France, and Sarkozy, Look Vulnerable as Euro Crisis Persists

President Nicolas Sarkozy at an Armistice Day ceremony in Paris this month. Mr. Sarkozy, facing re-election in April, fears becoming the next casualty in the euro crisis.

Πηγή: New York Times

By STEVEN ERLANGER and NICHOLAS KULISH

Nov 21 2011

PARIS — With the humiliating defeat on Sunday of the Socialists in Spain, the two-year euro crisis has already toppled eight governments, sending shivers of anxiety through the Élysée Palace and even the White House.

The main theme of recent elections has been voters’ unhappiness with austerity, uncertainty and whatever party or coalition happens to be in power. But under the pressure of the markets and the demands of Germany, Europe’s de facto financial leader, new governments have largely had to promise more of the same.

As the markets have swung from one vulnerable target to another, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Finland, Denmark and Slovakia have all altered their governments, either through elections or parliamentary maneuverings.

President Nicolas Sarkozy of France fears being next, with French bond costs rising to record highs, growth flat and a presidential election in April. The danger of a downgrade of French bonds has weakened Mr. Sarkozy, undermining his efforts to stay a full partner in the Franco-German couple that is leading efforts to solve the euro crisis.

For now the problem is one of contagion and market confidence. In general the markets want to see Europe and especially Germany stand behind the solvency of Italy. And Germany wants to find a way to do so that will not put German taxpayers on the hook anymore than they already are for Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek bond purchases.

Germany, already dominant but not quite big enough to have its own way, is adamant about a set of changes to the treaty governing the European Union that would impose German-style fiscal discipline on the 17 countries in the Union that use the euro, known as the euro zone, but in the process further divide the 27-member European Union.

The German disagreement with its partners is on two broad and fundamental issues, one immediate and one longer-term: whether and how to use the European Central Bank to stabilize the euro crisis, and how to reshape the euro zone — and thus the European Union itself — for the future. Both issues are fraught, with France in sharp disagreement with Germany over the role of the central bank and also uneasy about any fundamental reshaping of political power in the bloc, which has historically been weighted to France’s benefit.

But while Germany is pressing its partners for a longer-term solution to the institutional failings of the euro zone, it has had little useful to propose about the immediate crisis of market speculation over Italy and now France. Instead, it has objected to every suggestion to create a form of collective bond or to use the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort.

“Everyone is waiting for Germany to present a short-term solution, but the only points where they present a solution are medium and long-term,” said Henrik Enderlein, professor of political economy at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. “I can understand there’s a lot of frustration with this type of leadership.”

There have been many players with lots of suggestions. The most recent is the European Commission and its president, José Manuel Barroso, who has been pushed to the side in the crisis. He has been vocal in pleading for European solidarity and for finding a way to make bond issuance a collective endeavor for euro zone members. Mr. Barroso will present proposals this week for the issuing of collective bonds, so-called “stability bonds,” which could involve limited national guarantees.

But both France and Germany, with their own credit ratings at stake, have opposed any form of Eurobond until the euro zone countries are more aligned economically, which would take some years and more integration.

While France is eager to be an important player in a more integrated European “core” — the 17 euro zone nations — France disagrees with Germany about how to shape it. They also disagree about whether a new treaty would be necessary, a project that would take at least three years. The prospect of a euro zone with its own separate rules and internal obligations sharply displeases the 10 countries in the European Union that currently are outside the euro zone, though all but Sweden, Denmark and Britain, which have opted out of the euro, are obligated to work to one day join the currency — if it survives.

Britain is especially anxious, particularly under a government led by the Conservative Party, traditionally anti-European integration. Britain has always been wary of giving up fiscal sovereignty to Brussels, and it fears that new euro zone arrangements could damage the “single market” that Europe represents or London’s financial sector.

When Prime Minister David Cameron met Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany on Friday, the Tory press headlined stories about a “German plot” to take over Europe and a “secret German memo,” not secret at all, that laid out much-discussed German ideas for more integrated governance. France and Germany have been working with the European Council president, Herman Van Rompuy, on proposals to increase collective and European Union oversight of national budgets and statistics, pass debt-limit laws and harmonize certain tax and social welfare policies. The idea is to prevent another meltdown.

But these issues are all long-term in nature and will have little impact on market confidence now.

Mrs. Merkel has said that “if the euro fails, Europe fails.” But her own party, in coalition with the more free-market Free Democrats, is focused on two dangers. The first is that once market pressure is off vulnerable countries, they will stop difficult but vital economic and budgetary changes. Allowing debt-stricken countries to issue bonds guaranteed by the whole euro zone, or allowing the European Central Bank to lend in whatever quantities are necessary to ensure smooth functioning of the markets, the way the Federal Reserve does in the United States, would, in this view, let spendthrift, irresponsible governments off the hook.

Second, the Germans feel that the central bank is one of the last credible institutions left in the European Union. Germany officials argue that it would risk its credentials as a prudent steward of the euro by pumping funding into the financial system.

In an interview last week, Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, said, “I’m convinced that if we abandoned the promise of euro stability, we would have a few weeks, maybe a few months of relief on the financial markets. But after a few months the problem would return. It is all about trust.”

