Showing posts with label Joseph Stiglitz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Joseph Stiglitz. Show all posts

7/06/2012

The Euro’s Latest Reprieve



Πηγή: Social Europe Journal
By Joseph Stiglitz
July 4 2012

Like an inmate on death row, the euro has received another last-minute stay of execution. It will survive a little longer. The markets are celebrating, as they have after each of the four previous “euro crisis” summits – until they come to understand that the fundamental problems have yet to be addressed.

There was good news in this summit: Europe’s leaders have finally understood that the bootstrap operation by which Europe lends money to the banks to save the sovereigns, and to the sovereigns to save the banks, will not work. Likewise, they now recognize that bailout loans that give the new lender seniority over other creditors worsen the position of private investors, who will simply demand even higher interest rates.

It is deeply troubling that it took Europe’s leaders so long to see something so obvious (and evident more than a decade and half ago in the East Asia crisis). But what is missing from the agreement is even more significant than what is there. A year ago, European leaders acknowledged that Greece could not recover without growth, and that growth could not be achieved by austerity alone. Yet little was done.

What is now proposed is recapitalization of the European Investment Bank, part of a growth package of some $150 billion. But politicians are good at repackaging, and, by some accounts, the new money is a small fraction of that amount, and even that will not get into the system immediately. In short: the remedies – far too little and too late – are based on a misdiagnosis of the problem and flawed economics.

The hope is that markets will reward virtue, which is definedas austerity. But markets are more pragmatic: if, as is almost surely the case, austerity weakens economic growth, and thus undermines the capacity to service debt, interest rates will not fall. In fact, investment will decline – a vicious downward spiral on which Greece and Spain have already embarked.

Germany seems surprised by this. Like medieval blood-letters, the country’s leaders refuse to see that the medicine does not work, and insist on more of it – until the patient finally dies.

Eurobonds and a solidarity fund could promote growth and stabilize the interest rates faced by governments in crisis. Lower interest rates, for example, would free up money so that even countries with tight budget constraints could spend more on growth-enhancing investments.

Matters are worse in the banking sector. Each country’s banking system is backed by its own government; if the government’s ability to support the banks erodes, so will confidence in the banks. Even well-managed banking systems would face problems in an economic downturn of Greek and Spanish magnitude; with the collapse of Spain’s real-estate bubble, its banks are even more at risk.

In their enthusiasm for creating a “single market,” European leaders did not recognize that governments provide an implicit subsidy to their banking systems. It is confidence that if trouble arises the government will support the banks that gives confidence in the banks; and, when some governments are in a much stronger position than others, the implicit subsidy is larger for those countries.

In the absence of a level playing field, why shouldn’t money flee the weaker countries, going to the financial institutions in the stronger? Indeed, it is remarkable that there has not been more capital flight. Europe’s leaders did not recognize this rising danger, which could easily be averted by a common guarantee, which would simultaneously correct the market distortion arising from the differential implicit subsidy.

The euro was flawed from the outset, but it was clear that the consequences would become apparent only in a crisis. Politically and economically, it came with the best intentions. The single-market principle was supposed to promote the efficient allocation of capital and labor.

But details matter. Tax competition means that capital may go not to where its social return is highest, but to where it can find the best deal. The implicit subsidy to banks means that German banks have an advantage over those of other countries. Workers may leave Ireland or Greece not because their productivity there is lower, but because, by leaving, they can escape the debt burden incurred by their parents. The European Central Bank’s mandate is to ensure price stability, but inflation is far from Europe’s most important macroeconomic problem today.

Germany worries that, without strict supervision of banks and budgets, it will be left holding the bag for its more profligate neighbors. But that misses the key point: Spain, Ireland, and many other distressed countries ran budget surpluses before the crisis. The downturn caused the deficits, not the other way around.

If these countries made a mistake, it was only that, like Germany today, they were overly credulous of markets, so they (like the United States and so many others) allowed an asset bubble to grow unchecked. If sound policies are implemented and better institutions established – which does not mean only more austerity and better supervision of banks, budgets, and deficits – and growth is restored, these countries will be able to meet their debt obligations, and there will be no need to call upon the guarantees. Moreover, Germany is on the hook in either case: if the euro or the economies on the periphery collapse, the costs to Germany will be high.

