Professor Aydın says Cyprus issue set to sail through troubled waters

Πηγή: Todays Zaman

24 July 2011, Sunday / YONCA POYRAZ DOĞAN, İSTANBUL

Mustafa Aydın, a professor of international relations, says the Cyprus problem will not be solved until and unless the Greek Cypriot understanding of the situation changes, and the situation shows that the two sides on the divided island are moving “fast” toward separation.

“They [the Greek Cypriots] see the situation as a minority-majority problem on the island and an occupation by Turkey. As long as they see it that way, the only possible solution is ending the ‘occupation’ and giving the Turks minority rights in a Greek majority state,” Aydın said for Monday Talk. “No consensual, cooperative and peaceful solution will be possible until this stance of the Greek Cypriots changes. But there are other ‘solutions.’ I’m afraid we’re moving rather fast toward separation.”

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made his first visit abroad as prime minister of the 61st government of Turkey to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) last week. Erdoğan reiterated the possibility of freezing relations by saying that Turkey did not recognize the Greek Cypriots on diplomatic grounds, as the prime minister urged the 27-member European Union toward a solution on the island before the Greek Cypriot presidency starts in the middle of next year.

Since Erdoğan changed Turkey’s stance on the issue by taking a step back from the Annan plan that it had once agreed to, which called for the withdrawal of troops and returning some parts of the island, Turkish officials firmly ruled out interpretations that Ankara has reverted to its previous discourse on the subject. They clarified that Turkey still continues to support the UN-led process for reunification.

Answering our questions, Aydın elaborated on the issue. We also asked him to interpret developments in the Middle East in relation to Turkish foreign policy.

Do you think Turkey’s foreign policy of “zero problems with neighbors” has been damaged or failed because of what’s been happening in the Arab world as some observers suggest?

It’s too early to say whether it is damaged or has failed. Let’s first talk about what “zero problems with neighbors” means. It doesn’t exactly mean “zero problems with neighbors.” It is an ideal circumstance, and every state would like to achieve this ideal. It’s like the ideal that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk put forward in the 1920s when he said “Peace at home, peace in the world.” You make it a long-term goal and strive to reach it. What “zero problems with neighbors” actually means is that Turkey will try to solve old conflicts and won’t create new problems. This is the first point.

You have other points to add on this issue.



Yes. Another point is that there is an image created by the Turkish government and the Foreign Ministry that Turkey has a certain level of leverage in the wider Middle East to influence political developments in that region. It is based more on rhetoric rather than certain policies. What is being tested at this moment is this rhetoric: whether Turkey has leverage over other Middle Eastern countries. As it is being tested, we are finding the limits of Turkish influence in the region. Events in Libya and Syria have really tested whether Turkish foreign policy is effective in the region.

There was a recent summit in İstanbul where the Libya Contact Group tried to find a political solution for the crisis in Libya. Do you think the fact that the fourth meeting of the contact group was held in İstanbul showed an increased stature given to Turkey, considering that Turkey was not included in the process of solving the conflict in the beginning?

Behind the scenes Turkey has created a lot of contacts and inroads in the region -- in Iraq with different groups, and in Syria again with different groups: the government, the opposition, the dissidents. And the fact that the Libya meeting was held in İstanbul showed that Turkey has made inroads in Libya, too. But again, this revolves around a lot of rhetoric. If Turkey had such leverage in the Middle East, it would have achieved something spectacular by now -- like convincing Muammar Gaddafi to resign or persuading Bashar al-Assad to allow reforms. Turkey can only try. Behind the scenes, Turkey has been able to develop various connections and has been quite successful in that regard, considering that it is not the United States or the European Union; it is normal that Turkey has economic and political limitations. Thus, naturally there have been some zigzags in Turkish foreign policy regarding how to act when the uprisings started; there were expectations from Turkey that it would choose to be on the side of the democratic people’s movements.
‘Style in US-Turkey relations changed’

What are the expectations of the Turkish and Arab publics?

Yes, there are expectations from the Turkish and Arab publics, and even from some of the European governments. I have had no such expectations since I’m a realist when it comes to international relations. I look at the issue from the perspective of power politics. I believe in smart power, meaning that you analyze the situation and act in accordance with your national interests. Being a regional country, Turkey needed some time to evaluate what was happening. It is normal and natural that Turkey was cautious in the beginning. Turkey was not the only country avoiding taking sides from the first day of the crisis in the region. But the expectations emerged because of the image that the government portrayed about Turkey. It took about two weeks for Turkey to decide how to act regarding the case in Libya, and this was seen as zigzagging outside Turkey since Turkey did not support its traditional Western allies in the beginning, but then came around and supported the NATO action against Libya.

