Serb president says will 'never' recognise Kosovo

President of Serbia Boris Tadic

Πηγή: RNW
By AFP
Jan 7 2012

Serbian President Boris Tadic on Saturday stood firm on his refusal to recognise Kosovo's unilaterally declared independence after attending an Orthodox Christmas service in the territory.

Asked when he would recognise Kosovo, Tadic replied: "You know what my answer is. Never. It is a very short end clear answer."

Tadic spoke to journalists as he left the Christmas mass at the 14th-century Serb Orthodox monastery of Visoki Decani in western Kosovo.

He said he wanted peace for all those in Kosovo, including "Serbs, Albanians and members of the international community."

Neither Kosovo Serbs nor Belgrade recognise Pristina's 2008 declaration of independence, accepted by most of the European Union and many other countries, considering Kosovo still to be a province of Serbia and the cradle of its nation and religion.

However, Serbia is engaged in talks with Pristina and has reached several agreements aimed at improving the lives of all inhabitants of Kosovo. Progress in the dialogue is a key condition for Belgrade to become a candidate to join the EU.

Security forces were on high alert throughout Kosovo for Tadic's overnight visit, with NATO-led peacekeepers guarding the grounds of the monastery -- a UNESCO World Heritage site -- and Kosovo police securing the surrounding area.

On Friday, some 200 activists of the hardline ethnic Albanian Self-Determination Movement, which opposes any contact with Serbia, protested in the small town near the monastery and briefly blocked the entrance to the grounds.

Serbian media reported that a car in the presidential motorcade was pelted with rocks, but local police could not confirm the reports.

"I will not react to that aggressive behaviour. Today is Christmas. The only message I can send is peace, even (if) to them that can be very aggressive," Tadic said when asked about the protest.

Germany Makes Another Balkan Mess

Πηγή: The National Interest
By Ted Galen Carpenter

Sep. 26 2011

German chancellor Angela Merkel has received undeserved praise for adopting an uncompromising position regarding Kosovo in meetings with Serbian president Boris Tadic. The latest example of a laudatory reaction is the piece by Morton Abramowitz and James Hooper.

Abramowitz and Hooper are thrilled that she made it clear to Tadic that “Kosovo would not be partitioned” and that “the area inhabited by Serbs north of the Ibar River was Kosovo territory.” Further, she told the leader of a still-fragile democratic Serbia that the Kosovo issue “had to be resolved before Serbia could enter the EU.”

Rather than meriting praise, Merkel’s rigid, obtuse and decidedly unhelpful stance may have torpedoed any chance of resolving the Kosovo dispute in either a timely or sustainable fashion. Her ultimatum also undercuts the most democratic and pro-Western Serbian government that the EU is likely to encounter in the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, this is not the first time that a German government has made an already-difficult situation in the Balkans even worse. As Yugoslavia came apart in the early 1990s, Berlin sabotaged a promising international initiative that might have calmed the brewing storm in the newly minted country of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This time, German officials have spurned Belgrade’s hints that, despite major domestic political impediments, the Serbian government might be prepared to accept Kosovo’s independence—if territorial adjustments were made so that the predominantly Serb region north of the Ibar River would remain with Serbia. Shrewd diplomats would have explored those hints to see if they were serious. Merkel and her advisers, unfortunately, rejected any suggestion of reciprocity.

Yet, if a partition of Kosovo would remove a major headache from the Balkan region, it would seem to be a price well worth paying. To reject such an idea out of hand is a case of diplomatic malpractice. Insisting that Kosovo be recognized within its current, arbitrary boundaries creates needless instability. At best, the Serb population north of the Ibar will be a restless minority discriminated against by the Albanian Kosovar regime. At worst, they become a candidate for ethnic cleansing on the watch of NATO and the EU.

