Showing posts with label Eastern Europe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Eastern Europe. Show all posts

10/05/2011

Turkey’s muscular maneuvers on the world stage


Πηγή: Foreign Policy
By Joshua W. Walker
Oct 3 2011


United Nations General Assembly meetings are not traditionally the most exciting world events to keep track of, yet they are an important indicator of the times that we live in. As such, the impassioned case that President Mahmoud Abbas made for Palestinian statehood, with a rebuttal from Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, filled most of the headlines along with the now ritualistic walkout of Western diplomats during Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speech. President Obama's speech on the other hand barely made the news. But perhaps the most significant performance at the annual U.N. meeting that ended last week, and the prime beneficiary of this year's world stage, was arguably Turkey and its newly minted "rockstar" Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Coming on the heels of his tour of Somalia and the "Arab Spring" capitals in Cairo, Tripoli, and Tunis, Erdogan was received enthusiastically by every world leader he met with including President Obama, who praised him for his "great leadership." The cache of soft power Turkey brought to New York came not just from its recent surge in regional popularity because of its increasingly tough stance on Israel or burgeoning economy, but because of the personal credibility that its Prime Minister brings as a leader. America's diminished role in the Middle East mirrors Obama's own problems domestically that has created a leadership vacuum that Turkey has actively sought to fill.

Erdogan's regional travels take him beyond the isolated capitals to interact with individuals and communities that Western leaders can only dream of visiting because of security concerns. In turn the Prime Minister fills his talks with these personal experiences and touching anecdotes. Using the same political charisma and rhetoric that has captivated and won him an unprecedented three consecutive terms in office in Turkey, Erdogan's speech at the U.N. was vintage.

The agenda, focus, and tone of Erdogan's U.N. speech was telling. Gone was the humble and soft-spoken Turkey of last year. In its place was a self-confident global actor that demanded action and attention on a number of items. Erdogan emphatically stated his support for the recognition of a Palestinian state while also continuing his condemnation of Israeli behavior, part of Turkey's ongoing bilateral dispute with the country. But it was on Somalia where he began and showed the greatest leadership in championing a moral issue that no other country has embraced. As the first world leader to land at Mogadishu and only the third country after Ethiopia and Djibouti to re-open its embassy, Erdogan boldly flaunted Turkey's diplomatic muscles. He chastised the developed nations of the world for "forgetting" about Somalia and the suffering throughout the Horn of Africa, while tying it into a broader theme of international change and the march of history that puts Turkey squarely at the center.

Erdogan and Turkey's dramatic arrival and performance on the international stage has already caused waves as the perennial questions about Turkey's "axis shift" and "Where is Turkey going?" debates are being renewed in Western capitals. Many long-time observers are accustomed to assessing Turkey's behavior through the prism of convergence with or divergence from EU and U.S. policies and preferences without a critical assessment of Turkey's own agenda. In the emerging realities of the new Middle East, Turkey's ability to deliver on its agenda and promises as a regional power hinges on its consistent pursuit of democratization at home and a principled foreign policy that puts authoritarian rivals in the region to shame. Erdogan and Turkey have always offered an intriguing and tantalizing set of characteristics and potential that has never been fully realized, but is now being fully capitalized on the world stage. At the heart of Turkey's success has been a pragmatic flexibility towards its new more active regional policy.

With one of the most active U.N. agendas of any world leader, Erdogan also made time for addresses to civil society and media outlets such as Charlie Rose and Fareed Zakaria where he spoke directly to an international audience that is becoming more accustomed to him and his brash style. But the media attention paid to Turkey throughout the U.N. and every meeting it chaired is as much a reflection of Erdogan's self-confident leadership style as it is a vacuum on the part of other traditional Western power players and the extremes to which other "anti-Western" leaders go to make their cases. It also helps that when Erdogan speaks he is already the envy of his neighbors: Turkey is one of the great economic success stories of the 21st century and in the last quarter overtook China for the first time in overall rate of growth.

On almost every international issue, Turkey has actively involved itself and been able to pivot with more success than other players. As evidenced by Turkey's announcements before arriving at the U.N. that it was severing all ties with Syria and would be stationing NATO radar sites to deal with any potential threats from Iran, flexibility is part and parcel of Erdogan's more active leadership style. Still, having switched from "zero problems with neighbors" to a self-styled champion of the "people," Erdogan has had more success with his regional calculus than within a Turkey that continues to struggle with its perennial Kurdish problem. Having once championed a political solution, Erdogan's increasingly hard line on the Kurdish question has led many to criticize Turkey for hypocrisy and inconsistency.

But in the midst of the dramatic Middle Eastern revolutions and European economic crisis over the past year, Turkey has been offered as a "model" in every conceivable way despite a lack of consensus on the true lessons of the Turkish experience. Unlike many Middle Eastern governments, which lack legitimacy among their own populations, and Israel, which is increasingly isolated, Turkey has emerged stronger as an independent, populist, and powerful regional ally to be courted by all actors, not just the United States.

