Showing posts with label Argentina. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Argentina. Show all posts

6/30/2012

Cooking the Books, Not the Big Macs, in Argentina & Greece


Πηγή: Goldseek
By Robin Molinas and Adrian Ash
June 29 2012

So does Argentina a decade ago set a template for today's crisis in Greece...?

BACK IN 2001, Argentina was hit by a crisis similar to Greece's today.

Imposing a strict currency peg of 1 Peso to 1 US Dollar meant the currency was over-valued. Or the state should have reined in its spending. Or the economy needed to be more productive. Or all three, depending on your view. But either way, the trade deficit widened as imports became cheaper than exports – especially after neighboring Brazil devalued its Real in 1998-99, adding more pressure to the currency peg, and leading the government to borrow huge amounts of money overseas, including $40 billion arranged by the International Monetary Fund in December 2000.

High tax rates already meant tax evasion was widespread, so raising taxes to try and cover debt interest didn't bring extra revenue. Well aware how such crises had ended before, the middle-class quickly moved to withdraw money from bank deposits, even though interest rates jumped to 16%, because that wasn't enough to beat inflation. Squeezed by falling wages and rising prices, many Argentinians took to the streets of big cities, especially Buenos Aires, banging pots and pans in protest at soaring food costs, corruption and economic mismanagement – protests that became known as cacerolazo.

Pressure on the Peso, prices and now the banks mounted. Amid domestic riots and an international debate over the currency peg during the last week of 2001, and with bank deposits already frozen, an interim government – led by right-wing governor Rodríguez Saá – proposed a new currency, the Argentino. Named after the gold coin issued at the height of Argentina's 19th-century boom, it was to be backed by the country's housing and real estate, not by central-bank reserves, which were virtually empty anyway. But it never came to anything, as Saá proved literally a "seven-day president", whose only achievement was finally to declare default on the national debt.

Totaling $132 billion, that debt was approximately one-seventh of all the money borrowed by developing states worldwide. Some payments have since been refinanced and some restructured, but the International Monetary Fund, just as with Greece today, would accept no losses on its portion of the Argentine debt.

The difference between these two great crises? Argentina could devalue its currency, whereas Greece cannot. For 10 years before the 2001 crisis, Argentina had a currency exchange standard of 1 US Dollar to 1 Argentinian Peso. For the last 10 years, Greece has been part of the Eurozone, with 1 Greek Euro equal in every way to 1 German, Dutch, Spanish or Belgian Euro. During the Argentinian crisis, however, the currency's exchange rate fell dramatically, with the US Dollar rising from 1 to 4 Pesos.

This huge Peso depreciation in turn propelled inflation, but the official measure refused to show it. Annual inflation in Buenos Aires at one stage during the crisis actually showed a negative reading, as the government fought to avoid comparisons with the dictators' crises of the 1970s and '80s.




The Argentinian people nevertheless stopped trusting their government, their currency, and their banks, and the US Dollar began to overtake the country's Peso as a store of wealth. They were right to worry.

After 10 years of the currency peg, some 70% of bank deposits, credit and loans were denominated in US Dollars. In January 2002, new Argentine president Eduardo Duhalde pushed through a "forced Pesification", whereby everything was switched to the Peso. Bank loans were converted at 1-to-1, despite the real exchange rate already standing at 2 Pesos per Dollar. The conversion rate on deposits was better, but it was still well shy of the true rate and also handed the banks an immediate 30% shortfall on their balancesheets. In total, the 44 billion US Dollars in Argentinian bank depositswere switched to 55 billion Pesos. So the net loss of value to people's savings was more than 65% by the end of the year, when the Dollar exchange rate hit 4 Pesos. The poverty rate rose from 1-in-3 to worse than 1-in-2 inside a year.

Finally, under the next president, Néstor Kirchner, and with Duhalde's finance minister Roberto Lavagna still in his post, the external debt restructuring – which affected more than 76% of Buenos Aires' public debt, originally worth some $93 billion – came in January 2005. Did it work? Already in 2007, the government of Néstor's widow – Cristina Kirchner – imposed new exchange controls, capping the daily amount of money people were allowed to withdraw from the banks. But "Today we celebrate today our well-gained economic independence," said the Kirchner government in 2010, wrangling with the International Monetary Fund over $6 billion in loan repayments while enjoying economic growth of 9% annually, plus unemployment down by two-thirds from the crisis peak.