Europe has great strengths. Its weaknesses today mainly reflect flawed policies and institutional arrangements. These can be changed, but only if their fundamental weaknesses are recognized – a task that is far more important than structural reforms within the individual countries. While structural problems have weakened competitiveness and GDP growth in particular countries, they did not bring about the crisis, and addressing them will not resolve it.

Europe’s temporizing approach to the crisis cannot work indefinitely. It is not just confidence in Europe’s periphery that is waning. The survival of the euro itself is being put in doubt.



6/11/2012

Stiglitz: Spain bank deal may not work


Πηγή: Business Report
By Reuters
June 11 2012

Europe's plan to lend money to Spain to heal some of its banks may not work because the government and the country's lenders will in effect be propping each other up, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said.

“The system ... is the Spanish government bails out Spanish banks, and Spanish banks bail out the Spanish government,” Stiglitz said in an interview.

The plan to lend Spain up to 100 billion euros ($125 billion), agreed on Saturday by euro zone finance ministers, was bigger than most estimates of the needs of Spanish banks that have been hit by the bursting of a real estate bubble, recession and mass unemployment.

If requested in full by Madrid, the bailout would add another 10 percent to Spain's debt-to-gross domestic product ratio, which was already expected to hit nearly 80 percent at the end of 2012, up from 68.5 at the end of 2011. That could make it harder and more expensive for the government to sell bonds to international investors.

With Spanish banks, including the Bank of Spain, the main buyers of new Spanish debt in 2011 - according to a report by the Spanish central bank - the risk is that the government may have to ask for help from the same institutions that it is now planning to help.

“It's voodoo economics,” Stiglitz said in an interview on Friday, before the weekend deal to help Spain and its banks was sealed. “It is not going to work and it's not working.”

Instead, Europe should speed up discussion of a common banking system, he said. “There is no way in which when an economy goes into a downturn it will be able to sustain policies that will restore growth without a form of European system.”

Stiglitz, a former economic advisor to US President Bill Clinton, is a long-standing critic of austerity packages. He also wrote book attacking the International Monetary Fund for policies it has imposed on developing countries as a precondition for emergency loans.

What the European Union has done so far has been minimal and wrong in its policy direction because austerity measures to restore risk have the effect of reducing growth and increasing debt, he said.

“Having firewalls when you're pouring kerosene on the fire is not going to work. You have to actually face the underlying problem, and that is, you're going to have to promote growth,” Stiglitz said.

Instead, sweeping reforms to make Europe more of a fiscal union are needed to solve the debt crisis, reinforce the single currency and ultimately help Germany which, as the richest country in the union, will have to bear the highest cost of guaranteeing any commonly issued debt and providing more resources to boost public spending.

“Germany keeps saying that the strengthening is fiscal discipline, but that is a totally wrong diagnosis,” Stiglitz said.

Germany is expected to propose at the end of June a road map toward a European fiscal union, but Berlin favours joint euro bonds, backed by all the area's governments, only as a medium-term goal, once other countries have fixed their high debts and budget deficits through austerity measures so they are not reliant on Berlin's deep pockets.

“Eurobonds is just one institutional arrangement that could work, there are others: a common treasury,” said Stiglitz adding that ultimately “there has to be a way of raising revenue across Europe, to support the weaker countries in case of an economic downturn.”

While the economies of Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal are contracting, Germany grew 0.5 percent in the first quarter. The divide in the euro area in many cases reflects austerity programs to tackle debt and deficit problems.

Critics have said the focus on cutting costs is aggravating Europe's crisis and jeopardising the future of the single currency. Greek elections next week could bring to power parties opposed to the tough conditions attached to the country's EU and IMF-led rescue plan and raise the possibility of Greece leaving the euro zone.