The Germans believe that once the bank starts buying government bonds in large quantities, “this is going to undermine the trust of the global investor community in the last institution of the euro area,” said Guntram B. Wolff, deputy director at Bruegel, an economic research institute.

France, under attack, understands the argument about moral hazard, he said. “But then they say, ‘Look, moral hazard, yes. But even worse is if the whole thing blows up.' ”

Inequality and poverty in Greece: 'Myths, realities and the crisis'

"Inequality and poverty in Greece: 'Myths, realities and the crisis"


By Chrysa Leventi (Athens University of Economics and Business), Manos Matsaganis (Athens University of Economics and Business), Theodore Mitrakos (Bank of Greece), Panos Tsakloglou (Athens University of Economics and Business & IZA).

1. Introduction

"In recent years, distributional issues are almost always in the centre of the Greek public discourse while, at the same time, many aspects of inequality, poverty and the redistributive role of the state have been investigated in depth. Nevertheless, many assertions made in the public discourse are sometimes contradictory (for example, claims that inequality is due to sharp class differences and assertions that the Greek society is dominated by an oversized middle class), in some instances unsubstantiated (for example, statements about the distributional effects of the recent austerity measures) and in other cases in sharp contrast to the findings of the empirical studies (for example, the often heard claim that in recent decades inequality and poverty are constantly rising). The objective of this paper is to shed light in some of these allegations by presenting empirical findings on the inter-temporal trends and the structure of inequality and poverty in Greece, as well as on the distributional effects of the austerity measures adopted as a consequence of the current economic crisis".

Inequality Greece

Should we feel sorry for Greece?

Πηγή: BBC
Nov 7 2011

Greece is at the eye of the storm gathering over the world economy, and threatening to tear the eurozone apart. But should the rest of us be sorry for Greece, or angry? Here, two experts present opposing arguments for and against sympathy.


AGAINST SYMPATHY - Nicholas Walton, European Council on Foreign Relations

There's a popular new parlour game in Europe, where players complete the sentence: "Did you know that in Greece…?"

Here are some winning examples:
The railway system would be cheaper if every passenger was taken to their destination by taxi
Every MP has the right to an official car
There are more Porsche owners than taxpayers declaring an income of over €50,000 (£43,000)

Some answers may stretch the truth, but the bottom line is that Greece has evidently squandered the benefits of being in the eurozone in a quite startling way.

Instead of using low interest rates and the efficiencies of the world's largest single market as a mechanism to drive economic modernisation, Greek politicians continued their game of buying support by splurging state largesse.

The Greek people played too.

At the same time, of course, the national game of tax avoidance continued at Olympic levels of performance, while the books - with notable outside help and connivance - were cooked.

The economic tide has now firmly receded, and it's obvious that the Greeks have been skinny dipping, with the result that this rather small corner of the mighty eurozone is now terrifying commanders-in-chief and potentates from Berlin, to Washington, to Beijing.

This small crack in the dream of a common European currency has the potential to become a Charybdis-like whirlpool, sucking in the whole world economy.

The Greeks, of course, are far from the only ones to blame. Others built a fatally flawed euro edifice, while others also broke rules or turned a blind eye while rules were broken.

The Greeks themselves - many of whom, too young to be tainted by blame, now face a devastatingly bleak future - will suffer mightily in years to come.

But in the depths of a crisis the priority is not to blame or to feel too much pity - the real priority is to get out of the crisis. Now is not the time to feel sorry for the Greeks.

FOR SYMPATHY - Simon Tilford, Centre for European Reform

We should feel sorry for the Greeks, because they have been asked to do the impossible over the last two years. They have imposed public spending cuts that are greater than any developed economy has ever succeeded in carrying out.

To argue that they have been backsliding, or reneging on their obligations, or free-riding on the goodwill of other eurozone economies is inaccurate and quite unfair.

There is no doubt that Greece is one of the architects of its misfortune - successive Greek governments have mismanaged the country's public finances. But no country can put its public finances on a sustainable footing if its economy is in free fall, and these unprecedented cuts in public spending have pushed the economy into a deep slump.

And now, despite the fact that the strategy over the last two years has failed, and has proved completely counter-productive, Greece is being asked to impose further very very deep cuts in public spending. And if the Greeks fail to meet their budget targets (as they inevitably will, irrespective of how hard they try meet them), they will then be stripped of sovereignty over important aspects of economic policy.

It's a terrible position to put a country into. It's very risky and, I would say, runs counter to what the European Union is supposed to stand for.

I don't have much sympathy for the Greek elite. They took the country into the currency union against the advice of most economists. They joined for the wrong reasons - a determination to have a seat at the top table rather than a careful analysis of the country's economic interests. But they were hardly alone in making this mistake.

The Greek people do deserve our sympathy, however. They face unprecedented economic hardship, with no light at the end of the tunnel.

If Britain were in the eurozone it would not doubt be having to slash public spending by massively more than it is currently doing. Would there, in a such a situation, be no cause for sympathy with us?