Showing posts with label Bank of England. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bank of England. Show all posts

3/05/2016

Ex-Bank of England boss: Greece's crisis is 'almost a deliberate act of policy'

A protester shouts slogans during a rally against the government's decision to ask for an economic aid package in Athens April 23, 2010.


Πηγή: Business Insider
By Oscar Williams-Grut
March 2 2016


Former Bank of England Governor Lord Mervyn King is continuing his vocal criticism of Europe, claiming Greece's current economic, social, and political crises have been created "almost as a deliberate act of policy."

The Telegraph reports that Lord King, who was Governor of the Bank of England between 2003 and 2013, made the comments at a launch event for his new book, "The End of Alchemy", at the London School of Economics.

The Telegraph quotes Lord King as saying:

In the euro area, the countries in the periphery have nothing at all to offset austerity. They are simply being asked to cut total spending without any form of demand to compensate. I think that is a serious problem.

I never imagined that we would ever again in an industrialised country have a depression deeper than the United States experienced in the 1930s and that's what's happened in Greece.

It is appalling and it has happened almost as a deliberate act of policy which makes it even worse.

Greece has been in a contracted depression since 2008 but many observers believe bailouts from the IMF and other central bankers have exacerbated the problem by forcing harsh austerity measures on the country that depress growth. Greece's outspoken former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis compared the bailout reforms to being "fiscally waterboarded."

Lord King appears to echo this sentiment and The Telegraph says he argued that "the only way to plot a route back to economic growth and full employment" is for Greece and other weak eurozone states to readopt their national currencies, effectively leaving the eurozone.

Lord King makes a similar argument in his new book, extracts of which have been published in The Telegraph. He makes the radical suggestion that Germany should leave the European Union to herald its breakup.

King, who oversaw the UK's bailouts of Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Bank as the 2008 financial crisis struck, also believes "another crisis is certain" and says that central bankers need to have the "courage to undertake bold reforms" to safeguard against it.


6/25/2013

UK and China sign three year currency swap to make business in Yuan

Sir Mervyn King announced the deal. UK banks hold 35bn Yuan in deposits

Πηγή: MP
June 24 2013

The Bank of England and its Chinese counterpart have signed a deal likely to boost trade between the UK and China in the Yuan. The BoE and the People’s bank of China have signed a three year currency swap arrangement worth 200bn Yuan (33bn dollars), the UK central bank confirmed.

The UK is looking to become a centre for the Chinese currency, also known as the Renminbi. British banks hold 35bn Yuan worth of deposits in the Chinese currency.

Currency-swap agreements allow central banks to swap currencies and can be used by firms to settle trade in local currencies rather than in US dollars, as happens now, since China's currency is not fully convertible to other currencies.

The prospective deal was first announced in February by BoE Governor Sir Mervyn King.

“In the unlikely event that a generalised shortage of offshore Renminbi liquidity emerges, the Bank will have the capability to facilitate Renminbi liquidity to eligible institutions in the UK,” Sir Mervyn said on Saturday.

Last year, the UK Treasury announced plans to make London - the world's largest currency trading hub - the leading international centre for trading the Yuan outside mainland China and Hong Kong.

China has been gradually relaxing strict controls on the value of its currency and on flows of capital. Beijing has been using these pacts as part of its push for a more global role for the Yuan.

It has a swap agreement with Brazil worth 30bn dollars and has also signed similar agreements with other trading partners such as Japan, Australia and Hong Kong.


8/07/2012

Spiral of banks warns of financial meltdown


Πηγή: New Scientist
By Andy Coghlan
August 2 2012

Call it the financial meltdown forecaster. The team of economists who last year demonstrated that a small number of companies wield disproportional power over the global economy has now produced a simple visual tool that can monitor financial stability in real-time.

Like a weather forecast, DebtRank could monitor global financial activity for telltale signs of impending disaster. Its designers say it could anticipate and so help prevent global economic crises like the events of 2008, from which the world is still reeling.

Importantly, it's not just size that matters when it comes to how much risk a troubled bank poses to the financial system. Even a relatively small loss at a firm intimately connected to many other banks could cause a ripple effect that threatens the whole system.
High stakes

To test DebtRank, Stefano Battiston of the Swiss Federal Institute in Zurich used previously confidential data on the 2008 crisis gathered by the US Federal Reserve. The analysis identifies a number of firms that were particularly precarious: had just one of those defaulted on its obligations, it could have resulted in the depletion of more than 70 per cent of the wealth in the entire network. During the crisis, coordinated – and very expensive – intervention prevented such an outcome.

Regulators like Andy Haldane at the Bank of England have called for tools that would provide regulators with a clearer understanding of the state of the global financial system in real time.