Not only did Merkel probably wreck any chance for an orderly end to the Kosovo squabble, virtually guaranteeing that peacekeeping forces will have to remain for a very long time, she also set a worrisome precedent regarding the standards for joining the EU. By demanding that Serbia abjectly accept the secession of a portion of its territory, she is including a requirement that no current member had to meet. The contrast with the treatment of Cyprus is especially striking. There was no demand that the legitimate Cypriot government accept the independence of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus before Cyprus could become a member of the EU.

Merkel’s position—one that is supported by most (although it should be noted, not all) EU governments—will strengthen the impression among Serbs that the West has one standard for them and a different standard for everyone else in Europe. Unfortunately, that impression often seems well founded. Since the early 1990s, U.S. and EU policies appear to be based on the belief that all ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia have a right to political self-determination, including secession—except for Serbs. It is an ugly, discriminatory approach, and Merkel’s conduct is but the latest example.

Far greater Western realism and flexibility is imperative. The option of partition to create more cohesive and stable political entities needs to be put on the table. That means being receptive to territorial changes based on ethnic partition with respect to both Bosnia and Kosovo. The former is no closer to ethnic reconciliation and political viability today than it was when the Dayton Accords were signed nearly 16 years ago. The artificial nature of that pretend country is exceeded only by its chronically dysfunctional nature.

The task of partition in Kosovo would be more limited and less challenging. The Kosovars would retain control of nearly 90 percent of Kosovo’s current territory, and the Serb population would be able to leave the jurisdiction of a political entity that they loathe. In addition, such a breakthrough might enable Kosovo to receive diplomatic recognition from the dozens of countries around the world that, despite intense pressure from the United States and the principal EU countries, have thus far refused to do so.

Ideally, Washington should be able to view Merkel’s antics and the entire misguided policy in the Balkans as a bemused spectator. But thanks to the insatiable desire to meddle on the part of previous administrations, we are entangled; the United States has peacekeeping troops in Kosovo. Indeed, personnel from the Texas National Guard are currently on their way there to participate in that quixotic nation-building mission.

U.S. leaders ought to have had enough of the international social-engineering crusade in the Balkans by now. Washington’s response to Merkel’s ham-handed approach should be to caution Berlin and other EU capitals about the probable deleterious ramifications of their current policy. U.S. officials also should put their European counterparts on notice that if the Balkans again blow up because of German-led diplomatic mismanagement, the EU will have to deal with the consequences entirely alone. As a first step, the United States should immediately withdraw all of its peacekeeping forces from Kosovo. The broader message to the Europeans should be: Don’t even think about calling on Washington to help bail you out of your folly—especially after you’ve spurned the last best chance for a peaceful, equitable resolution of the Kosovo problem.

Ted Galen Carpenter, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international affairs, including Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America. He is also a contributing editor to The National Interest.

Kosovo Serbs clash with NATO: Six People Hurt

Πηγή: acus
By Jorge Benitez
Sep. 27 2011


Six Kosovo Serbs were injured in a shootout between protesters and NATO peacekeepers at a disputed border crossing, local authorities and health officials said on Tuesday.

Eyewitnesses said troops from the NATO peacekeeping force (KFOR) fired teargas and rubber bullets to disperse a crowd rallying against the removal of a Serb-held barricade from the Jarinje border post linking Kosovo's north with Serbia.

From Reuters: "All the wounded were transferred to the hospital," said Branko Ninic, the mayor of the nearby town of Leposavic. "We are urging people to remain calm. This situation is very dangerous."

A NATO spokesman in Pristina said troops fired rubber bullets in self defence.

Milan Jakovljevic, the head of the hospital in the Serb, northern part of Mitrovica, a tense city divided into Albanian and Serb districts, said the six wounded men had gunshot wounds and not injuries caused by rubber bullets.

In northern Mitrovica, angry Serbs damaged two police vehicles. NATO and police brought reinforcements to the southern, Albanian part of the city, a Reuters eyewitness said. . . .

The clashes came as negotiators from Serbia and Kosovo were to meet in Brussels under EU auspices to try to mend daily ties such as flow of people and goods, property rights and personal documents. . . .