Turkey did not transform itself from a defeated post-Ottoman Empire state to a flourishing market-based Muslim-majority democracy overnight, nor did Prime Minister Erdogan become the most successful conservative Muslim politician in Turkey and its neighborhood without going through a series of major transformations; it has been almost a century in the making. The lessons learned and the opportunities offered by both are particularly applicable to the world today, which is in a period of profound change and increasingly explains why all eyes have been turning towards Erdogan and Turkey.

For the transatlantic community, Turkey's newfound swagger and Erdogan's victorious international performance can make him either a more valuable or an uncertain partner. Turkish policies and Erdogan's populism can still complement the EU and U.S. if framed within a broader and longer-term perspective of the transatlantic alliance that shares common goals and values, even if the short-term means differ. At a moment in which U.S. leadership is being questioned and Middle Eastern frustrations continue, the timing has never been more opportune to re-focus on the core principles and values that have led to the emergence of Erdogan as leader in the new democratic Turkey.


7/18/2011

The coming global financial crisis



Πηγή: MSN Money

By Jim Jubak, 6/13/2011 10:30 AM ET|


Politicians in the US, China and Europe are all postponing tough financial decisions until after next year's elections. But in 2013, we'll have to face the (bigger) problems.

Politics virtually guarantee that the global economy won't go into crisis in 2011. Politics make it extremely unlikely that the global economy will slow down as much as the market seems to fear. Politics, in fact, put a safety net under the global economy this year.

And politics also virtually guarantee another, deeper crisis in 2012 or 2013. I'd bet 2013.

How come? You see, just about every politician in the world is trying to kick an economic problem down the road into 2012 or 2013. I think they'll succeed in postponing the day of reckoning in 2011 using a combination of funny accounting, additional spending and subsidies. But the price for that postponement will be that problems will be bigger and harder to truly solve in 2012 or 2013 than they are now. And that will raise the odds that the global economy will face another serious crisis -- just five years or so after the last one.

This kick-it-down-the-road effort is most obvious in the eurozone, where the effort to put together a new rescue package for Greece really comes down to putting off a Greek default from 2012 to 2013 or 2014.

But the effect is also visible in the United States, where I think the most likely result of negotiations in the U.S. to raise the debt ceiling will be to kick the problem into the 2012 election campaign, with a "solution" postponed to 2013. You can also see it in China, where the leadership that takes over in 2012 and 2013 from President Hu Jintao will be extremely reluctant to rock the boat until it's firmly in power.

Altogether, this politics of delay means that in 2011 the global economy will get enough stimulus to keep growth at the relatively high levels that politicians need to keep voters reasonably happy. Politicians won't even think about making the tough choices that might inhibit growth until well into 2012.
Greece example is clear

You should be familiar with the politics of procrastination from my posts on the Greek debt crisis. The original rescue plan for Greece, cobbled together last year with funding from the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, turned out to be an all-too-hopeful effort to push the problem down the road into 2012. The thinking last year, when the rescue program was put together, was that if Greece could get enough cash from a European Union rescue program to get to 2012, the country would have enough time to get its house in order so it could start to finance its debt from private investors again.

That turns out to have been exceedingly optimistic (I'd call it just plain wrong). Greece has failed to quickly reform its dysfunctional system of tax collection; instead, the country has continued to collect less tax than it is owed (and less than it promised its rescuers it would collect). Meantime, budget cutting and asset sales -- while painful enough to elicit widespread protests in Greece -- haven't lived up to projections, either. Add in the effects of the all-too-predictable slowdown in the economy as a result of these measures, and Greece clearly won't be embraced by financial markets in 2012 and maybe not in 2013.

Efforts at a new package are held up now by fighting between the German government and the European Central Bank about whether bondholders should be required to extend the maturity of Greek bonds as part of any deal. But the real focus of the talks is on getting enough money from the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund to support Greece until 2013 or 2014 when -- hope springs eternal -- Greece will be able to sell debt in the financial markets again.

The political imperatives driving this thinking are clear. The only alternative to this deal -- if it can be sold to voters in Germany and other northern European countries and assuming that it works -- is a painful re-examination and restructuring of the entire euro project. In the current political climate it's unlikely that voters in the northern or southern eurozone would approve a restructuring that actually dealt with the problems of running a single currency for economies as different as those of Germany and Greece. Kick the problem down the road and hope seems like a pretty good alternative to European politicians.
US and the debt-ceiling debate

The situation is totally different in the United States, but the result is remarkably similar. In the U.S., the presidential election looms in 2012, and the anemic recovery is the issue where the Obama administration is most vulnerable to Republican attack. The Republican opposition certainly doesn't want to strike any deal over the debt ceiling -- the U.S. will run out of room to borrow in August, according to the U.S. Treasury. That would remove the shocking state of U.S. finances from the minds of voters.