DebtRank is an answer to such calls. Battiston says that armed with tools like this, regulators could theoretically spot potential problems as they occur and intervene before the entire system is at risk of collapses. They could also model the impacts of interventions ahead of time, allowing them to experiment until an optimal solution is decided upon.
1000 days

The previously confidential data included detailed daily balance sheets for 407 institutions that between them received bailout funds worth $1.2 trillion from the Federal Reserve. The data covers 1000 days from before, during and after the peak of the crisis, from August 2007 to June 2010.

Battiston and his colleagues focused on the 22 banks that collectively received three-quarters of that bailout money, and which turned out to be intimately linked to one another in a closely-knit network. Almost all were members of the "super-entity" found at the heart of the global economy by last year's study.

From the data, Battiston and his colleagues calculated a daily DebtRank value, ranging from 0 to 1, for each bank. The value reflects the likelihood that a bank will default, and how much this would damage the creditworthiness of other banks and companies in the network.
Spiral to collapse

A DebtRank value of 0 means that if a bank defaults, it poses no risk whatsoever to other members of the network. Theoretically, if a bank with a value of 1 were to fail, it would obliterate the economic value of the entire network.

Battiston represents DebtRank values pictorially within a spiral. Companies ranked 0 sit on the outside of the spiral, and a company ranked 1 would occupy dead centre. As a company's DebtRank value rises, it moves steadily towards the centre of the spiral, posing ever greater threats to the entire system as it does so.

Representations of the 22 companies before and at the peak of the crisis show visually how valuable the tool could be to regulators. In August 2007, well before the crisis, all 22 banks sit around the edge of the spiral (see image 1), with DebtRank values averaging just 0.08. By the crisis, the average had risen to 0.52, sending banks plunging towards the centre (see image 2).


Image 1
In August 2007, well before the financial crisis, all 22 banks sat safely around the edge of the spiral



Image 2
As the 2008 crisis arrived, many of the banks had plunged towards the centre of the spiral, where greater risk lies

At that point, several of the individual institutions could have wiped out more than 70 per cent of the total value of the network on their own, had they failed.

The model also demonstrated how shocks to the system can be rapidly propagated between the closely connected banks. If all 22 simultaneously suffered a 10 per cent loss in the value of their assets, as was seen in the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the losses to the entire network could have caused a the system to crash.
Confidentiality hurdle

Battiston says that his team is collaborating with the European Central Bank and a selection of national banks in Europe to experiment with DebtRank and other systems designed to avoid financial meltdown. To create DebtRank registers, regulators would need to receive daily or weekly updates of all transactions, debt profiles, detailed balance sheets and other assets.

The problem, he says, is that most global financial transactions are confidential, and any regulation that does occur is only at national level. "The police are local, but the transactions international," he says. "There's no authority keeping track at international level," he says.

If such a system was installed globally, the data the regulator receives could be kept confidential, and highly-connected banks at risk of defaulting could be spotted early and warned privately to fix the situation, to solve the problem without panicking the markets.

The study is a good proof of principle and its methodology looks promising, says Simone Giansante at the University of Bath in the UK. Though he cautions that Battiston's study has only looked at two types of transactions, and says a more comprehensive tool would be better – assuming the researchers could obtain the relevant data.


7/15/2012

The Real Libor Scandal



Πηγή: IPE
By Paul Craig Roberts and Nomi Prins
July 17 2012

According to news reports, UK banks fixed the London interbank borrowing rate (Libor) with the complicity of the Bank of England (UK central bank) at a low rate in order to obtain a cheap borrowing cost. The way this scandal is playing out is that the banks benefitted from borrowing at these low rates. Whereas this is true, it also strikes us as simplistic and as a diversion from the deeper, darker scandal.

Banks are not the only beneficiaries of lower Libor rates. Debtors (and investors) whose floating or variable rate loans are pegged in some way to Libor also benefit. One could argue that by fixing the rate low, the banks were cheating themselves out of interest income, because the effect of the low Libor rate is to lower the interest rate on customer loans, such as variable rate mortgages that banks possess in their portfolios. But the banks did not fix the Libor rate with their customers in mind. Instead, the fixed Libor rate enabled them to improve their balance sheets, as well as help to perpetuate the regime of low interest rates. The last thing the banks want is a rise in interest rates that would drive down the values of their holdings and reveal large losses masked by rigged interest rates.

Indicative of greater deceit and a larger scandal than simply borrowing from one another at lower rates, banks gained far more from the rise in the prices, or higher evaluations of floating rate financial instruments (such as CDOs), that resulted from lower Libor rates. As prices of debt instruments all tend to move in the same direction, and in the opposite direction from interest rates (low interest rates mean high bond prices, and vice versa), the effect of lower Libor rates is to prop up the prices of bonds, asset-backed financial instruments, and other “securities.” The end result is that the banks’ balance sheets look healthier than they really are.

On the losing side of the scandal are purchasers of interest rate swaps, savers who receive less interest on their accounts, and ultimately all bond holders when the bond bubble pops and prices collapse.