“Germany is going to have to face the question, do they want to pay the price that would follow from the dissolution of the euro, or do they want to pay the price of keeping the euro alive?” Stiglitz said. “I think the price they will pay if the euro falls apart will be greater than the price they will pay for preserving the euro. I hope they will come to realise that, but they may not.”

Stiglitz's latest book, “The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future,” is scheduled to be published on Monday. It challenges the idea that inequality is an unavoidable evil needed to sustain economic expansion.

“We could have more growth and less inequality,” Stiglitz said, “so we could do better in both dimensions simultaneously.”



4/12/2012

The Perils of 2012


Πηγή: Social Europe Journal
By Joseph Stiglitz
Jan 13 2012

The year 2011 will be remembered as the time when many ever-optimistic Americans began to give up hope. President John F. Kennedy once said that a rising tide lifts all boats. But now, in the receding tide, Americans are beginning to see not only that those with taller masts had been lifted far higher, but also that many of the smaller boats had been dashed to pieces in their wake.

In that brief moment when the rising tide was indeed rising, millions of people believed that they might have a fair chance of realising the “American Dream.” Now those dreams, too, are receding. By 2011, the savings of those who had lost their jobs in 2008 or 2009 had been spent. Unemployment checks had run out. Headlines announcing new hiring – still not enough to keep pace with the number of those who would normally have entered the labor force – meant little to the 50 year olds with little hope of ever holding a job again.

Indeed, middle-aged people who thought that they would be unemployed for a few months have now realised that they were, in fact, forcibly retired. Young people who graduated from college with tens of thousands of dollars of education debt cannot find any jobs at all. People who moved in with friends and relatives have become homeless. Houses bought during the property boom are still on the market or have been sold at a loss. More than seven million American families have lost their homes.

The dark underbelly of the previous decade’s financial boom has been fully exposed in Europe as well. Dithering over Greece and key national governments’ devotion to austerity began to exact a heavy toll last year. Contagion spread to Italy. Spain’s unemployment, which had been near 20% since the beginning of the recession, crept even higher. The unthinkable – the end of the euro – began to seem like a real possibility.

This year is set to be even worse. It is possible, of course, that the United States will solve its political problems and finally adopt the stimulus measures that it needs to bring down unemployment to 6% or 7% (the pre-crisis level of 4% or 5% is too much to hope for). But this is as unlikely as it is that Europe will figure out that austerity alone will not solve its problems. On the contrary, austerity will only exacerbate the economic slowdown. Without growth, the debt crisis – and the euro crisis – will only worsen. And the long crisis that began with the collapse of the housing bubble in 2007 and the subsequent recession will continue.

Moreover, the major emerging-market countries, which steered successfully through the storms of 2008 and 2009, may not cope as well with the problems looming on the horizon. Brazil’s growth has already stalled, fuelling anxiety among its neighbours in Latin America.

Meanwhile, long-term problems – including climate change and other environmental threats, and increasing inequality in most countries around the world – have not gone away. Some have grown more severe. For example, high unemployment has depressed wages and increased poverty.

The good news is that addressing these long-term problems would actually help to solve the short-term problems. Increased investment to retrofit the economy for global warming would help to stimulate economic activity, growth, and job creation. More progressive taxation, in effect redistributing income from the top to the middle and bottom, would simultaneously reduce inequality and increase employment by boosting total demand. Higher taxes at the top could generate revenues to finance needed public investment, and to provide some social protection for those at the bottom, including the unemployed.

Even without widening the fiscal deficit, such “balanced budget” increases in taxes and spending would lower unemployment and increase output. The worry, however, is that politics and ideology on both sides of the Atlantic, but especially in the US, will not allow any of this to occur. Fixation on the deficit will induce cutbacks in social spending, worsening inequality. Likewise, the enduring attraction of supply-side economics, despite all of the evidence against it (especially in a period in which there is high unemployment), will prevent raising taxes at the top.

Even before the crisis, there was a rebalancing of economic power – in fact, a correction of a 200-year historical anomaly, in which Asia’s share of global GDP fell from nearly 50% to, at one point, below 10%. The pragmatic commitment to growth that one sees in Asia and other emerging markets today stands in contrast to the West’s misguided policies, which, driven by a combination of ideology and vested interests, almost seem to reflect a commitment not to grow.