"The outcome would have been totally different if we had followed the recommendations traditionally made by the IMF – opening our economy, foreign indebtedness, financial liberalization and 'unbeatable' market-oriented reforms. Today we would have been embroiled in a fresh economic, social and political crisis."

Here in 2012, however, and with commodity prices now falling and economic growth quickly fading, cacerolazo is being revived in protest at the government, and again middle-class savers are attempting to flee their currency.

An unofficial exchange rate, offered by Buenos Aires' illegal casa de cambioshas been created, known as the "Parallel Dollar" or "Blue Dollar", which trades at an extremely high price compared to the official price. Today's exchange rate standard is 1 Dollar to 5 Pesos, but 1 "Blue Dollar" is 6.15 Pesos, which is closer to the official Peso-Euro rate. The "Blue Dollar" is available in the downtown area, where traders now known as arbolitos, or little-trees, can be found at the side of the road flashing wads of green notes like leaves.

To block the black-market in Dollars, Argentina's tax inspectors – the AFIP – were last year armed with 300 sniffer dogs, trained to find money. By mid-December 2011, they'd found $2.7 million in illegal Dollars. But the government continues to support the thriving Blue Dollar market by blocking legal exchange. This month, on its website, the AFIP deleted any choice beyond "travel" or "business procurement" from the options for enquirers wanting to know if they're allowed to buy US currency. "Savings and investment" queries are no longer available. And the Argentinian government is also playing games with inflation data again, worsening the loss of confidence as strikes break out over inflation-linked wage increases and state benefits.

In particular, Kirchner's secretary for domestic trade, Guillermo Moreno, has been accused of cooking the books by encouraging McDonald's not to cook Big Macs. "In some branches of McDonald's," noted the Cronista newspaper in March 2011, "the Big Mac is advertised only by a small hand-written note, hidden on a side wall. In other places there is not even that.

"What's led Ronald McDonald in Buenos Aires to hide your favorite dish?"

Well, The Economist magazine's Big Mac index – launched in 1986 – tries to get round government manipulation of statistics, by comparing the price of McDonald's iconic burger around the world. Because "the price of a good should not vary much across efficient markets," as The Economist puts it. Comparing the different local prices of a Big Mac is therefore a blunt, if frivolous way of measuring the purchasing power of different currencies.

So by suppressing the Big Mac's price, people believe, Argentina would be able to suppress its apparent rate of inflation from what El Cronista calls "the very British Economist magazine." But it would also put McDonald's at risk of selling lots of under-priced burgers to hungry Porteños, however. So the world's most famous burger was hidden from view. Until now.

"Moreno lost the battle," reported Cronista.com in early June. "The Big Mac combo is out of the price freeze and has jumped in price by 26.2%." A discount of 2 Pesos two days later was "a result of negotiations with the Ministry of Internal Trade," according to the Argentinian press. But it also affected the burger alone – not the meal-deal including fries and a shake – edging down the Big Mac's Peso price where it might matter most. On the Big Mac Index.

Now, the Greek government already had a reputation for cooking the bookslong before its crisis broke, specifically to meet the requirements for Euro entry in 2001. Tax evasion has also been widespread, with untaxed business worth some 27.5% of the annual economy on one estimate. Given these drags, external debt has also leapt as Athens struggles to maintain its currency regime – a relatively strong currency that's seen relatively unproductive Greece slip to last place in Western Europe's league table of competitiveness. A run on the banks has already begun, with withdrawals now reaching €80 billion – one third of total deposits before the crisis began in 2010 – as household and business depositors fear the very same "freeze" imposed by Argentina a decade ago.

The difference is, quitting the Euro – unlike Argentina quitting the Dollar – can't be done overnight. "Pesification" would first mean create (or recreating) a currency to switch to. Whatever mess Argentina has suffered – before and since abandoning its currency peg – the mess in Greece would likely be much uglier still.



