Πηγή: WPR
Even if the conflict picks up steam again after Ramadan ends on Aug. 30, the alliance will then have to confront a new deadline: The NATO mission's mandate will draw to a close on Sept. 27 unless it is explicitly renewed or extended, a decision that would require unanimous consent of all the alliance's members. Enthusiasm for the operation was never that strong among key NATO states such as Germany and Turkey, and public support for the mission in Britain and France has been eroding. French President Nicolas Sarkozy will want to bring operations to a successful close well in advance of the April 2012 presidential contest, while the government of British Prime Minister David Cameron will want to be in a position to proclaim that the conflict is winding down by the time it must again submit the biannual "bill" for the Libya operation to parliamentary scrutiny.
In Washington, increasingly focused on spending issues, the news that the costs for the Libya war have now surpassed $1 billion -- 75 percent of which has been funded by the American taxpayer -- will not endear the operation to members of Congress contemplating drastic cuts in social services and unwelcome tax increases as a way to staunch the country's flood of red ink.
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's recent admission that he had reservations about the NATO operation from the very beginning echoes efforts by other alliance leaders to back away from the maximalist rhetoric of early spring, when many were confidently predicting that Gadhafi would be overthrown quickly in an operation that was supposed to last "days, not weeks." Now, France, Britain and the U.S. have publicly floated the possibility of a post-conflict scenario in which Gadhafi remains in Libya after leaving power. That suggests that NATO leaders are seriously seeking an exit strategy that will quickly disengage the alliance from becoming further entangled in the Libyan civil war.
Some of the urgency is also being driven by the recognition that NATO may soon have other missions handed to it, and that the Libya operation is expending military assets that could be needed elsewhere. Just as the Libya intervention was launched, in part, under the rubric of the "responsibility to protect," there may soon be growing demands for another humanitarian operation further to the south and east, providing the security necessary to protect humanitarian relief efforts to deal with the growing famine in the Horn of Africa.
Meanwhile, the Balkans remain the "most likely arena for instability" in Europe, and the recent flare-up in violence in Kosovo is a warning that unsettled issues in that part of the continent could easily spiral out of control. Indeed, NATO had to take control of two border crossings and deploy additional forces to tamp down the conflict, but if Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci is determined to assert Pristina's sovereign control over the Serb-populated north, then future clashes are inevitable. In turn, a new Kosovo crisis would not bode well for the fragile state of affairs in neighboring Bosnia. David Bosco described the mood at a recent meeting of Balkan experts as "gloom and resignation," adding, "It was all but taken for granted that the expensive and prolonged international involvement in the region had failed. . . . Several participants hinted darkly that new violence could erupt at any time and noted that the international community's tools for responding to violence have grown much weaker; most NATO forces have withdrawn over the years . . . "
So it is likely that we will soon see a redefinition of the Libya mission's criteria for success. While the overall, long-term goal remains Gadhafi's departure from power, that in and of itself may no longer be used as the trigger for determining when active NATO involvement ends. Instead, what may end up happening is a final massive air campaign to "wreck" the remaining pillars of Gadhafi's power -- military bases, communications infrastructure and key government buildings -- and degrade his ability to regenerate his forces. Following that, NATO's emphasis will shift from efforts to oust Gadhafi in favor of a more passive stance of enforcing the blockade to prevent new supplies from reaching the "Brother Leader," combined with building up the rebel forces' capabilities over the next months -- even if that means leaving Gadhafi in control of "greater Tripoli" for the time being. In other words, instead of one dramatic push leading to Gadhafi's fall, the rebellion would slowly but surely gain control over the country. And despite all the rhetoric about bringing Gadhafi and his lieutenants to justice, the recent "amnesty offer" proffered by the rebels indicates that a quiet diplomatic solution that ends up removing Gadhafi from power over a longer timeframe would be preferable to a all-out offensive that encourages him to desperately fight on to the bitter end.
Some of this change in approach is also being driven by an awareness that if the Gadhafi regime falls too rapidly, the resulting power vacuum could invite chaos and anarchy. Conversely, having the rebel movement proceed more slowly, while institutionalizing its capabilities, would in the long run lead to a smoother transition that might alleviate the need for a large post-conflict stabilization force. This seems to be the thinking of Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, who on the eve of Poland's assumption of the EU presidency noted that the Libyan opposition must "work out a plan for what they will do the moment they walk into Tripoli."
The Libya operation was launched under the premise that it would be a short victorious war. As those assumptions have not panned out, there is a clear effort underway to make sure it does not become a long, hard slog.