As a result, global economic rebalancing is likely to accelerate, almost inevitably giving rise to political tensions. With all of the problems confronting the global economy, we will be lucky if these strains do not begin to manifest themselves within the next twelve months.



12/13/2011

Stiglitz on the Great Depression: 'The Book of Jobs'

DOMINO THEORY: The financial meltdown is the Depression parallel everyone notices. The more frightening parallel is everything else.

Πηγή: The Vanity Fair
By Joseph Stiglitz
Dec 13 2011

Forget monetary policy. Re-examining the cause of the Great Depression—the revolution in agriculture that threw millions out of work—the author argues that the U.S. is now facing and must manage a similar shift in the “real” economy, from industry to service, or risk a tragic replay of 80 years ago.


It has now been almost five years since the bursting of the housing bubble, and four years since the onset of the recession. There are 6.6 million fewer jobs in the United States than there were four years ago. Some 23 million Americans who would like to work full-time cannot get a job. Almost half of those who are unemployed have been unemployed long-term. Wages are falling—the real income of a typical American household is now below the level it was in 1997.

We knew the crisis was serious back in 2008. And we thought we knew who the “bad guys” were—the nation’s big banks, which through cynical lending and reckless gambling had brought the U.S. to the brink of ruin. The Bush and Obama administrations justified a bailout on the grounds that only if the banks were handed money without limit—and without conditions—could the economy recover. We did this not because we loved the banks but because (we were told) we couldn’t do without the lending that they made possible. Many, especially in the financial sector, argued that strong, resolute, and generous action to save not just the banks but the bankers, their shareholders, and their creditors would return the economy to where it had been before the crisis. In the meantime, a short-term stimulus, moderate in size, would suffice to tide the economy over until the banks could be restored to health.

The banks got their bailout. Some of the money went to bonuses. Little of it went to lending. And the economy didn’t really recover—output is barely greater than it was before the crisis, and the job situation is bleak. The diagnosis of our condition and the prescription that followed from it were incorrect. First, it was wrong to think that the bankers would mend their ways—that they would start to lend, if only they were treated nicely enough. We were told, in effect: “Don’t put conditions on the banks to require them to restructure the mortgages or to behave more honestly in their foreclosures. Don’t force them to use the money to lend. Such conditions will upset our delicate markets.” In the end, bank managers looked out for themselves and did what they are accustomed to doing.

Even when we fully repair the banking system, we’ll still be in deep trouble—because we were already in deep trouble. That seeming golden age of 2007 was far from a paradise. Yes, America had many things about which it could be proud. Companies in the information-technology field were at the leading edge of a revolution. But incomes for most working Americans still hadn’t returned to their levels prior to the previous recession. The American standard of living was sustained only by rising debt—debt so large that the U.S. savings rate had dropped to near zero. And “zero” doesn’t really tell the story. Because the rich have always been able to save a significant percentage of their income, putting them in the positive column, an average rate of close to zero means that everyone else must be in negative numbers. (Here’s the reality: in the years leading up to the recession, according to research done by my Columbia University colleague Bruce Greenwald, the bottom 80 percent of the American population had been spending around 110 percent of its income.) What made this level of indebtedness possible was the housing bubble, which Alan Greenspan and then Ben Bernanke, chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board, helped to engineer through low interest rates and nonregulation—not even using the regulatory tools they had. As we now know, this enabled banks to lend and households to borrow on the basis of assets whose value was determined in part by mass delusion.

12/05/2011

Joseph Stiglitz on China Trade, Occupy Wall Street, and More


Πηγή: JCNnetwork
Dec 2 2011

Hong Kong Trade Development Council

17 November 2011 Interview Transcript:

Joseph E Stiglitz (from New York),

Professor, Columbia University,

Interviewer: Martin Evan-Jones, Hong Kong Trade Development Council

1. There are many worries over Western economies with their debt mountains that no-one is going to escape from anytime soon. This is an intractable problem, isn’t it?