Do you think the Turkish administration learned from its experience in Libya?

Yes, there has been no zigzagging in the case of Syria, which came shortly after the uprising in Libya. Turkey has been cooperating with its Western allies, especially with the United States, as the leaders of Turkey and the United States are talking at the highest levels and coordinating policy. In its dealings with Syria, this position empowers Turkey because Turkish leaders can say to the Syrian leadership that what they are proposing is supported by the United States. This cooperation also increases the chances of acceptance of the policies designed by Turkey in relation to a solution to the Syrian crisis.

Do you see increased cooperation between Turkey and the United States since the Obama administration came to power?

There are ups and downs. Turkey is now a different country than it was 20 years ago, and even different now than it was five years ago. Turkey does not need the United States as much as it needed it before, and the United States does not need Turkey as much as it used to. Therefore, we have to understand that the style of the relationship has changed, and it is different than it was 20 years ago, when the relationship was based on a defense-centered reaction to an external threat.

If we look at the relationship from that point of view, the relationship has diminished somewhat. On the other hand, Obama’s election has helped the relationship recover briefly from its lowest point in 2003, when trust between the two countries, both in military and non-military circles, was lost due to the US’s occupation of Iraq and the aftermath of the Sulaimaniya incident (in which US troops and Kurdish militiamen captured and hooded 11 Turkish military observers in this northern Iraqi town). From that time onwards, the United States administration tried to mend ties with Turkey. Let’s not forget that one of the first foreign visits of President Obama’s presidency in 2009 was to Turkey. His administration invested a lot in Turkey, and there emerged a certain level of disappointment in the US since then, as there is a widespread understanding in Washington that Turkey has not responded the way the administration expected.

What is this in reference to in terms of what the United States has been expecting from Turkey?

An example is a decline in public support for NATO in Turkey.

But does that mean that Turkey is going to leave NATO?

Of course not, but this has emerged as a problem. The United States administration expects actions or at least statements of support from the Turkish administration to change public opinion in that regard.

The United States does not seem to be doing much to convince the American public of its foreign policy actions, does it?

That’s right. Indeed, public opinion does not matter much in foreign policy making in any country unless they are quite nerve-wracking issues for the public, such as the Cyprus issue in Turkey.
‘Turkey would not negotiate from the Annan plan onwards’

Where is the Cyprus problem going?

The prime minister’s recent messages are very strong regarding Cyprus. This shows a certain level of disappointment. This psychology is understandable considering the situation the Turkish government is in. This is the government that took risks and changed Turkey’s long-held Cyprus policy of deadlock. Prime Minister Erdoğan put his political future on the line to do that; but after all the compromises, the Annan plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. So the prime minister is reacting now and trying to level the playing field, undermining Greek Cypriot policy.

Can you elaborate on that idea?

The Greek Cypriots’ strategy is such that they clearly wish to go on with the negotiations on the basis of the Annan plan, but behaving as if the Annan plan is the basis of all talks. Their idea is to start negotiations from the Annan plan compromise, so that they could get additional compromises. However, in order to reach the Annan plan, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots made compromises. The Turkish side compromised because we thought we were going to gain something. However, the Greek Cypriots were rewarded even though they rejected the plan. So, it is not acceptable to start the negotiations from the end point of the Annan plan. If the two sides were to negotiate and exchange compromises, they should start from their earlier positions. This is the position of Prime Minister Erdoğan.

Secondly, the Greek Cypriots have been playing for time, holding back progress and refusing to accept any timeframes in negotiations with the Turkish side since they will hold the rotating presidency of the EU in 2012 and expect to force Turkey to give in. Prime Minister Erdoğan is trying to undermine the policies of the Greek Cypriot administration. Turkey says those tactics will not have an effect in the negotiation process with the EU since accession negotiations have already been frozen, and Turkey can easily suspend relations with the EU for six months during the Greek Cypriot presidency.

So what is Turkey saying exactly?

These are Turkey’s messages to the Greek Cypriot side: If you want the transfer of Varosha (Maraş), then you have to give something; if you want Turkish ports to be opened to Greek Cypriot shipping, then you have to give something; if you want Turkish troops to leave the island, then you have to give something, too. The time for concessions is over. Turkey will not negotiate from the Annan plan onwards.

