Bahrain Shiites mark revolt anniversary

A line of riot police stand in front of razor wire near a shopping mall and "Cinema Dana" in Manama, Bahrain, about one-half kilometer from the hub of last year's pro-democracy protests on Tuesday, Feb. 14, 2012, the first anniversary of the uprising in the Gulf kingdom. Bahraini security forces fanned out across the island nation in unprecedented numbers for the anniversary

Πηγή: AP
By REEM KHALIFA and BARBARA SURK
Feb 14 2012

MANAMA, Bahrain (AP) -- Bahraini security forces fanned out across the island nation in unprecedented numbers on Tuesday as Shiites marked the one-year anniversary of their uprising against the country's Sunni rulers.

Authorities sent troop reinforcements and armored vehicles to the predominantly Shiite villages around the capital Manama to prevent people from gathering and answering the call of the main opposition movement, Al Wefaq.

Six American members of an activist group were detained during the protests, activists and the government said. Authorities said they had violated the terms of their visa, and that they agreed to leave the country without further legal measures taken against them.

The government meanwhile threatened to take legal action against the organizers of protests on Monday that turned violent. This could herald a new crackdown on Al Wefaq, which until last year was tolerated but which has suffered sporadic prosecutions and detentions after it took the lead in last year's protests.

At least 40 people have been killed during a year of unprecedented political unrest in Bahrain. The island kingdom, the home of the U.S. 5th Fleet, was the Gulf Arab nation hardest hit by upheaval during 2011's Arab Spring protests.

The kingdom's ruling dynasty has promised reforms to end the upheaval, although it refuses to make the far-reaching changes the protesters and Al Wefaq, have demanded. These include ending the monarchy's ability to select the government, set key state policies and appoint most of the parliament members.

Police on Tuesday fired tear gas at protesters in an apparent attempt to pre-empt a repeat of the marches the night before, in which protesters made their largest effort in months to retake the city's central roundabout. Pearl Square had served as the epicenter of weeks of anti-government protests last year, and its reoccupation would be a major boost for the movement.

The government statement said many protesters on Monday departed from a pre-authorized route in Manama, turning the march into a riot after police arrived. It said Al Wefaq was responsible for the violence, because it failed to "control the crowd (and) that jeopardized the safety of the people along a busy main road."

Legal procedures will be taken against the organizers of the march, Tuesday's statement said.

Al Wefaq rejected the claim, and said that the "unfounded accusations" are part of the rulers' efforts to discredit the group.

"They have used excessive force against the people throughout all this time, but people keep coming back to the streets to insist on their demand to have a role in the decisions about their country," said Abdul Jalil Khalil, a former Al Wefaq parliamentarian.

Shiites account for about 70 percent of Bahrain's population of some 525,000 people, but say they have faced decades of discrimination and are blocked from top political and security posts.

"After years of broken promises for change, Bahrain exploded last year," Khalil said. "We are still here and we want serious solution and meaningful reform."

Sunni rulers made token concessions in June ahead of U.S.-supported reconciliation talks between the monarchy and the opposition. A so-called national dialogue began in July, but Al Wefaq delegates pulled out of the talks, saying the government was not willing to discuss political reform.

Since then, no talks between the monarchy and the opposition have taken place, Khalil said. Street battles between security forces and protesters still flare up almost every day in the predominantly Shiite villages around the capital.

U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said Tuesday the Bahraini government and the opposition "have a responsibility, both of them, to work together to ensure that the right to peaceful protest is respected by all sides."

Nuland also called on the demonstrators to refrain from violence and urged Bahraini security forces to "use maximum restraint" during peaceful protests. Washington asked the government in Bahrain to work with the opposition and other groups "to establish a process leading to real, meaningful political reform" in the Gulf kingdom.

The U.S.-based Witness Bahrain meanwhile said in a statement that six American members of the activist group were arrested during a peaceful march and held at a Manama police station.

Bahrain's Information Affairs Authority said that six U.S. passport holders have been ordered deported for "applying for tourist visas under false pretenses."

The statement says the six activists arrived in Bahrain in the past week and obtained tourist visas at the airport. "They were participating in illegal demonstrations," the statement says.

It said they were taken to a police station and "agreed to leave the country without further legal procedures" against them.

Another two Americans from the group were deported from Bahrain Sunday for taking part in opposition activities after they had entered the Gulf kingdom on tourist visas. Authorities on Monday tightened entry policies into the kingdom, and now demand prior visa approval for many nations that had been allowed to obtain entry stamps upon arrival, including the U.S. and other Western countries.

Bahrain: “The Puzzling Silence of Humanitarianism”

On 23 March, four days after Operation Unified Protector started in Libya the EU foreign policy adviser and Catherine Ashton's right-hand man Robert Cooper commenting on the Bahrain protests' brutal crackdown said: “I'm not sure if the police have had to deal with these public order questions before. It's not easy dealing with large demonstrations in which there may be violence. It's a difficult task for policemen. It's not something that we always get right in the best western countries and accidents happen”. This claim was similar to what Gaddafi had to say excusing his own crackdown on the Benghazi’s protesters.

