War Within NATO? Why Is Turkey Getting So Aggressive With Greece?

 

Source: The National Interest
By Startfor Worldview
Sept 13 2020

Turkey is putting its 50-year view on maritime rights into practice through its Blue Homeland Doctrine, growing its naval and commercial presence in Mediterranean waters that it claims are part of its exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Oil and gas exploration is becoming a crucial tool in implementing this strategy. But Ankara's attempts to claim extensive maritime resource rights risk broadening to a wider conflict with Greece and other NATO allies that would bring foreign energy projects, and potentially the United States, into the fray.

Turkey's Maritime Ambitions

Turkey claims that all of its neighboring waters in the Aegean, Black and Mediterranean seas deserve special treatment under international law, and that the islands in the Aegean Sea (which Greece controls the majority of) should not enjoy the same rights as large countries like Turkey with lengthy coastlines. The international community never adopted these distinctions, which is why Turkey is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and prefers to resolve disputes through bilateral negotiations in lieu of not international arbitration. This has so far led to two major disputes with Greece in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, as well as a major dispute with Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean.





Turkey's most important dispute is in the Aegean Sea, where thousands of Greek islands help boost Greece's maritime claims over Turkey's, and where the two countries disagree on how to even start drawing a maritime border due to the disparity in the number of islands between them. Turkey has just three islands in the Aegean Sea, while Greece claims more than 3,000. Given the higher number of Greek islands, Turkey has long maintained that any expansion of Greek maritime claims from six nautical miles (nm) to 12 nm off Greece's shores would constitute a "casus belli," or cause of war. While Greece and Turkey have nearly gone to war several times over disputes in the Aegean Sea, the two countries have so far avoided declaring full EEZs in the region, as well as claiming territorial waters beyond six nautical miles. But that doesn't mean they can't do so in the future. 

Ankara has argued that if both Greece and Turkey extended their claims beyond 12 nm, Turkey's percent ownership of the territory would only marginally increase, while Greece would see its territorial control reach nearly three-quarters of the entire Aegean Sea.
The use of Greece's islands in the Aegean Sea to demarcate a maritime border for EEZs, which extend up to 200 nm from the coast, would also leave Turkey with virtually no rights to the natural resources and fisheries in the Aegean Sea.
Turkey has argued that a more equitable way to split the sea's resources would be by ignoring the islands altogether and starting off with an equidistant line between the Greek and Turkish mainlands.




By more aggressively flexing its claims through energy exploration and naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is trying to both legitimize its declared EEZ claim, as well as delegitimize any potential EEZ claims in the region that Greece has through its islands of Crete, Rhodes and Kastellorizo. Kastellorizo, in particular, has the potential to generate a significant EEZ claim for Greece that could connect to Cyprus's own claimed EEZ, thus significantly limiting Turkish claims to resources between Crete and Cyprus. Further escalation could result in Greece finally claiming its full EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean, which Athens has so far been reluctant to do for fear of spurring a wider conflict.

Protected by a Turkish naval convoy, Turkey's Oruc Reis surveying vessel has been active throughout the Mediterranean Sea since the beginning of the year.

Turkey's December 2019 maritime agreement with Libya's Government of National Accord aims to legitimize Turkey's claims by establishing a border between Turkish and Libyan waters that ignores Crete and Kastellorizo. 

On Aug. 27, the Greek parliament ratified a maritime border agreement with Egypt aimed at countering Turkey's pact with Libya by legitimizing a potential EEZ border generated via its control of Crete with Egypt. Greece's deal with Egypt is a first step in potentially declaring a full EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean, but the agreement with Egypt does not legitimize potential claims that Kastellorizo could give Greece rights to.




Turkey has also been actively attempting to delegitimize Cyprus' claimed EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean by both conducting energy exploration in waters that Cyprus directly claims, as well as harassing foreign companies that are operating on behalf of the Cypriot government. Turkey has argued that Cyprus' claimed EEZ is not legal because it was not done in coordination with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which Ankara recognizes as a legitimate government for all of Cyprus. Turkey also argues that, as an island, Cyprus cannot claim a full EEZ.

Turkey's Yavuz vessel is currently drilling off the coast of Western Cyprus.

Turkey's Barbados vessel is also currently researching in the Northern Cyprus territorial waters that Turkey recognizes as a part of an oil exploration block held by the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation.

In 2018, the Turkish navy prevented the Italian oil firm Eni from drilling on its Cuttlefish prospect in an exploration block the company received from Cyprus.

The Specter of War

Turkey's increased provocations will continue to drive the United States and other NATO countries, including France and Greece, to boost their own naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Both Turkey and Greece will try to refrain from crossing red lines that could spur a larger confrontation that neither wants, but the higher presence of ships in the eastern Mediterranean will nonetheless increase the possibility of incidents, as evidenced by the Aug. 10 collision between the Greek frigate Limnos and the Turkish frigate Kemal Reis. International mediation would likely avoid further escalation to a military conflict between Greece and Turkey, but is unlikely to result in a diplomatic solution to their dispute.