Will that work?

I am not sure it will solve the problem, but it will certainly level the playing field, which is important. Prime Minister Erdoğan is trying to scale everything back.
‘Separation supported more and more’

Will that position solve the Cyprus problem? Isn’t this contradictory with what the UN tells the two sides -- namely, that they need to be engaged in a serious give and take?

The Cyprus problem will not be solved until and unless the Greek Cypriot understanding of the situation changes. They see the situation as a minority-majority problem on the island and an occupation by Turkey. As long as they see it that way, the only possible solution is ending the “occupation” and giving the Turks minority rights in a Greek majority state. No consensual, cooperative and peaceful solution will be possible until this stance of the Greek Cypriots changes. But there are other “solutions.” I’m afraid we’re moving rather fast toward separation. If public opinion is important in this case, many people in northern and southern Cyprus have started to support separation more and more.

Following the two Cypriot leaders’ meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in Geneva a few weeks ago, there was optimism that a deal could be possible.

Ban Ki-moon said there will be time limits, and that the UN would stop its involvement in the issue if those limits are not respected; he even threatened with pulling back UN peacekeeping forces from the island. The time limit Ban is talking about is the spring of 2012. In order for the two sides to reach a solution by that time, they need to engage in very intense, goal-oriented negotiations. This is what the secretary-general is trying to achieve. But if this is not realized, talks will end and the UN might pull out, and we will be back to square one. If that happens, there is no way out but separation, which will not be accepted by the European Union, the United States and the international public in general. It’s a difficult situation we are in today.

What would you say about the Greek government’s stance? This is all happening at a time when Turkey and Greece are on very good terms.

Successive Greek governments were able to develop good relations with Turkey only by sidelining the Cyprus issue; if they did not, they would not have been able to go ahead with their relations with Turkey. If the Greek government becomes involved in the Cyprus issue, the Greek public will not be so amenable to the development of Turkish-Greek relations; this is a classic catch 22 -- we need Greece to be involved in Cyprus to find a solution, but its involvement in Cyprus will hurt its relations with Turkey due to hostile Greek public opinion. Under these circumstances, it would be very naive to expect the Greek government to put pressure on the Greek Cypriot side.

Isn’t it going to be a big problem for the EU if the island is split?

The EU would not accept it. Its member countries would put economic pressure on Turkey. They would stop or suspend negotiations with Turkey, if they want to. There are probably enough European states that would support those types of policies against Turkey. But this is too dangerous even to contemplate right now. It is obvious that the Cyprus issue is set to sail through troubled waters.
‘Turkey should be ready for challenges of 2015’

An important issue awaiting Turkey is how it is going to deal with the activities related to the commemoration of the centennial of the 1915 incidents regarding Armenians. What would you say about it from the perspective of foreign policy?

If Turkey wants 2015 to pass as smoothly as possible without creating a rupture in Turkey’s relations with the United States or the European Union, Turkey needs to deal with the administration in Armenia. In order to do that, Turkey needs to find a way to convince Azerbaijan that if Turkey’s relations with Armenia improve, it will also help Azerbaijan-Armenia relations. Last time Turkey couldn’t do it. One thing we saw was that Turkish public opinion was not as supportive of Azerbaijan as it was before. Turkey needs to talk more with the Azerbaijani administration in order to move forward with Armenia because Turkey is not supportive of the status quo. We also have to keep in mind that the Armenian diaspora is not monolithic; there are groups that want Armenia to have relations with Turkey, and there are other groups that do not want that.

PROFILE

Mustafa Aydın is a professor of international relations. He is the president of İstanbul’s Kadir Has University as well as the president of the International Relations Council (UIK) of Turkey. He is also co-coordinator of the International Commission on the Black Sea and a member of the Greek-Turkish Forum.

His books include “Black Sea After the Enlargement” (2004); “Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis” (2005); “International Security Today: Understanding Change and Debating Security” (ed. with K. Ifantis, 2006); “Regional In/security: Redefining Threats and Responses” (ed., 2007); “Turkey’s Eurasian Adventure” (in Turkish, 2008); “Turkish Foreign Policy: Old Problems, New Parameters” (ed. 2010) and “Non-Traditional Security Threats and Regional Cooperation in the Southern Caucasus” (ed. 2011).