Earlier on Tuesday, KFOR troops used bulldozers to remove the roadblock near the Jarinje border post and briefly detained five local Serbs.

Serbia, Kosovo and the EU: Sinking the flagship

Πηγή: The Economist
Sep 3 2011

ANGELA MERKEL, the German chancellor, has just holed Serbia’s flagship foreign policy below the water line. For the past year, the country’s leaders have been doing everything they can to win candidate status to the European Union in December, with the aim of going to the country in the spring brandishing their achievement. To that end, they secured the arrest of Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb general wanted by the UN’s Yugoslav war-crimes tribunal. They have passed EU-compatible laws and entered into an EU-sponsored dialogue with the leaders of Kosovo, a former province that declared independence in 2008. So far, so good.

Then along came Mrs Merkel. Visiting Belgrade on August 23rd, the chancellor said Germany still wants Serbia in the EU, but to become a candidate it should first “abolish parallel structures”—the term for Serbian institutions in Kosovo. This blew apart an artful piece of Serbian ambiguity.

About two-thirds of Kosovo’s Serbs live in enclaves in the centre and south of the country. They have begun to work with authorities in the capital, Pristina. But cross the bridge in the divided city of Mitrovica, into the Serbian north, and it is a different story. Here and in the rest of north Kosovo, which is home to about 40,000 Serbs and only a few Albanians, you might as well be in Serbia. Schools, utilities and municipalities are part of Serbia’s system, not Kosovo’s. Since Serbia’s government discreetly signals that its eventual aim is Kosovo’s partition—keeping the north in exchange for recognising the independence of the rest—dismantling these institutions would be to admit that it cannot achieve its aim. That is exactly what Mrs Merkel wants. But Boris Tadic, Serbia’s president, has consistently said Serbs do not need to choose between Kosovo and the EU. That he has been proved wrong is no surprise. The surprise is Mrs Merkel’s timing.

Her remark shocked those in Brussels who have been preparing for Serbia’s candidacy. “It is as bad as it looks,” says one. Unless the government has a last trick up its sleeve, then the most likely winners will be nationalist and populist parties—not what the EU wants. Still, Mrs Merkel has made one thing clear. In reality, Serbia—which now has only a toehold in Kosovo—can either join the EU without Kosovo, or not join the EU without Kosovo.

Debating the Lessons of History in Libya

Πηγή: Foreign Affairs

Micah Zenko
March 28, 2011

The Mythology of Intervention

When considering how the United States should deal with persistent foreign policy problems, history can be instructive. Distorted or misremembered history, however, is dangerous. Unfortunately, in the recent debate over U.S. intervention in Libya, journalists and analysts have propagated an array of falsehoods and mischaracterizations about the United States' uses of military force since the end of the Cold War. Believing in these myths -- particularly in their supposedly successful outcomes -- leads to a misunderstanding of contemporary problems and to a more interventionist U.S. foreign policy.

The first myth is that the combination of NATO airpower and a Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ground offensive drove Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic out of Kosovo in 1999. Today, proponents of intervention in Libya, such as Max Boot at the Council on Foreign Relations and Peter Juul at the Center for American Progress, have advocated replicating this supposed success. They argue that Libyan rebel forces, fighting with close air support from Western fighter planes, could wage an effective ground offensive all the way to Tripoli and force Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi from power.

But a U.S. Air Force review of its precision airpower campaign in Kosovo revealed a much darker picture than NATO's glowing initial assessment: 14 tanks were destroyed, not 120, as previously reported; similarly, 18 armored personnel carriers, not 220, and 20 mobile artillery pieces, not 450, were eliminated. During the campaign, the Serbian military quickly adapted to NATO's operations by constructing fake "artillery" from logs and old truck axles, and "surface-to-air missiles" made of paper.

Furthermore, the KLA failed to mount a credible and sustained opposition to the disciplined, ruthless, and better-armed Serbian ground forces. Ultimately, it was NATO's escalation of air strikes against the Serbian military and the civilian infrastructure in Serbia proper -- combined with Russia's withdrawal of its support for Serbia -- that caused Milosevic to capitulate.
Even when accurate, historical analogies can be a double-edged sword.