“Well, I don’t think that actually the debt problem in the United States is the major problem in the United States. Remember just 10 years ago, we actually had a surplus that was so great that the worry was we were going to pay back the entire national debt. In ten short years, we went from these very large surpluses to very large deficits, so my mind is actually not that difficult to reverse that. Europe’s debt-GDP ratio is actually lower than that of the United States. But obviously the Europe framework is very problematic.”

2. You were a creator of the theory of the “Economics of Information”. Given the question marks over the Eurozone’s stability and US recovery, is the theory of asymmetric knowledge bases actually illustrated in today’s global economy?

“Yes, and you see a playing-on for instance right now in the fact that there is so much uncertainty about the financial status of the banks, the banks in Europe, the banks in America the extent to which they are intertwined, we saw that problem back in 2008 where the interlinking of the banks virtually brought down the whole financial system and the economies of the west. There was a hope that in the aftermath of that, we would increase transparency, not get perfect information, but at least improve the information so we could see more clearly what was going on. Unfortunately the banks resisted and we are very much in the state that we were before, a little bit better, but (not a great deal of certainty) about exactly how fragile our financial system is.” 

3. How would you guide analysts? What have we to look forward to?

“Well, I think we can look forward to a lot of turbulence. I think that unfortunately the austerity that has been undertaken in the United States and Europe, partly response to the, I think to some extent, unnecessary anxieties about the debt, particularly in the United States, is going to mean that the economies is going to be weaker and because economies are weaker, tax revenue is going to be lower, there is going to be a lot of disappointment about the improvement in the fiscal stance of the country. And when those numbers come in, markets are going to be disappointed and there will still be more turmoil.”

4. As a critic of global management and free market forces, do you have sympathy for the “Occupy Wall Street” movement?

“I do have a lot of sympathy for them. You know, protest movements like that are … a reflection of frustration. It’s a belief that the electoral process hasn’t worked in the way it should. What they are saying is that something is going wrong with the things are going. I think they are absolutely right, you know, market economies are supposed to provide jobs for those who work hard, study hard. (But) youth unemployment very high, and prospects do not look very good. But also they are very concerned with is the apparent inequities.

The banks were largely responsible for bringing on the crisis. And yet the bankers are the only people that seem to be doing very well, the government gave them hundreds of billions of dollars, (gave) ordinary citizens very little help with their mortgages. While the taxpayers turned all over this money to the banks. They are now left with cutbacks of public services, with job prospects that are bleak and real wages that are staggered going down.” 

5. Is it reasonable to say that market capitalism now has no answers for developed societies?

“Well, I think the forces of market capitalism are still very positive when they are directed in the right way. The problem is that markets have to be governed, markets have to be regulated. And in the years before the crisis, the banks, you might say “bought” through their campaign contributions, lobbying and so forth, deregulation, the wealthy bought a system of taxes that most Americans think is unjustified, unfair where speculators are taxed at much lower rates than people who work for a living, and that doesn’t make any sense. And that’s what people are bridling over. If you can get a market to work in a way it’s supposed to work, then yes, then capitalism can actually deliver. But in the recent years, capitalism, market economy has not been delivering for most Americans. Just to give you some numbers, the medium-income people, person in the middle, income today is the same as it was in 1997. It has been almost a decade and a half of stagnation. But if you look at a full-time male worker, his income is comparable to what it was in 1978, that is to say that is more than three decades of stagnation. Obviously something is not working right, and the benefits of the growth have not been shared to the point where that most Americans are actually getting worse off year after year.”  

6. A very different model has been followed in China. How would you assess its “report card” after three decades of opening up?

“Oh very much so! I mean, just looking at the numbers, you have to say, China has not only managed to grow at an extraordinary rate, close to 10 per cent over 30 years, but … at least much of benefit, or some of the benefit has gone to the bottom, hundreds of millions have moved out of poverty. At the same time, one have to recognise there has not been growing inequality. The benefits of that growth have not been shared by all citizens in the same way, and that’s going to be one of the real challenges to China as it moves more into, as you might say, a market economy. Market economies often are highly in-egalitarian, and one of the frameworks that is often talked about in China is a harmonious society, how do you reconcile the inequalities that the markets often throw up with creating a harmonious society?”