In the case of a wider crisis, most NATO members would view Turkey as the aggressor and would likely back Greece. This would likely reinforce Ankara's overall pursuit of its maritime strategy and intensifying national security push by offering Turkey further proof that NATO does not prioritize its national security priorities. Countries can only leave NATO on their own accord, which Turkey remains is unlikely to do. Instead, Ankara would probably continue to reduce collaboration with NATO countries.





Despite Cyprus and Greece's calls for a more significant response to deter Turkey's behavior, the European Union will likely be hesitant to impose more drastic measures for fear of prompting Ankara to reduce cooperation on migration and other EU priorities. Unless Turkey starts to more directly protect its claims in the Aegean Sea, fires upon a Greek or another European vessel, or conducts drilling or exploration activities around Crete, Brussels will likely limit its sanctions pressure to companies and individuals supporting Turkish activities in the Mediterranean. 

Decisions on implementing EU sanctions require unanimity among the bloc's member states. And some countries, such as Germany, are more concerned about aggressive sanctions only inflaming Brussels' tensions with Turkey. 

If the European Union does not take significant action on Turkey, Cyprus is now threatening to veto proposed EU sanctions against Belarus amid the country's ongoing political crisis. This may result in slightly stronger EU sanctions that target more Turkish individuals and companies, but more broad-based economic sanctions against the Turkish government remain unlikely.

Energy Projects in the Crossfire

The United States will likely let the European Union continue to take the lead in responding to Turkey's attempts to delegitimize Greek and Cypriot maritime claims, but Chevron's recent entry into the eastern Mediterranean could eventually draw Washington more directly into the conflict. On July 20, Chevron announced an agreement to acquire the Houston-based oil and gas firm Noble Energy, which operates both the Leviathan gas field off the coast of Israel and the Aphrodite gas field off the coast of Cyprus. Ankara, however, will likely adopt a more hands-off approach to U.S. companies operating in the region, as the United States would be more willing to impose hardline sanctions in response to American firms being drawn into its maritime disputes.

By continuing to increase the cost of developing resources in Cypriot waters, Turkey's ongoing harassment of foreign energy firms will drive its neighbors closer together on both maritime security and energy exploration issues. But it could also potentially halt their construction of the proposed East Med pipeline. Cyprus, Egypt, Greece and Israel created the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2019. The quartet has since collaborated to construct the roughly $6 billion pipeline project, which would carry natural gas from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe. Under international law, Turkey is technically required to allow other countries to build pipelines through its EEZ. But Ankara retains the power to demand that any constructors of the East Med pipeline adhere to its environmental reviews and oversight, which would be de facto recognition of Turkey's EEZ. Otherwise, Turkey could send its navy to harass or intercept vessels involved with construction as Ankara did in 2018 with a drillship planning to spud a well in Cypriot waters. 

If France and Egypt actively support Greece, Turkey will be defeated

 

Source: Bulgarian Military

August 28 2020

By Alexander Khramchikhin

MOSCOW, (BM) – The scenario of a war between two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, described quite recently, is becoming more and more real and tangible. The specific reason for a possible war is the division of the Mediterranean shelf with oil and gas fields.

At the same time, the country, which is also a NATO member, unexpectedly but very decisively came out on the side of Greece. And this country is a whole France, a nuclear power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, it is clear that the nuclear potential of this country is irrelevant, it will not be used under any circumstances. But the usual potential of the French Armed Forces has, as it were, even openly demonstrated.

In the event of a military confrontation only between Greece and Turkey, the latter has an obvious advantage. The intervention of France radically changes the situation.

The French ground forces have the least influence on this situation. In terms of the number of tanks and artillery systems, they are much weaker than both the Greek and Turkish ones. Ground military air defense is absolutely insignificant; now it consists only of Mistral MANPADS.

There are still a few SAMR / T and Krotal air defense systems, but they are part of the Air Force and are intended to protect military airfields. And it is difficult to imagine the transfer of French ground contingents to Greece. But it is no less difficult to imagine in general a land war between Greece and Turkey through a very short and geographically inconvenient continental border between these countries, especially since the border is far from the disputed shelf. Accordingly, the weakness of the French ground forces does not matter much. What matters is French air and sea potential.

In terms of the number of American F-16C / D fighter-bombers, Turkey currently has an advantage over Greece 235 to 154, according to the old, but still vigorous Phantoms – 43 to 33, while Turkey also has 20 equally old ones in service. but upgraded F-5. In addition, at least one and a half hundred different outdated aircraft are in storage on each side, but their return to service is hardly possible.

True, Greece has 42 more French fighter-bomber Mirage-2000, to which France can add 156 similar aircraft of several modifications at once [and the French have up to 64 such aircraft in storage]. This already significantly changes the balance of power, but France has 105 much more modern Rafale-V / S, belonging to the 4+ generation [F-16 and Mirage-2000 – 4th generation].