Second, many in and outside of government, including Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) and the diplomat and academic Philip Zelikow, have called for a so-called no-drive zone, in which Libyan armored divisions would be prohibited from any movement around the country, or at least from movement against civilian populations. They cite the successful use of such a policy by U.S. forces in Iraq after the first Gulf War. In Libya, this thinking goes, a no-drive zone could be relatively easy to set up and would neutralize Qadaffi's conventional ground capabilities and alter the military balance between the regime and rebels.

Yet there never was a no-drive zone in Iraq. In fact, in October 1994, Saddam Hussein dispatched 70,000 troops, led by two Republican Guard divisions, toward the Kuwaiti border. There, they joined six Iraqi army divisions already stationed below the 32nd parallel, the geographic marker that cordoned off the southern no-fly zone. To safeguard Kuwaiti and Saudi oil, the Clinton administration responded with Operation Vigilant Warrior, which rapidly deployed U.S. ground forces and armored equipment to the Persian Gulf. Deterred, Hussein quickly pulled his Republican Guard divisions back to central Iraq, where they stayed. In addition, UN Security Council Resolution 949 demanded the "withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq." Washington and London used that resolution as justification for formal diplomatic warnings to Baghdad that it could not augment its ground forces beneath the 32nd parallel. But this policy applied only to military units that arrived in the region after October 1994: in other words, although Hussein may have withdrawn his two Republican Guard divisions, six Iraqi Army divisions remained and freely attacked foes of the Baghdad regime.

Third, many military analysts, along with U.S. Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), seem to believe that no-fly zones protect civilians on the ground. But this is often not the case. Despite the rosy memories of some interventionists, the no-fly zones over Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95) and northern and southern Iraq (1991-2003) failed to protect civilian populations.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the no-fly zone went largely unenforced (with one notable exception, when NATO shot down four Serbian planes in February 1994). As Madeline Albright, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, wrote in her memoir: "We voted to enforce no-fly zones, but the Serbs violated them hundreds of times without paying a significant price." To a lesser degree, Croatian and Bosnian Muslim airplanes and helicopters also violated the no-fly zone. Even if it had been enforced, the no-fly zone would have been impotent against the brutal counterinsurgency attacks conducted by Serbian ground forces, which massacred 9,000 unarmed Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica.

Within both the northern and southern no-fly zones in Iraq, Saddam's ground forces attacked any group that opposed the regime. In the south, in the years after the failed Shia uprising in 1991, Hussein initiated a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. His troops destroyed the marshlands that were part of the historical ecosystem of southern Iraq, building roadways through some so they could bring artillery within range of Shia insurgents and draining others so as to eliminate rebel hiding places. At the same time, Iraqi security forces cordoned off suspected rebel areas and controlled the movement of people. In the north, in August 1996 -- with the no-fly zone in full operational force -- Hussein viciously put down a short-lived Kurdish uprising with 40,000 troops, 300 tanks, and 300 pieces of artillery.

Outside powers, meanwhile, routinely violated the Iraqi no-fly zones. In southern Iraq, Iranian jets penetrated Iraqi airspace to bomb camps run by Mujahideen-e Khalq (an armed, Shia, anti-Tehran opposition group), which housed both civilians and fighters. In northern Iraq, Turkish fighter planes repeatedly bombed villages suspected of harboring Kurdistan Workers' Party terrorists. According to the U.S. State Department's 2000 report on human rights, in one of these attacks, Turkish planes accidentally killed 38 civilians. As one U.S. commander of the northern no-fly zone told me: "We would fly over the Kurds in F-16s to protect the population and assure humanitarian supplies. Then the Turks would bomb the Kurds with F-16s."

The fourth myth of U.S. intervention is that NATO established a no-fly zone over Kosovo in the 1990s -- which then did not stop Serbian soldiers and paramilitaries from forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians and killing 10,000 others. In debating a no-fly zone in Libya, commentators in The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal, among others, invoked this supposed fact, which suggested that no-fly zones were impotent, as a reason why they would fail in Libya.