2/02/2012

Argentina as a blueprint for Greece



Πηγή: Jerousalem Post
By AARON KATSMAN
Feb 2 2012

Your Investment: Instead of delaying, why not just admit the truth: Declare bankruptcy and start fixing.

The common wisdom being bandied about by analysts is that Greece needs a bailout and must remain part of the euro zone or else a global financial Armageddon will ensue. According to the Sydney Morning Herald, International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde said during a speech in Germany, “We need a larger firewall,” warning that otherwise the world could slide into a “1930s moment” of isolationism, which led to the Great Depression.”

I guess the question is whether this is actually true. After all, the IMF has a tradition of messing up these situations. Just look at the Asian financial crisis of 20 years ago, or the Latin American crisis of a decade ago. The IMF prescription in these crises exacerbated and prolonged the problems for more time than was needed.

The IMF and the European Union are pushing for a bailout of Greece in exchange for austerity measures. The problem is that the bailout money they are talking about is barely enough to keep the country solvent for a month or two. It sure seems like a black hole. Keep pumping more and more money into Greece in order to delay the inevitable. Is this sound policy? Is this the solution to prevent a “1930s moment”?

Don’t cry for me Argentina

A decade ago, another country was in similar dire straits as Greece is today. No, I am not talking about Israel, which was certainly teetering on the brink, but rather Argentina. There are many similarities between Greece and Argentina, and maybe we can learn from the Argentinean model and apply it to Greece.

Mario I. Blejer, a former governor of Argentina’s central bank, and Eduardo Levy-Yeyati, one of its former chief economists, jointly penned an opinion piece for Bloomberg about the Greek crisis, and they pointed to a lesson that can be learned:

“The first has to do with the timing and size of the debt exchange. In this regard, Argentina’s lessons are clear: Delaying the unavoidable and then defaulting belatedly, unilaterally and in a disorderly fashion, imposes significant costs in real activity, with no visible benefits. True, markets need to see some pain to be convinced of a country’s willingness to pay, in order to accept a default. But Argentina, like Greece now, went way beyond that. By the time Argentina defaulted in 2001, it had experienced four years of recession and its gross domestic product had declined by about 22 percent. How much pain should Greece endure?”

Bob Adelman wrote in the New American about the similarity between then and now: “The Argentine crisis had been brewing for years (some say as far back as 1913 when the welfare state began to be installed) but came to a head when a new government was elected in December 1999 and found itself facing years of mismanagement and fraud left over from the previous administration, including much higher debts and deficits than had been claimed. In December of 2000, Argentina fell for the siren song of the IMF (“we’re here to help you”) and received its first bailout.

“IMF aid made the problem worse. The Argentine currency, the peso, was tied one-to-one to the American dollar and had become grossly overvalued. With foreign trade declining and interest payments to the IMF increasing, the government couldn’t continue supporting the peso. An overnight devaluation of the currency took place, dropping the peso’s purchasing power by 40 percent over one weekend and beginning an inflationary spiral that reached an annual rate of 5,000 percent by the summer of 2002.”

Just do it

Instead of punting the problem down the road another three or four months, why not just admit the truth: declare bankruptcy and start fixing the problems like Argentina? By starting off with a clean slate and a devalued currency, the Argentines where able to extricate themselves from the mess, and from 2003-07 they averaged 9% growth. It wasn’t easy for them, but in the end Argentina has a flourishing economy.

Greece should declare bankruptcy and leave the euro so that it will be free to take the steps it needs to get its economy back on solid footing. It should bring back the drachma, let it devalue and then export its way out of the mess. Greece can’t do that if it is tied to the euro and constrained by EU rules. No one says this will be easy, but it will ultimately lead to living within its means and having a solid economy.

Ansgar Belke, a professor at the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin, said: “What happened in Argentina proves that it is possible for a country to come back after bankruptcy and once again play an important role in international financial markets. I always supported a restructure of debt in Greece. The damage would not be as grave as is commonly feared. Greece is a relatively small country. A restructure would stagger a few German and French banks... but this scenario is more sensible than the massive credit that we’re currently giving.”