Even a partial use of this potential immediately changes the balance of power against Turkey. It may be recalled that in the only real air battle in October 1996, the Greek Mirage-2000 shot down a Turkish F-16D. “Rafal” is obviously much better than the F-16 [with “Phantoms” belonging to the 3rd generation, it is generally pointless to compare them].

Another 43 “Raphael-M” is carried by the only French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle”. However, nothing prevents the deck “Raphael” from flying from ground airfields, further increasing the superiority of the Franco-Greek coalition in the air.

According to the German-built submarines of the project 209 of various modifications, Turkey has an advantage over Greece of 12 to 7, however, Greece has four newest submarines of the project 214. France can put up four Rubis-class submarines, thereby providing the Franco-Greek side with a certain superiority under water. In terms of frigates, Turkey surpasses Greece by a ratio of 22 to 13.

France has 29 frigates, of which 11 are actually destroyers (they are classified as “1st rank frigates”). Of these destroyers, 8 (2 of the Forbin type, 6 of the Aquitaine type) are the latest ships, significantly superior in their performance characteristics to any of the Turkish frigates. In terms of the number of missile boats, Turkey bypasses Greece by very little (19 and 17), so the Franco-Greek coalition will have a significant superiority in the surface forces. It is clear that in a potential conflict it is impossible to involve all available air and sea forces, but this applies equally to all parties.

If the war is air-sea, then the ground air defense of the parties will not be able to make a special contribution to it. Although the Greeks are able to deploy their air defense systems on the islands in the Aegean Sea, and they have already deployed the S-300P in Crete. This could create additional problems for the Turkish Air Force.

However, the Turks are theoretically able to bring the S-400 to their Mediterranean coast, then the French and Greeks will become sad. The question is how much the Turkish military mastered the newly purchased air defense system and how much they bought the air defense system for it.

There is evidence that there are only about 120 missiles, that is, less than Greece and France have combat aircraft. True, if the S-400 knocks down at least a couple of dozen aircraft, the rest will sharply diminish the desire to climb into its zone of action.

Although ground-based air defense adds to the uncertainty, the overall quantitative and qualitative superiority is on the side of Athens and Paris. Moreover, their task is purely destructive: to prevent Turkish geological exploration on the shelf, as well as, possibly, the transfer of Turkish troops to Libya.

This makes the coalition’s actions even easier, since it does not need to defend anything, and makes Turkey’s position completely unpleasant – its Air Force and Navy, on the contrary, find themselves “tied” to defenseless geophysical and transport vessels. Oil rigs will be even more vulnerable if it comes to installing them offshore.

The situation becomes simply exciting if the Libyan scenario is added to the Mediterranean scenario, where France is on the side of the “opposition” (LNA led by Haftar), and Turkey actively supports the “legitimate government” (PNS led by Saraj). The main support of the LNA, as you know, is Egypt, which in fact is already in a state of covert war with Turkey and is one step away from a direct invasion of Libya (“The Expected Impossible”).

At the same time, he is also actively involved in offshore affairs. Earlier this year, Turkey and Libya (represented by the PNC) signed an agreement to “close” their economic zones in the Mediterranean Sea, to which Greece and Egypt recently responded with a similar “closure”. The arbitrary delimitation of Mediterranean waters by both pairs has a very distant relationship to the law of the sea, but it creates the possibility of another conflict, since each of the pairs divided the same waters.

Accordingly, Cairo can quite openly side with Paris and Athens. And put up against Ankara up to 300 modern combat aircraft (F-16, Mirages-2000, Rafaley and MiG-29M2), three Project 209 submarines, 11 frigates (including one “actual destroyer” of the “Aquitania” type), not less than 30 missile boats.

After which the superiority of the “troika” becomes overwhelming. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates, which have 78 F-16s of the most advanced E / F modifications and up to 58 Mirages-2000 in the Air Force, at least 30 missile corvettes and boats in the Navy, can also act on its side. It is clear that the Emirates will not send all this into battle, but even a third of this potential will make Turkey’s position completely sad.

In this situation, it would be strange for Greece not to attempt to liquidate the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The war for Cyprus between only Greece and Turkey is almost guaranteed to be won by Turkey (despite the participation of the Cypriot land forces on the side of the Greeks), but in the configuration described here, on the contrary, Greece is practically guaranteed to win.

At the same time, Cyprus is becoming an excellent “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the coalition, allowing its aircraft to penetrate deep into Turkish airspace. And in this case, the Syrian troops and Kurdish formations, with the “feasible help” of the Russian aviation, will be able to cleanse Idlib and Afrin from the Turks and their local puppets.

Ironically, out of five potential war participants, three are NATO members, and the other two are the most westernized countries in the Arab world. But this is certainly not what will stop the war, for there is no longer that West in general, and even more so NATO in particular. It will be stopped by the fear of human and material losses, which in the event of such a grandiose “batch” will be huge for all participants in the war. On the other hand, someone may just accidentally break off or just as accidentally re-bluff. After that, an uncontrolled escalation will follow.

Originaly posted to VPK. Alexander Khramchikhin is a Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.