In reality, after small skirmishes between Serbian forces and the KLA in early 1998, in July and August of that year, NATO debated a number of preventive deployments -- such as placing military observers in Albania and Macedonia -- and more intrusive measures, including a phased air campaign and the incursion of up to 200,000 NATO troops into Kosovo. Before Operation Allied Force began on March 24, 1999, however, NATO neither debated implementing a no-fly zone over Kosovo nor did it impose one.

Lastly, many believe the myth that killing political leaders neutralizes the threat their regimes pose. Citing the recent success of unmanned drone strikes in killing suspected al Qaeda and Taliban operatives in Pakistan, many, including British Foreign Secretary William Hague, have asked, "Why don't we just assassinate Qadaffi?" Although this may appear to be an easy solution, the targeted killing of political leaders does not work.

Recent, comparable efforts to use cruise missiles or bombs to eliminate U.S. adversaries -- including Qadaffi himself in 1986 and again by the British last Monday, Osama Bin Laden in 1998, Milosevic in 1999, and Saddam Hussein in 1991 and 2003 -- all failed. Despite the United States' intelligence capabilities, political leaders who believe they are targeted are adaptive, resilient, and hard to kill from a distance. The U.S. record of failure in this regard is even worse than the historical average. Of the 298 publicly reported assassination attempts on national leaders between 1875 and 2004, less than 20 percent were successful. Furthermore, while decapitating the leadership certainly generates confusion, the aftermath is rarely positive -- as with the killing of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, when the United States plunged deeper into a civil war on behalf of incompetent generals in Saigon. However unpleasant a truth it may be, nothing short of a full-scale invasion can assure regime change, as shown everywhere from Grenada to Panama and Iraq to Afghanistan.

Even when accurate, historical analogies can be a double-edged sword. As Ernest May and Richard Neustadt argued in their book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, well-deployed and critically examined historical references can enhance decision-making (the Kennedy administration relied on the lessons of World War II to avoid a nuclear war with the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis), or degrade it (the Truman administration misunderstood Nazi and fascist expansionism, which led it to miscalculate in Korea).

In the debate over whether, and how, to intervene in Libya, opponents and proponents called on historical examples to bolster their case. Too often, these examples were historically inaccurate and were misapplied to Libya's unfolding civil war. If the legacy of recent uses of U.S. military force demonstrate anything, it is that regardless of whether the objective is to protect civilians on the ground, precipitate Qaddafi's removal from power, or stabilize a postconflict Libya, more force, time, attention, and resources will be needed than the international community has thus far proven willing to commit.

EU warns against growing tensions in Kosovo

Serbs set fire to a border crossing in northern Kosovo after Kosovo police captured it in a police operation [Reuters]

Πηγή: Aljazeera

28 Jul 2011 06:11

Concerns grow after ethnic Serbs angry with a Kosovo police operation set fire to a border crossing post in the north.

The European Union has issued a stern warning against a deadly flare-up of violence in Kosovo's Serb-run north, reports Reuters news agency.

Ethnic Serbs set fire to a border crossing post in northern Kosovo on Wednesday, after Kosovo's government regained control of the post and a second one late on Monday night.

Catherine Ashton, EU foreign policy chief, said in a statement: "I strongly condemn the violence that has taken place in northern Kosovo. These latest developments are unacceptable".

She said that it is the responsibility of the governments in Belgrade and Pristina to restore peace between the two nations.

Armed Kosovo police units crossed into the ethnic Serb-dominated north on Monday in an effort to station troops in a region that takes its orders from Serbia, news agencies said.

A Kosovo police officer was shot in the head and died on Tuesday and four others were injured during an exchange of gunfire between police and local Serbs opposing Kosovo's efforts to take control of its border posts.

The same border post was burned down in 2008 by local Serbs after Kosovo declared independence.

