Πηγή: Defence iQ
Dec 12 2011
The final part of Defence Dateline Group's three-part review of 2011 sees Jonathan Dowdall explore the development and changing nature of Europe’s defence industry.
Reporting from deep inside the ‘Brussels Bubble’, it is easy to forget how alien the workings of NATO HQ and the European Union can seem to the outside observer. At best, that generic place the UK press calls ‘Europe’ is a confusing world of never-ending economic crisis talks, bizarre acronyms, and the French. At worst, it is a looming bogey man, threatening to strip Britain of its sovereign defence policy.
Yet 2011 has seen both of these institutions tackling some of the major challenges of the current security and defence field. From operations over Libya to the pooling and sharing of military equipment, NATO and the EU have been busy. Some initiatives have been notably more successful then others. In review, the overall picture may indicate progress towards a stronger foundation for European defence – even if it’s the sort of slow, deliberating progress which so many in Britain would label as typical of European politics.
Libya: Taking to the skies, or down in the dirt?
Enough coverage has been provided on the timeline for NATO’s Libya mission, Operation Unified Protector. So far, the lead nations have received considerable credit for their intervention, but the story is not yet over. Should the NTCs shaky hold of the country break down, or political reconciliation falter, then the world will quickly come to blame the North Atlantic Council members that so enthusiastically lobbied the UN for a mandate to intervene. In this regard, it’s all too early to tell.
More generally, Libya threw up a host of new empirical examples of NATO’s multilateral military machine in action - some good, some bad.
On the positive side, NATO’s C4I architecture and operational facilities, after a quick dust-up in Naples, proved up to the task. Not only were a staggering number of sorties successfully coordinated between a dozen active bombing nations, but even non-members such as the UAE and Qatar managed to integrate into this ad hoc system. Whilst commentators wryly note the almost complete reliance on US air-to-air refueling, Europe’s co-owned NATO AWACs performed admirably. Meanwhile, the particularly enthusiastic participation of Denmark and Norway meant there was never a lack of ordinance when it was needed.
Yet there are some less confident messages from Libya, most of them political. Germany’s decision to abstain from the UN vote for a mandate may have been rectified by later contributions of staff and naval assets, but it casts a bad light on the level of consensus the alliance can create for a major deployment, even in an unequivocal humanitarian emergency. Meanwhile, Italy’s early procrastination over its commitment almost put vital air bases beyond NATO use. Both cases highlight ongoing internal tensions in the alliance.
So whilst Libya may, for now, be considered successful, its legacy could prove to be decidedly mixed at NATO HQ.
European military equipment woes
The wider picture of European defence budgets and equipment deficits seems to have only worsened in 2011. In June, outgoing US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a stinging rebuke that Europe needs to pull its weight or lose US investment; certainly marking a new low in a transatlantic defence spending relationship which sees Europe contribute just 25% of the NATO total.
For NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, this is exactly why 2011 was supposed to be the year of Smart Defence - an ambitious programme which seeks to increase European capabilities through increased efficiency and the pooling and sharing of military assets.
What to say about Smart Defence? Commentary is difficult when so little of the practical negotiations have been made public. A small announcement in November that 160 potential collaborative projects have been discussed between NATO Defence Ministers hardly changes the picture fundamentally.
What we do know is that the knowledge and expertise of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in defence reform has been available to member states since 1999. Moreover, to many European states the need to increase spending efficiency has been glaringly obvious for years. This hardly bodes well for the rapid transformation the Secretary General envisions.
Meanwhile, though some fairly historic agreements - such as the Anglo-French or Weimar Triangle defence treaties - certainly seem to take on board the Smart Defence message, it has been argued in some quarters that such bilateral initiatives are actually bypassing wider alliance cooperation. In short, they might bring more equipment to the table in a time of war, but at the expense of wider solidarity and cooperation in the alliance. The jury, then, is still out on Smart Defence.
"A similar degree of mixed progress has been made by the EU in addressing Europe’s equipment woes. The Union’s own Ministerial level pooling and sharing initiative - or Ghent Framework - produced 11 "concrete" project ideas in December, which now need to be negotiated between member states for implementation. As of yet, none have made that difficult leap from a concept on paper to an actual deal. Yet given the raft of affirmative military agreements signed between nations such as France, Poland, Sweden and Germany this year, the potential foundations for progress have certainly been laid."
Finally, that EU policy staple of trade regulation was put to surprising use in 2011, when the long awaited Defence Package came into force in August. A policy with a long term objective - the creation of a competitive, single European defence market - we have yet to see the acid test for these new regulations: a military equipment tender by a major European state.
When this does occur, the Package’s promise of throwing more bids open to EU-wide competition, as opposed to domestic champions, will have its baptism of fire. Many are skeptical member states can be trusted to play honestly under the new rules - especially when the financial crisis is already putting industrial jobs at risk. Nonetheless, the law is on the books, and European lawyers will look on with interest for signs of compliance in the market.
Rolling with the punches in 2012?
When 2011 began, the rhetoric in NATO and elsewhere was of recovery: restructuring defence budgets, recuperating capabilities, rejuvenating cooperative agreements. With the depths of the financial crisis apparently behind us, European defence officials were ready to tackle the tricky business of making their new means work for their desired ends.
As November’s spectacular breakdown of confidence in the Eurozone has indicated, it appears the financial crisis has knocked the prospective budget situation back into emergency mode. Recovery may have to wait.
Nonetheless, as the above assessment indicates, progress, whilst mixed, has been made. Libya unexpectedly reaffirmed NATO’s worth in what has become its core business - armed intervention in regional conflicts of concern. European pooling and sharing, whilst slow, has been given some serious thought, and national governments are being forced to consider the wider market structure of their defence sector thanks to new EU trade laws.
In summary, for NATO and the EU 2011 has provided that stuttering progress typical of European multilateralism. Slow, and hardly methodical, a shared consensus has nonetheless emerged in some key areas. Where it has not, 2012 will likely throw up further surprises to sharpen minds and focus will.
Besides, after the knocks of the past few years, surely the only way is up?
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