11/10/2011

Debt. This is Your Brain on Debt.


Πηγή: foxbusiness
By Elizabeth MacDonald
Nov 10 21011

The worldwide bond market continues to be an increasingly tight financial pressure cooker, with yields on Italian and Greece bonds spiking higher into technical default territory.

Meanwhile, Europe continues to meet to discuss rescues of previous rescues of prior rescues, indicating the magnitude of the problems in Italy, Greece and elsewhere in the Euro zone are now greater than their leaders’ ability to respond to it.

Debt. This is your brain on debt. Any questions?

Citigroup’s top economist says the European bailout fund needs $3.5 trillion in firepower for the eurozone to get out of its debt mess, backed by the half dozen remaining 'AAA' countries, including France and Germany.

Meanwhile, France, hasn't balanced its budget in the last three decades. The U.S. has balanced its budget just five times in the last half a century. Greece has 12 million people, more than $320 billion in debt and virtually no growth over the last two decades. Italy has 65 million people, $2.6 trillion in debt and virtually no growth over the last decade. The U.S. has 311.8 million people, $14 trillion in debt, not counting unfunded liabilities for Social Security and Medicare, totting up at an estimated $57 trillion. U.S. GDP growth now struggles to stay above an annualized rate of 2% .

Let’s sit back for a second. What happens when a country defaults and devalues its way out of their crises? There have been 74 defaults between 1981 and 1990. The one that parallels what’s happening in Greece is the subprime sovereign debt crisis of Argentina in 1998 to 2002.

Like Greece, Argentina had mostly a tourist industry, it welshed on $81 billion in debt, its currency crashed, it got locked out of credit markets for about a decade, and creditors are still chasing money in litigation. Argentina though went through a brutal restructuring. Argentina gave investors a take it or leave it offer of 35 cents on the dollar. Greece says 50 cents, which will still keep it at 120% debt to GDP. That fifty cent haircut is a gift to bondholders. Other countries that have crashed, burned, then even retrieved their Triple A ratings include Canada and Finland.

But now there’s pressure on the inflation wary central bankers of Germany and the European Central Bank to print money, but these bankers are adverse to that, as they have memories of the hyperinflationary Weimar Republic era still fresh in their memories. Throughout, Germany’s Angela Merkel in the Middle is fighting to keep the 17-member zone intact.

It’s likely instead that this bond debt will become warehoused in off-balance sheet vehicles at emergency rescue facilities, including those overseen by the ECB. Already, an estimated one third of Greece’s debt is held by government institutions. That means taxpayers take the haircut here.

Meanwhile, the Euro zone is hoping China will step in and use its massive foreign reserves to buy junk bonds from Greece and Italy, as investors continue to give Euro zone bonds the cold shoulder—but why should China buy Euro bonds if no one else wants them? At the least, Euro bonds should now come with their own health warnings.

There’s more curious news. The European Commission clearly leaked to the Financial Times a draft of proposals to more tightly-regulate credit ratings companies. European regulators are now moving to approve rating methods, and even ban sovereign credit ratings in “exceptional situations,” such as when a country is getting bailed out. Ed Yardeni, a U.S. economist, doesn’t like the smell of this one.

A day after the last euro rescue was announced, which would use the European Financial Stability Facility, “S&P rushed to confirm its AAA rating for the EFSF,” Yardeni notes, even though the EFSF would be leveraged to the hilt to provide guarantees for distressed countries.

What’s with the timing and the dubious rating reaffirmation here?

Watch whether any U.S. money goes toward rescuing Europe too—the International Monetary Fund has reportedly committed to a euro bailout of about 250 billion Euros. But Americans foot the bill for 17% of the contributions to IMF, which means now the U.S. is paying in $54 billion towards helping Europe. Also, the Administration has already buried expanded U.S. funding for the IMF of about $108 billion, which the IMF could use for a European bailout, in a U.S. troop funding bill.