Serbian explanation

The Reuters news agency quoted Serbian negotiators for Kosovo, who are attempting to negotiate a solution to the violence with Kosovo officials and NATO peacekeepers, as saying that Wednesday's fire was set by criminals trying to undermine talks.

Borko Stefanovic, the chief Serb negotiator, said: "This violent act, an act of criminals and extremists, represents a clear attempt to undermine the process we are pursuing and the attempts to resolve all the issues in a peaceful manner.

"This greatly aggravates the position of Serbs in the north of Kosovo and Metohija and is not contributing to the resolution of the problems which had brought us here in the past couple of days."

Oliver Ivanovic, Serbia's state secretary for Kosovo, also voiced concerns about further violence.

"One act of violence produces more violence. I am afraid we are entering a spiral of violence," he said.

Armed ethnic Serbs fired at NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo on Wednesday in the north.

"The situation deteriorated at the customs post Jarinje and it was confirmed that an act of arson was committed against that position," NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (KFOR) said in a statement.

"There have also been confirmed reports of shots fired at KFOR personnel in the vicinity."

The NATO statement did not say whether anyone was injured in the attack or whether KFOR troops returned fire, but said reinforcements had been sent to the border.

Raid defended

Hashim Thaci, the prime minister of Kosovo, justified the police operation on Tuesday, saying it was a "concrete step in establishing the rule of law" in the north.

He said co-operation with the international community was important, but that "the constitution and the sovereignty of my country are sacred for myself and for my countrymen and go beyond any partnership or loyalty".

At a news briefing, Maja Kocijancic, an EU commission spokesperson described Kosovo's unilateral action in the region as "not helpful".

"It was not done in consultation neither with the European Union nor the international community and we do not approve it," she said.

In Washington, President Barack Obama echoed Kocijancic's sentiments, but stopped short of condemning Kosovo.

Though Kosovo seceded from Serbia in 2008, Serbia does not recognise its independence.

To undermine Kosovo's claim of sovereignty, Serbia has stationed its troops in the northern region and enforced a boycott against goods from Kosovo.

Kosovo wants to assert control over the north and enforce a similar ban on Serbian goods.

Libya War Lies Worse Than Iraq

Πηγή: Froreign Policy Journal

by Thomas C. Mountain
July 23, 2011

The lies used to justify the NATO war against Libya have surpassed those created to justify the invasion of Iraq. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both had honest observers on the ground for months following the rebellion in eastern Libya and both have repudiated every major charge used to justify the NATO war on Libya.

According to the Amnesty observer, who is fluent in Arabic, there is not one confirmed instance of rape by the pro-Gadaffi fighters, not even a doctor who knew of one. All the Viagra mass rape stories were fabrications.

Amnesty could not verify a single “African mercenary” fighting for Gaddafi story, and the highly charged international satellite television accounts of African mercenaries raping women that were used to panic much of the eastern Libyan population into fleeing their homes were fabrications.

There were no confirmed accounts of helicopter gunships attacking civilians and no jet fighters bombing people, which completely invalidates any justification for the No-Fly Zone in the Security Council resolution used as an excuse for NATO to launch its attacks on Libya.

After three months on the ground in rebel controlled territory, the Amnesty investigator could only confirm 110 deaths in Benghazi, which included Gadaffi supporters.

Only 110 dead in Benghazi? Wait a minute, we were told thousands had died there, ten thousand even. No, only 110 lost their lives, including pro-government people.

No rapes, no African mercenaries, no helicopter gunships or bombers, and only 110 ten deaths prior to the launch of the NATO bombing campaign; every reason was based on a lie.

Today, according to the Libyan Red Crescent Society, over 1,100 civilians have been killed by NATO bombs, including over 400 women and children. Over 6,000 Libyan civilians have been injured or wounded by the bombing, many very seriously.

Compared to the war on Iraq, these numbers are tiny, but the reasons for the Libyan war have no merit in any form.