Catherine Ashton in an official statement earlier on 17 March had called the Government “to initiate a political process with concrete steps that answers the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Bahrainis”. But then she was convinced by the regime's offer of talks: “"The crown prince of Bahrain has appeared to put forward an interesting proposal for a dialogue to start without preconditions, that would bring in the spectrum of opinion in Bahrain and begin discussions that over time would move forward to some sort of, I don't know, possibly constitutional monarchy. But certainly he has a plan".

In the case of Bahraini uprising the government didn’t use mercenaries as it was unfoundedly ascribed to Libya’s regime but imported Army from the neighbor Saudi Arabia. Robert Cooper in his obvious attempt to downplay the incident and maybe to evade the logical questioning “why intervening in Libya and not Bahrain the home to the US fifth fleet?” stated that it is "a rather pleasant, peaceful place” while “"one should understand the authorities were right to restore calm and order and that's what they've done".

Bahrain where some 40 per cent of the world’s oil passes through, is divided between a Shia majority (61,3%) receiving poor treatment in employment, housing, and infrastructure in favor of the Sunnis minority often imported from Pakistan and Syria. The protests started on 14 February when thousands gathered at the Pearl Square resulting to an open shooting by the police forces which left behind two dead and 55 wounded. In the ongoing every oppressing mean was used by the regime like tear gas, torture, tracing activists through social media and subsequent detentions, while around 600 people, including human rights defenders, political leaders, trade unionists, doctors, paramedics and clerics have been arrested since February 2011. On 14 March about 1,200 Saudi and other Gulf countries soldiers have reportedly entered Bahrain at the invitation of the Bahraini royal authorities in order to quell protests that have been raging there for a month. Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, Bahrain’s crown prince, formally requested the Saudi intervention. It is worth noting that this Saudi Arabia's national guard deployed in public order enforcement measures and the use of sniper rifles is trained by Britain’s "humanitarian" government.

Last year, Britain approved 163 export licences for military equipment to Saudi Arabia, worth £110m. Exports included armoured personnel carriers, sniper rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights. In 2009, the UK supplied Saudi Arabia with CS hand grenades, teargas and riot control agents. On 8 July a video released showing one of the formidable armored vehicles (62-ton Leopard tank) being used to suppress rioting civilians in Bahrain, fuelled criticism of Berlin’s decision to sell 200 Leopards to Saudi.

President Barack Obama called King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain to express his deep concern over the violence in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia, a large supplier of U.S. oil, which is Sunni, has made it clear it will not accept a Shiite government next door in Bahrain. Iran, with which Obama administration is already battling over its nuclear program, having a Shiite government that backs the Shiite majority in Bahrain, called the Saudi move "unacceptable, threatening to escalate a local political conflict into a regional showdown with Iran." According to Adrian Blomfield of the London Telegraph: “Saudi officials say they gave their backing to Western air strikes on Libya in exchange for the United States muting its criticism of the authorities in Bahrain, a close ally of the desert kingdom”.

If the Arab Spring Turns Ugly

Πηγή: New York Times
By VALI NASR
Published: August 27, 2011

THE Arab Spring is a hopeful chapter in Middle Eastern politics, but the region’s history points to darker outcomes. There are no recent examples of extended power-sharing or peaceful transitions to democracy in the Arab world. When dictatorships crack, budding democracies are more than likely to be greeted by violence and paralysis. Sectarian divisions — the bane of many Middle Eastern societies — will then emerge, as competing groups settle old scores and vie for power.

Syria today stands at the edge of such an upheaval. The brutality of Bashar al-Assad’s regime is opening a dangerous fissure between the Alawite minority, which rules the country, and the majority Sunni population. After Mr. Assad’s butchery in the largely Sunni city of Hama on July 31, on the eve of the holy month of Ramadan, the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni group, accused the regime of conducting “a war of sectarian cleansing.” It is now clear that Mr. Assad’s strategy is to divide the opposition by stoking sectarian conflict.

Sunni extremists have reacted by attacking Alawite families and businesses, especially in towns near the Iraq border. The potential for a broader clash between Alawites and Sunnis is clear, and it would probably not be confined to Syria. Instead, it would carry a risk of setting off a regional dynamic that could overwhelm the hopeful narrative of the Arab Spring itself, replacing it with a much aggravated power struggle along sectarian lines.

That is because throughout the Middle East there is a strong undercurrent of simmering sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shiites, of whom the Alawites are a subset. Shiites and Sunnis live cheek by jowl in the long arc that stretches from Lebanon to Pakistan, and the region’s two main power brokers, Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, are already jousting for power.

So far this year, Shiite-Sunni tensions have been evident in countries from Bahrain to Syria. But put together, they could force the United States to rethink its response to the Arab Spring itself.

Sectarianism is an old wound in the Middle East. But the recent popular urge for democracy, national unity and dignity has opened it and made it feel fresh. This is because many of the Arab governments that now face the wrath of protesters are guilty of both suppressing individual rights and concentrating power in the hands of minorities.