11/06/2011

South America has lessons for Greece on debt


Πηγή: The News Tribune
By JUAN FORERO AND MICHAEL BIRNBAUM (WP)
Noev 5 2011

BUENOS AIRES – Rage in the streets, workers thrown from their jobs, creditors demanding their money – that’s Greece, but nearly a decade ago that scenario played out in this region of South America.

In a story that might provide a lesson for Europe, one country, Uruguay, that was on the edge of financial oblivion organized a fast, orderly and negotiated response that revived the economy and ended a run on banks. Another, Argentina, spiraled into a chaotic default and remains a pariah in world financial markets.

The possibility of a quick or easy salvation looks increasingly unlikely for Greece, which would be bankrupt without international support but whose leaders have had difficulty making the drastic reforms European leaders say are necessary.

With uncertainty still hanging over a European bailout package, it remains possible that Greece could default on its debts entirely, making it an outcast like Argentina.

But the tales of other countries in crisis have shown that it’s possible to push through tough measures and emerge with growth on the other side.

Today, tiny Uruguay, with just 3.5 million people across the River Plate from Argentina, is a darling of Wall Street and its economy is among the world’s fastest-growing, 10 years after being forced to ask creditors to accept a 20 percent writedown on its debts.

Carlos Steneri, an economist who oversaw Uruguay’s debt management at the time, said officials agreed that it was vital to quickly restore public confidence in the face of a bank run. Technically, Uruguay defaulted. But it worked closely with U.S. and International Monetary Fund officials, negotiated with bondholders and slashed wages and pension payments.

The goal, he said, was to ensure that Uruguay’s reputation remained intact.

“We are a country known for being serious, respecting contracts and the law,” Steneri said. “There was no sense throwing that away. Simply defaulting would have brought gains, but we would have lost being a credible country.”

So far, however, Greece has responded to its crisis with political paralysis. No civil servant has been laid off, privatizations of inefficient state companies are at a snail’s pace and tax evasion remains rampant. A decision by Prime Minister George Papandreou to seek a referendum (he seemed to be backing away from the public vote late Thursday) on bailout plans means that rejection by the voters would spell a quick end to his country’s attempts to pay its debts.

It is a scenario that is beginning to resemble what happened in Argentina, whose $100 billion default in December 2001 was history’s biggest.

In the Argentine case, five presidents stepped down in two weeks, deadly riots shook Buenos Aires and Argentines lost their life savings.

Much later, Argentina issued a take-it-or-leave-it offer to bondholders, offering to pay about 35 cents on the dollar.

Today, the government still owes an estimated $15 billion to hard-core creditors and has lost numerous judgments in U.S. courts to pay up. With the country still blocked from tapping international capital markets, it is mostly because of booming demand for its agricultural products that Argentina has been lifted from economic calamity.

“Nobody recommends the Argentine approach to anything,” said Arturo Porzecanski, a Uruguayan economist and professor of international finance at American University in Washington, D.C.

The way European finance officials see it, Greece has no other option but to abide by the bailout package being offered by European leaders. The plan, developed by euro zone and IMF leaders, calls on Greece’s creditors to take a 50 percent reduction on their debt – larger than Uruguay’s, smaller than Argentina’s.

Even if the package is approved, official European projections for Greece suggest that the country’s woes could linger for decades. The country is hamstrung by its ties to the euro, which it cannot devalue to make its exports cheaper, while leaving the currency zone might prove even more painful. The harsh austerity programs being forced by the country’s creditors might also be reaching their limits.

Economists say Greece will not be able to borrow on the open market for at least a decade, and the worry now is that the crisis will spread to other hobbled economies like Italy and Spain.

“In terms of pain inflicted on the creditors and in terms of the boomerang effects around the euro zone, it looks like the Greek debt overhang problem is going to have a traumatic solution analogous more to the case of Argentina than Uruguay,” Porzecanski said.


8/13/2011

Debt crisis: A default in Europe could benefit poor countries

Closed shops in the centre of Athens, victims of Greece's debt crisis. Photograph: Sean Smith for the Guardian


Πηγή: The Guardian
By Jonathan Glennie
Tuesday 9 August 2011 07.00 BST

If a European country defaults, poor countries might feel bolder about defaulting when faced with a public emergency, and it might encourage world leaders to look for better ways to deal with debt problems.