Saddam Hussein was evil; he invaded his neighbors in wars that killed up to a million. He used Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the form of poison gas on both his neighbors and his own people, killing tens of thousands. He was brutal and corrupt and when American tanks rolled into Iraq the Iraqi people refused to fight for him, simply put their weapons down and went home.

Libya under Col. Gadaffi hasn’t invaded their neighbors. Gadaffi never used WMD on anyone, let alone his own people. As for Gadaffi being brutal, in Libya’s neighbor Algeria, the Algerian military fought a counterinsurgency for a decade in the 1990’s that witnessed the deaths of some 200,000 Algerians. Now that is brutal and nothing anywhere near this has happened in Libya.

In Egypt and Tunisia, western puppets like Mubarak and Ben Ali had almost no support amongst their people with few if anyone willing to fight and die to defend them.

The majority of the Libyan people are rallying behind the Libyan government and “the leader”, Muammar Gadaffi, with over one million people demonstrating in support on July 1 in Tripoli, the capital of Libya. Thousands of Libyan youth are on the front lines fighting the rebels and despite thousands of NATO air strikes, authentic journalists on the ground in western Libya report that their morale remains high.

In Egypt, the popular explosion that resulted in the Army seizing power from Mubarak began in the very poorest neighborhoods in Cairo and other Egyptian cities where the price of basic food items like bread, sugar, and cooking oil had skyrocketed and led to widespread hunger. In many parts of Egypt’s poor neighborhoods, gasoline/benzene is easier to find then clean drinking water. Medical care and education is only for those with the money to pay for it. Life for the people of Tunisia is not that much better.

In contrast, the Libyan people have the longest life expectancy in the Arab world. The Libyan people have the best, free public health system in the Arab world. The Libyan people have the best, free public education system in the Arab world. Most Libyan families own their own home and most Libyan families own their own automobile. Libya is so much better off than its neighbors every year tens of thousands of Egyptians and Tunisians migrated to Libya to earn money to feed their families, doing the dirty work the Libyan people refused to do.

When it comes to how Gadaffi oversaw a dramatic rise in the standard of living for the Libyan people despite decades of UN inSecurity Council sanctions against the Libyan economy, honest observers acknowledge that Gadaffi stands head and shoulders above the kings, sheiks, emirs and various dictators who rule the rest of the Arab world.

So why did NATO launch this war against Libya?

First of all, Gadaffi was on the verge of creating a new banking system in Africa that was going to put the IMF, World Bank, and assorted other western banksters out of business in Africa. No more predatory western loans used to cripple African economies; instead, a $42 billion dollar African Investment Bank would be supplying major loans at little or even zero interest rates.

Libya has funded major infrastructure projects across Africa that have begun to link up African economies and break the perpetual dependency on the western countries for imports. Here in Eritrea, the new road connecting Eritrea and Sudan is just one small example.

What seems to have finally tipped the balance in favor of direct western military intervention was the reported demand by Gadaffi that the USA oil companies who have long been major players in the Libyan petroleum industry were going to have to compensate Libya to the tune of tens of billions of dollars for the damage done to the Libyan economy by the USA instigated “Lockerbie Bombing” sanctions imposed by the UN inSecurity Council throughout the 1990’s into early 2000’s. This is based on the unearthing of evidence that the CIA paid millions of dollars to witnesses in the Lockerbie Bombing trial to change their stories to implicate Libya, which was used as the basis for the very damaging UN sanctions against Libya. The government of the USA lied and damaged Libya so the USA oil companies were going to have to pay up to cover the cost of their government’s actions. Not hard to see why Gadaffi had to go, is it?

Add the fact that Gadaffi had signaled clearly that he saw both Libya’s and Africa’s future economic development linked more to China and Russia, rather than the west, and it was just a matter of time before the CIA’s contingency plan to overthrow the Libyan government was put on the front burner.

NATO’s war against Libya has much more in common with NATO’s Kosovo war against Serbia. But one still cannot compare Gadaffi to Saddam or even the much smaller-time criminals in the Serbian leadership. The Libyan War lies are worse than Iraq.