The problem goes back to the colonial period, when European administrators manipulated religious and ethnic diversity to their advantage by giving minorities greater representation in colonial security forces and governments.

Arab states that emerged from colonialism promised unity under the banner of Arab nationalism. But as they turned into cynical dictatorships, failing at war and governance, they, too, entrenched sectarian biases. This scarred Arab society so deeply that the impulse for unity was often no match for the deep divisions of tribe, sect and ethnicity.

The struggle that matters most is the one between Sunnis and Shiites. The war in Iraq first unleashed the destructive potential of their competition for power, but the issue was not settled there. The Arab Spring has allowed it to resurface by weakening states that have long kept sectarian divisions in place, and brutally suppressed popular grievances. Today, Shiites clamor for greater rights in Lebanon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, while Sunnis are restless in Iraq and Syria.

This time, each side will most likely be backed by a nervous regional power, eager to protect its interests. For the past three decades the Saudi monarchy, which sees itself as the guardian of Sunni Islam, has viewed Iran’s Shiite theocracy as its nemesis. Saudis have relied on the United States, Arab nationalism and Sunni identity to slow Iran’s rise, even to the point of supporting radical Sunni forces.

The Saudis suffered a major setback when control of Iraq passed from Sunnis to Shiites, but that made them more determined to reverse Shiite gains and rising Iranian influence. It was no surprise that Saudi Arabia was the first Arab state to withdraw its ambassador from Damascus earlier this month.

The imprint of this rivalry was evident in regional conflicts before the Arab Spring. Saudis saw Iran’s hand behind a rebellion among Yemen’s Houthi tribe — who are Zaydis, an offshoot of Shiism — that started in 2004. Iran blamed Arab financing for its own decade-long revolt by Sunni Baluchis along its southeastern border with Pakistan. And since 2005, when Shiite Hezbollah was implicated in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, a popular Sunni prime minister who was close to the Saudis, a wide rift has divided Lebanon’s Sunni and Shiite communities, and prompted Saudi fury against Hezbollah. The sectarian divide in Lebanon shows no sign of narrowing, and now the turmoil in Syria next door has brought Lebanon to a knife’s edge.

Graphic
Points of Confrontation


Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s audacious power grab has angered Saudi Arabia. Officials in Riyadh see the turn of events in Lebanon as yet another Iranian victory, and the realization of the dreaded “Shiite crescent” that King Abdullah of Jordan once warned against.

In March, fearing a snowball effect from the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia drew a clear red line in Bahrain, where a Shiite majority would have been empowered had pro-democracy protests succeeded in ousting the Sunni monarchy. The Saudis rallied the Persian Gulf monarchies to support the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain in brutally suppressing the protests — and put Iran on notice that they were “ready to enter war with Iran and even with Iraq in defense of Bahrain.”

The Saudis are right to be worried about the outcome of sectarian fights in Lebanon and Bahrain, but in Syria it is Iran that stands to lose. Both sides understand that the final outcome will decide the pecking order in the region. Every struggle in this rivalry therefore matters, and every clash is pregnant with risk for regional stability.

The turn of events in Syria is particularly important, because Sunnis elsewhere see the Alawite government as the linchpin in the Shiite alliance of Iran and Hezbollah. The Alawite-Sunni clash there could quickly draw in both of the major players in the region and ignite a broader regional sectarian conflict among their local allies, from Lebanon to Iraq to the Persian Gulf and beyond.

The specter of protracted bloody clashes, assassinations and bombings, sectarian cleansing and refugee crises from Beirut to Manama, causing instability and feeding regional rivalry, could put an end to the hopeful Arab Spring. Radical voices on both sides would gain. In Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, it is already happening.

NONE of this will benefit democracy or American interests. But seeking to defuse sectarian tensions wherever they occur would help ensure regional stability. Even if Washington has little leverage and influence in Syria, we should nevertheless work closely with our allies who do. Turkey, which is a powerful neighbor, could still pressure the Assad government not to inflame sectarian tensions. And both Turkey and Saudi Arabia could use their influence to discourage the opposition from responding to President Assad’s provocations.

Beyond Syria, the two countries most at risk are Bahrain and Lebanon, and here we can have an impact. The United States should urge Bahrain’s monarchy to end its crackdown, start talking seriously with the opposition, and agree to meaningful power sharing. Washington has strong military ties with Bahrain and should use this leverage to argue for a peaceful resolution there.

In Lebanon, we should not encourage a sectarian showdown; instead we should support a solution to that country’s impasse that would include redistribution of power among Shiites, Sunnis and Christians. Lebanon last had a census in 1932, and its power structure has since favored Sunnis and Christians based on that count. Meaningful power-sharing in Beirut is as important to peace and stability in Lebanon as disarming Hezbollah.

The Middle East is in the midst of historic change. Washington can hope for a peaceful and democratic future, but we should guard against sectarian conflicts that, once in the open, would likely run their destructive course at great cost to the region and the world.

(Vali Nasr is professor at Tufts University, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of “The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future.”)