On the other hand, pragmatic Republicans don't want to force the United States into even a technical default on its debt in August and risk creating a crisis a year too early or getting blamed for any crisis. Democrats, for their part, would like a deal this year that doesn't preclude the chance that the economy will pick up speed and look better in June 2012 than it does now.

That's why, in my opinion, the most likely outcome isn't a crisis this year but some patchwork compromise that gives both sides potential ammunition for 2012 and pushes off the hard work on reducing the U.S. deficit into 2012 or into the post-election period.

That would mean odds are relatively low that negotiations in Washington will produce budget cuts large enough to make a difference in the deficit or turn the current anemic slowdown into a double-dip recession. It's more likely that U.S. fiscal policy will remain muddled, with the Federal Reserve able to hold growth at 2% -- or perhaps even better if the first-quarter slowdown was a result of temporary factors stemming from the Japanese earthquake and tsunami.

By 2013, no matter how the election goes, the Federal Reserve will be under almost unbearable pressure to reduce its balance sheet and raise interest rates. That's when global bond markets will really pressure the United States to come up with a plan -- at the least -- for reducing its budget deficit over the long term.
As for China . . .

China won't hold U.S.-style elections to pick its next leaders, but the politicking is no less intense just because it's done behind closed doors and is limited to a handful of candidates at the top of the party hierarchy. All the evidence now points to intense jockeying as candidates for power try to move up the hierarchy as far as they can during the transition. The revival of Maoist slogans, songs and work campaigns in some regions in China are signs of that.

This transition is likely to be especially hard fought, because it marks the emergence of the so-called "princelings" onto the stage. The last generation was a transitional one between those who had led the revolution and the new generation, which is composed of the sons and daughters of revolutionary leaders. For example, Xi Jinping, the almost-certain successor to current President Hu Jintao, was born in 1963. His father, Xi Zhongxun, joined the party in 1928 and was deputy prime minister of China from 1959 to 1962. That background presents a generational contrast with Hu, the current president, who born in 1942, was a student during the Cultural Revolution and began his climb up the party hierarchy in the 1980s.

There are more princelings than leadership slots, and the princelings themselves represent a wide range of ideological positions, from economic reformers to cultural hard-liners who see the widespread corruption in China's government as a sign that Chinese capitalism and democracy have gone too far.

7/11/2011

Template Revolutions: Marketing U.S. Regime Change in Eastern Europe (2008)



Πηγή: CRAG
11/7/2011
Template Revolutions: Marketing U.S. Regime Change in Eastern Europe
Gerald Sussman and Sascha Krader
Portland State University
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture (2008)
Images and captions added by Color Revolutions and Geopolitics


Introduction

The dissolution of Soviet power throughout the region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Central Asia excited a new kind of Western intervention, a ‘soft imperialism’ described in official lexicon as ‘democracy promotion’. In the late 1990s and into the next decade, Western mass media routinely represented the serial political upheavals that took place in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as legitimate struggles of ‘people power’ democracy over tyranny. The Western allies, particularly the United States, actively encouraged political mobilisations in the region that sequentially deposed Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia, and invalidated the election of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine. Foreign electoral intervention was a means of politically engineering their replacement by pro-Western politicians who, in the name of democracy, presumably would carry out ‘reforms’ in concert with state and commercial interests of the United States, the European Union, the WTO, and NATO.

By the time of the Milošević overthrow initiative in 2000, the State Department already had in place a ‘revolution template’,1 or what Beissinger (2006) calls a democracy ‘module’. The template began taking shape in the 1980s in Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria and became for the whole Eurasian region a nonmilitarist and cost-effective option for vanquishing left-wing and nationalist heads of state.2 So-called democracy assistance consisted of a fluid package of funding and other support mechanisms designed essentially around marketing principles to effect rapid regime change and political and economic ‘shock therapy’ in selected countries whose governments the State Department regarded as impediments to a global market-based political order. These efforts relied heavily on techniques and technologies of modern propaganda, largely drawn from U.S. political practice.



The principal institutional actors in U.S.’democracy promotion’ consist of the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Endowment for Democracy. NED was created in 1983 as a nominally private, Congressionally funded organization that would assume some of the regime change functions, but with more flexible and transparent means, as those used by the then discredited CIA. One of NED's founders told the Washington Post that ‘A lot of what we [NED] do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA’. Relative openness was seen as a better formulation for pursuing U.S. national interests (Ignatius 1991). Democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe, starting with Poland and East Germany, became one of central tropes in a renewed U.S. effort by the Reagan administration to roll back the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact alliance.