert Friday saying the U.S. blueprint announced a day earlier is clearly targeted at China.

The newspaper quoted Renmin University analyst Jin Canrong saying the United States feels threatened by China's rapid development. He warned the new American strategy will make Beijing uncomfortable and could affect bilateral relations.

U.S. President Barack Obama announced the reorganization Thursday. He said the United States will strengthen its presence in the Asia Pacific region even as it cuts billions of dollars from overall defense spending.

The announcement came amid a major buildup in the capabilities of China's military, which in the last year tested its first aircraft carrier and its first stealth fighter jet. Chinese forces are engaged this week in major exercises in Fujian and Liaoning provinces and in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.

China's official Xinhua news agency also commented on the U.S. defense plan, saying the United States is welcome to contribute to peace and stability in the region, but that any militarism will cause ill will and be met by strong opposition.

In its generally restrained commentary, Xinhua said the United States should abstain from flexing its muscles as this will not help solve regional disputes.

Some Western analysts also see the U.S. defense plan as aimed at least in part at countering China's growing power.

Britain's influential newspaper, The Times, reported Friday that, with the reorganization, President Barack Obama was sending "a clear warning signal to China."

The U.S.-based Associated Press news agency, meanwhile, published an analysis saying the new defense strategy was intended to focus on Asian security risks - mainly China and North Korea.

2011 in review: European defence makes slow, yet very definite, progress

Πηγή: Defence iQ
Dec 12 2011

The final part of Defence Dateline Group's three-part review of 2011 sees Jonathan Dowdall explore the development and changing nature of Europe’s defence industry.

Reporting from deep inside the ‘Brussels Bubble’, it is easy to forget how alien the workings of NATO HQ and the European Union can seem to the outside observer. At best, that generic place the UK press calls ‘Europe’ is a confusing world of never-ending economic crisis talks, bizarre acronyms, and the French. At worst, it is a looming bogey man, threatening to strip Britain of its sovereign defence policy.

Yet 2011 has seen both of these institutions tackling some of the major challenges of the current security and defence field. From operations over Libya to the pooling and sharing of military equipment, NATO and the EU have been busy. Some initiatives have been notably more successful then others. In review, the overall picture may indicate progress towards a stronger foundation for European defence – even if it’s the sort of slow, deliberating progress which so many in Britain would label as typical of European politics.

Libya: Taking to the skies, or down in the dirt?

Enough coverage has been provided on the timeline for NATO’s Libya mission, Operation Unified Protector. So far, the lead nations have received considerable credit for their intervention, but the story is not yet over. Should the NTCs shaky hold of the country break down, or political reconciliation falter, then the world will quickly come to blame the North Atlantic Council members that so enthusiastically lobbied the UN for a mandate to intervene. In this regard, it’s all too early to tell.

More generally, Libya threw up a host of new empirical examples of NATO’s multilateral military machine in action - some good, some bad.

On the positive side, NATO’s C4I architecture and operational facilities, after a quick dust-up in Naples, proved up to the task. Not only were a staggering number of sorties successfully coordinated between a dozen active bombing nations, but even non-members such as the UAE and Qatar managed to integrate into this ad hoc system. Whilst commentators wryly note the almost complete reliance on US air-to-air refueling, Europe’s co-owned NATO AWACs performed admirably. Meanwhile, the particularly enthusiastic participation of Denmark and Norway meant there was never a lack of ordinance when it was needed.

Yet there are some less confident messages from Libya, most of them political. Germany’s decision to abstain from the UN vote for a mandate may have been rectified by later contributions of staff and naval assets, but it casts a bad light on the level of consensus the alliance can create for a major deployment, even in an unequivocal humanitarian emergency. Meanwhile, Italy’s early procrastination over its commitment almost put vital air bases beyond NATO use. Both cases highlight ongoing internal tensions in the alliance.

So whilst Libya may, for now, be considered successful, its legacy could prove to be decidedly mixed at NATO HQ.

European military equipment woes

The wider picture of European defence budgets and equipment deficits seems to have only worsened in 2011. In June, outgoing US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a stinging rebuke that Europe needs to pull its weight or lose US investment; certainly marking a new low in a transatlantic defence spending relationship which sees Europe contribute just 25% of the NATO total.

For NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, this is exactly why 2011 was supposed to be the year of Smart Defence - an ambitious programme which seeks to increase European capabilities through increased efficiency and the pooling and sharing of military assets.

What to say about Smart Defence? Commentary is difficult when so little of the practical negotiations have been made public. A small announcement in November that 160 potential collaborative projects have been discussed between NATO Defence Ministers hardly changes the picture fundamentally.

What we do know is that the knowledge and expertise of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in defence reform has been available to member states since 1999. Moreover, to many European states the need to increase spending efficiency has been glaringly obvious for years. This hardly bodes well for the rapid transformation the Secretary General envisions.

Meanwhile, though some fairly historic agreements - such as the Anglo-French or Weimar Triangle defence treaties - certainly seem to take on board the Smart Defence message, it has been argued in some quarters that such bilateral initiatives are actually bypassing wider alliance cooperation. In short, they might bring more equipment to the table in a time of war, but at the expense of wider solidarity and cooperation in the alliance. The jury, then, is still out on Smart Defence.