7. Would you agree that the relationship between China and the US is fundamental to international trade…but it looks as if there going to be continual collisions of their respective trade priorities?

“That’s right, and I think one of the challenges for the United States and to some extent, for China, is to come to grips with the new global economic balance in power. In the years after followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was only the dominant economy, which was the United States. Now within a short span of time, China is already the second largest economy and the projections are well within the decade, that would probably be equal in size with the United States. Per capita income will still be much lower … would be what they call “a moderate prosperous economy,” still long way to grow to have the per capita income the same. But what that means is that the United States will not be in the kind of position that it was for a long time to dictate the international rules of the game. The United States will not be in the position to lecture other countries about how they should run their economies. After the aftermath of the great recession, the credibility of the United States giving those lectures is obviously much diminished. So we are going to have a new global landscape, I think it will probably be a good thing for global economic stability, global economic prosperity.”

8. As an aside I’d like to explore with you the implications of the Trans Pacific Partnership, introduced by the US and collecting eight other countries around the Pacific with Japan but no China. Can the initiative be successful in this formation?

“I actually have a lot of other reservations about the TPP, because I have reservations about some of the US free trade agreements as they are called. They are really not free trade agreements, they are managed trade
agreements. And they are managed free trade agreements for special interests in the United States. The intellectual property frameworks, for instance, often deny access to medicine to poor people; very important for emerging markets to have access to knowledge, they often restrain access to knowledge; many people in academia worry about how our intellectual property regime is actually counterproductive for innovation, for academic development of ideas. So what worries me is that the TPP has been discussed to a very large extent
in secret without the kind of democratic discussion of the particular provisions. The result is, quite frankly, there is a lot of anxiety inside the United States, among those who are concerned about issues that I raise, about development, about health, about intellectual property, about whether it is going to be a balanced agreement or one which reflects the special interests of some of our business interests.

But other question that you raised is obviously that, over the long run, the framework that we ought to be going forward on is a multilateral trade framework. I’ve been very concerned about these bilateral or regional trade agreements because actually they lead to fragmenting the global trading regime. Economists talk about the extent to which there is trade diversion rather than trade creation. So I would be much happier if we engage in efforts to expand the multilateral framework rather than having one group versus other group within this global community in the way that the TPP seems to be going.”

9. How would see Hong Kong’s role in the trade relationships that are emerging?

“Well, as you know, Hong Kong has long been the gateway to China. It’s been an important interface between the mainland and the United States. It’s been a financial centre and I think it would continue to play that role, but obviously in a more complicated way as, for instance, other financial centres develop in China, as other gateways open up. But I think it will continue to be a place where, you might say, the East and the West get together and come to a better understanding to each other.” 

10. You’re attending the Asian Financial Forum, whose theme is: “Asia: driving sustainable growth”. To what extent is the Asian growth engine a sustainable one?

“Well, I think it’s sustainable, in a way what’s happened is that Asia has succeeded in creating a strong domestic economy. The middle class, for instance, in both India and China, other countries in Asia, have been growing very rapidly. It is (said that) there are more middle class Chinese now than Americans altogether. For a long time, China was very dependent on export, the model was export-led growth, and exports are still going to be important.

But there is, there has been a process of shifting away from this dependence on exports, it was the key plank of the 11th five-year plan and it has been re-emphasized in the 12th five-year plan. And rightly so; I think the global financial crisis of 2008 has really accelerated that movement. There are huge opportunities for the development of domestic demand in China, both consumption and perhaps even more important: investment. Investments in the cities, people who have been moving from rural areas to the cities, but many of cities still need large investments to make them more livable, parks, public transportation systems and so forth. So there is a real basis for sustained development in China based on the needs and the resources that China has.”

11. Are you looking forward to the Forum?

“Very much looking forward to coming to Hong Kong.”