We think we can conclude that Libor rates were manipulated lower as a means to bolster the prices of bonds and asset-backed securities. In the UK, as in the US, the interest rate on government bonds is less than the rate of inflation. The UK inflation rate is about 2.8%, and the interest rate on 20-year government bonds is 2.5%. Also, in the UK, as in the US, the government debt to GDP ratio is rising. Currently the ratio in the UK is about double its average during the 1980-2011 period.

The question is, why do investors purchase long term bonds, which pay less than the rate of inflation, from governments whose debt is rising as a share of GDP? One might think that investors would understand that they are losing money and sell the bonds, thus lowering their price and raising the interest rate.

Why isn’t this happening?

PCR’s June 5 column, “Collapse at Hand,” explained that despite the negative interest rate, investors were making capital gains from their Treasury bond holdings, because the prices were rising as interest rates were pushed lower.

What was pushing the interest rates lower?

The answer is even clearer now. First, as PCR noted, Wall Street has been selling huge amounts of interest rate swaps, essentially a way of shorting interest rates and driving them down. Thus, causing bond prices to rise.

Secondly, fixing Libor at lower rates has the same effect. Lower UK interest rates on government bonds drive up their prices.

In other words, we would argue that the bailed-out banks in the US and UK are returning the favor that they received from the bailouts and from the Fed and Bank of England’s low rate policy by rigging government bond prices, thus propping up a government bond market that would otherwise, one would think, be driven down by the abundance of new debt and monetization of this debt, or some part of it.

How long can the government bond bubble be sustained? How negative can interest rates be driven?

Can a declining economy offset the impact on inflation of debt creation and its monetization, with the result that inflation falls to zero, thus making the low interest rates on government bonds positive?

According to his public statements, zero inflation is not the goal of the Federal Reserve chairman. He believes that some inflation is a spur to economic growth, and he has said that his target is 2% inflation. At current bond prices, that means a continuation of negative interest rates.

The latest news completes the picture of banks and central banks manipulating interest rates in order to prop up the prices of bonds and other debt instruments. We have learned that the Fed has been aware of Libor manipulation (and thus apparently supportive of it) since 2008. Thus, the circle of complicity is closed. The motives of the Fed, Bank of England, US and UK banks are aligned, their policies mutually reinforcing and beneficial. The Libor fixing is another indication of this collusion.

Unless bond prices can continue to rise as new debt is issued, the era of rigged bond prices might be drawing to an end. It would seem to be only a matter of time before the bond bubble bursts.

Nomi Prins is author of It Takes A Pillage and a former managing director of Goldman Sachs.

Paul Craig Roberts was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy and associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. He was columnist for Business Week, Scripps Howard News Service, and Creators Syndicate. He has had many university appointments. His internet columns have attracted a worldwide following.




8/16/2011

Analysis: Why are BCCI fraudsters being protected?

Why is the Treasury refusing to release the names of the architects of one of the biggest frauds in banking history?

by Melanie Newman 
August 16th, 2011


We may be about to find out – thanks to an academic who has fought tirelessly for five years, through several self-funded court battles.

Prem Sikka’s quest for the full version of a PricewaterhouseCoopers report into the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) started in 2006 as part of a wider investigation into banking failures.

The Bank of England – then the banking regulator – had relied on the report to justify ordering BCCI to close down its UK activities. That led BCCI to collapse owing creditors around the world around US$10 bn.

Fictitious transactions

Most of the report was already public in the US – though not in the UK. The auditors described ‘an enormous and complex web of fictitious transactions.’ But crucial sections of their report were missing.

Professor Sikka, a professor of accounting at the University of Essex, used the Freedom of Information Act to ask the Treasury to release the missing information. It refused, saying that the names of key BCCI employees, brokers who handled BCCI profits and other individuals, were exempt from disclosure under data protection laws.

The professor appealed to the Information Commissioner, which ruled that the redacted parts could ‘prejudice relations between the UK and another country’ and denied his request.

The persistent academic challenged this ruling, without the benefit of legal advice. A judge allowed his appeal even though he had lodged it outside the permitted time limits and on 11 July 2011 three judges unanimously ordered the government to publish most of the missing sections.

‘We were surprised to see that the Treasury sought to extend the protection of the data protection principles to information about some individuals who exercised ultimate control over the whole of BCCI’s operations and were the architects of a group-wide programme of fraud and concealment,’ said the judges. ‘Not to mention the creation of a culture that led others with positions of responsibility within the bank to follow their lead.’

Appeal decision due

The government was given 35 days to appeal the decision, and that time limit is about to expire.

Professor Sikka said the episode ‘raises serious questions about the regulatory role of the Bank of England’, as well as questions about why the government is protecting wrong-doers.

‘The Bank has now returned as regulator of the UK financial institutions,’ said the professor. ‘Can it really be trusted to come clean to parliament or the public? What else has it concealed?’