Senior economic advisers in Greece and a couple of other European countries are considering defaulting on part of their debt. Not to be taking such a course of action seriously would be irresponsible. Defaulting can never be plan A. But when countries get into very serious financial trouble it is sometimes the least bad of the bad options.

In the current climate, this doesn't sound very radical. Economists of all backgrounds are popping up arguing that default might ultimately be best for Greece, and indeed for the rest of Europe, providing at least a modicum of stability for banks and country creditors. It is almost in danger of becoming the conventional wisdom.

That certainly wasn't the context five years ago when I wrote a paper arguing that debt default should be considered a serious option for many countries around the world. Rather than conventional wisdom, that view was characterised by many as irresponsible. How could Christian Aid, the organisation for which I was working, sanction the refusal to pay debts?

For much the same reasons it might be good for Greece now. If huge debt payments are causing social problems and political unrest in Greece, one of the world's richest countries (ranking about 30th out of 200 countries in GDP per capita terms), imagine the misery being caused in poor countries with similar or larger debt burdens.

Campaigns since the 1990s had some success in getting creditors to cancel the debt of the very poorest countries, but some of the world's poorest countries are still paying out far more money than they receive in aid, rather than spending it on health, education and infrastructure. It is morally bankrupt to force poor countries to pay debts while their people suffer in extreme poverty, especially if much of the debt is illegal or otherwise illegitimate. It is also bad for the economy.

Another argument for debt repudiation not mentioned in Greece's case but relevant for many poor countries is that the debt may well be illegal. Money lent to dictators and snaffled away into offshore accounts gets racked on to the public debt to be paid by future generations. This immoral practice leaves no responsibility with the creditors for the initial lending, a classic case of moral hazard. Debt audits, such as the one that led Ecuador to refuse to pay some of its debt in 2008, are being used by some countries to bolster their case for debt default.

A recent debate between Mark Weisbrot, an economist at the Centre for Economic and Policy Research , and an IMF deputy director about Jamaica's debt demonstrates the kind of creditor thinking that has kept poor countries saddled with huge debts. Despite a clearly unpayable debt causing havoc to the economy and social welfare, the IMF still insists on repayment.

While the IMF and its main shareholders dress up their insistence that countries "pay up at all costs" with technical analysis and claims to have the interests of the poor at heart, the truth is that they are simply serving their own interests as the major creditors. Economic theory follows economic interest far more often than it does academic reasoning.

There is no doubt that default can be a costly option. That is not in debate. When Peru defaulted in the 1980s, there was a creditor backlash and Peru was eventually forced to pay up. The question is whether the alternative is even more costly.

The famous case of Argentina, which defaulted on its debts in 2001, appears to suggest that default can be the least bad option. Argentina was growing again at 8-9% within a year or two. Although threatened with retaliation from investors, this is probably exaggerated as well, as investors tend not to be moralists – they go where there are returns to be had. As the Economist put it: "Capital markets appear to have a remarkably short memory."

It is possible that two positive outcomes will emerge from default in a country like Greece. First, countries in the poor world might be bolder in defaulting when there are clear public health and education emergencies to deal with. If it was OK for Greece, they might say, why not for us? Our debt burden is higher, and the opportunity cost of paying it greater in terms of basic needs provision.

And, second, it might encourage world leaders to look again at the need for a fair and transparent mechanism to deal with debt problems. Under the present system, when a debtor has to choose between repaying its debts and meeting the basic rights of its citizens, it has to ask for a meeting with its creditors (usually the Paris and London Clubs and the IMF) and request a "rescheduling". Under the proposed alternative mechanism, debtor countries could call for the convening of an ad hoc panel with neutral parties, probably based at the United Nations.

Many existing arbitration panels could serve as a model for this. It was a key demand in the Make Poverty History campaign of 2005 and even an IMF deputy managing director tried to establish one unsuccessfully. An independent panel would try to ensure that the debtor emerges from the proceedings with good prospects for financial and economic stability. And lenders will know that they can no longer get away with odious or careless lending.