"A similar degree of mixed progress has been made by the EU in addressing Europe’s equipment woes. The Union’s own Ministerial level pooling and sharing initiative - or Ghent Framework - produced 11 "concrete" project ideas in December, which now need to be negotiated between member states for implementation. As of yet, none have made that difficult leap from a concept on paper to an actual deal. Yet given the raft of affirmative military agreements signed between nations such as France, Poland, Sweden and Germany this year, the potential foundations for progress have certainly been laid."

Finally, that EU policy staple of trade regulation was put to surprising use in 2011, when the long awaited Defence Package came into force in August. A policy with a long term objective - the creation of a competitive, single European defence market - we have yet to see the acid test for these new regulations: a military equipment tender by a major European state.

When this does occur, the Package’s promise of throwing more bids open to EU-wide competition, as opposed to domestic champions, will have its baptism of fire. Many are skeptical member states can be trusted to play honestly under the new rules - especially when the financial crisis is already putting industrial jobs at risk. Nonetheless, the law is on the books, and European lawyers will look on with interest for signs of compliance in the market.

Rolling with the punches in 2012?

When 2011 began, the rhetoric in NATO and elsewhere was of recovery: restructuring defence budgets, recuperating capabilities, rejuvenating cooperative agreements. With the depths of the financial crisis apparently behind us, European defence officials were ready to tackle the tricky business of making their new means work for their desired ends.

As November’s spectacular breakdown of confidence in the Eurozone has indicated, it appears the financial crisis has knocked the prospective budget situation back into emergency mode. Recovery may have to wait.

Nonetheless, as the above assessment indicates, progress, whilst mixed, has been made. Libya unexpectedly reaffirmed NATO’s worth in what has become its core business - armed intervention in regional conflicts of concern. European pooling and sharing, whilst slow, has been given some serious thought, and national governments are being forced to consider the wider market structure of their defence sector thanks to new EU trade laws.

In summary, for NATO and the EU 2011 has provided that stuttering progress typical of European multilateralism. Slow, and hardly methodical, a shared consensus has nonetheless emerged in some key areas. Where it has not, 2012 will likely throw up further surprises to sharpen minds and focus will.

Besides, after the knocks of the past few years, surely the only way is up?

Defence Ministry restoring missile umbrella

Πηγή: ITAR - TASS
05:28 11/08/2011

MOSCOW, August 11  — The Russian Space Troops will receive two sophisticated Voronezh-DM radars in December 2011, to be incorporated in the system of early warning of missile launches.

One of them will start operating in Armavir, and the other – in Kaliningrad, the Russian westernmost city. This radar will ensure Russian nuclear parity in case a Euro ABM is deployed, writes the Izvestia newspaper on Thursday. In 2012 a similar facility will be put into operation in the Irkutsk Region.

The task of the advanced radars will be to detect missiles, blasted off from other countries. Using these radar stations, Russia will fully restore control over air space around its borders.

“The commissioning of the Voronezh-DM radars is to restore integrity of radar control over air space. In some cases, we plug the present gaps, in others, we increase capacities of old stations,” the newspaper learnt at the Space Troops.

In contrast to “Soviet predecessors” – the radars in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – the new radars will be stationed in the Russian territory. Besides, they consume 40 percent less energy and can see what is going on in the skies and outer-space at a distance of 4,500 kilometres.

The first new-type radar Voronezh-DM was handed over for test operation in 2009 near St. Petersburg, in the village of Lekhtusi. It will be already combat-ready in December. Its operation set off the loss of a radar in Latvia. The Space Troops got the chance to see air space from the Morocco coast to Shpitsbergen as well as the US east coast.

The next year witnesses the commissioning of the second radar in Armavir, “inspecting” South Europe up to the North Africa coast. Its capacities closed the gap that formed as a result of Moscow’s refusal to operate a station in Sevastopol.

“The construction of the radar in the Kaliningrad Region, in the village of Pionerskoye covers the western sector which was guarded by stations in Mukachevo and Belarussian Baranovichi. The second station under construction in Armavir will supplement capacities of the Gabalinskaya radar in Azerbaijan.

The next year will see the commissioning of a facility in the Irkutsk Region, which will “search” the space from China to the US western coast. Following this, “we can say that we fully restored the radar system of early warning of a missile attack,” the Space Troops emphasised.

Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov who recently visited the Azerbaijan Gabalinskaya radar (“Daryal”), said that the military leadership does not intend to abandon the old Soviet stations, located in neighbour republics. “Everything remains as it is for the time being. We do not give up a single station and do not plan to,” Serdyukov said.

According to Izvestia, Russia is not likely to stop with construction of the radar near Irkutsk. The Defence Ministry’s plans provide for complete replacement, under the state programme of armaments till 2020, of all Soviet long-distance radars with the new Voronezh-DM and construction of several new ones.

It is planned to spend several billion roubles for their erection. The military say that the Arctic alone remains inaccessible.