Source: eureporter
Feb 19 2022
By Dick Roche
It is estimated that 5G could add up to €1 trillion to EU gross domestic product and to create or transform up to 20 million jobs in the short term, writes Dick Roche.
The Court of Auditors Special Report 5G Roll-out in the EU released on 24 January could have provided policymakers with an objective appraisal as to the validity of issues that have dominated the 5G debate. It could have provided an objective cost and benefit analysis of the alternative approaches to ensuring the security of 5G networks. Regrettably, it fails to do.
The report which has been largely overlooked raises more questions than it answers.
Who should call the shots?
The Court of Auditors [ECA] set itself three basic objectives in its Special Report 5G Roll-out in the EU. First, to examine how effectively the EU Commission has performed its responsibilities. Second to analyse “aspects related to both the implementation of 5G networks ---- and their security” and third to provide “insights and recommendations” for the deployment of secure 5G networks across the 27 EU member states.
Overall the Court is critical of the general approach taken by the EU Commission on 5G and raises questions as to the Commission’s effectiveness.
The ECA disagrees with the EU Commission's view as to where responsibility for the security of the 5G network should lie. The Auditors advance the highly political view that as 5G security cuts across national and EU competences, it is a shared competence and as should be the subject measures made in Brussels.
It argues that by taking what it refers to as a “narrow interpretation of security” the Commission has restricted itself to playing a supporting role and sidelined itself on the issue of security of 5G networks.
In an EU where the role of Brussels is increasingly resented the line taken by the ECA seems particularly tone-deaf. It is hard to see a Government in Berlin, Paris, or any other capital agreeing to play second fiddle to Brussels on the issue of national security.
The 5G toolbox
The report is critical of the EU’s 5G Toolbox, the measures agreed in 2020 to mitigate security risks arising from the rollout of 5G.
The ECA criticises the pace at which Toolbox is being rolled out. It notes that as of October 2021 only 13 member states had enacted or amended national legislation.
It also notes that as the Toolbox came into effect four years after the launch of the 5G Action Plan after many of Europe’s major network operators had already made contracts for the 5G equipment required to build out their networks – a valid criticism.
The clarity of the criteria for adjudicating as to whether equipment suppliers are “high-risk” is raised. The question of how Internal Market impacts arising from the different approaches being adopted by the member states is also flagged.
The Commission, while ‘noting’ the ECA comments pointed out that Member States viewed its approach “as timely, effective and proportionate”.
The Commission also argued that the collaborative approach adopted involved not only the Commission and Member State authorities but other key stakeholders and by so doing allowed “Member States to adopt measures to their national circumstances”.
Multi-Billion Euro Question not Asked or Answered
The ECA notes that the cost of deploying 5G across all member states could reach €400 billion and that the estimated investment over the period 2121 to 2025 could range between €281 billion and €391bn.
Following on from an intervention by the Trump administration, a central issue in Europe’s 5G debate has been the proposition that equipment supplied by companies based in China should be excluded from the build-out of Europe’s networks.
Despite the centrality of this issue, the ECA notes that the Commission “does not have sufficient information” about the costs of banning such equipment an extraordinary admission.
The ECA cites an Oxford Economics report which suggested that restricting a key vendor from participating in 5G buildout would add €2.4 billion per year over the next decade. It also records an estimate by Danish consultants that put the cost of ripping out and replacing existing equipment from Chinese vendors since 2016 at “about €3 billion”, a figure that looks on the low side given the investment made in 5G across the EU in the last five years.
The failure to compile an independent estimate of the costs that arise from a ‘country of origin’ policy of vendor exclusion, a central issue in the 5G debate, can only be described as disturbing. Making public policy without knowing the full costs makes no sense.
The lack of cost data is all the more extraordinary given the multiple statements by major network operators as to the costs and rollout delays that they would face from restricting their right to deal with leading equipment suppliers with whom they have been dealing for decades.
Myths unchallenged and self harm ignored.
The failure to independently establish the cost implications associated with removing long-established vendors is not the only shortcoming.
There is no in-depth analysis of the delays in 5G rollout that will inevitably arise from limiting equipment suppliers - delays that will particularly hit non-urban populations.
There is, equally, no in-depth analysis of the other long-term implications that arise from limiting the ‘pool’ of suppliers which European MNOs can use, of the vulnerabilities that arise from limiting the capacity of operators the opportunity to spread their bets and of the consequences of preventing them from engaging with the fullest range of evolving technologies.
The ECA also fails to make any critical examination as to the truthfulness of allegations on which the idea of excluding suppliers has been based. Allegations about company ownership, state funding, and intellectual property which have largely been thrown into the mix from the US and which have been swallowed by many in the EU are not examined, even though it would not have been hard for the ECA to establish the facts.
Importantly no effort is made to weigh up warnings, again of US origin, about ‘back doors’, malware, or ‘vulnerabilities against the actual record or to examine the alternative approaches available to address security concerns. The ECA fails to question the false binary peddled by the US that banning specific suppliers is the way to ensure network security. It also ignores the reality that the complexities of global supply chains make the idea of determining Europe’s policy for 5G, the key enabler for digital transformation, on the ‘country of origin’ approach untenable.
The ECA report could and should have objectively and comprehensively reviewed all aspects of the debate that has ranged on 5G over the last few years. Regrettably, it has failed to do so.
Feb 19 2022
By Dick Roche
It is estimated that 5G could add up to €1 trillion to EU gross domestic product and to create or transform up to 20 million jobs in the short term, writes Dick Roche.
The Court of Auditors Special Report 5G Roll-out in the EU released on 24 January could have provided policymakers with an objective appraisal as to the validity of issues that have dominated the 5G debate. It could have provided an objective cost and benefit analysis of the alternative approaches to ensuring the security of 5G networks. Regrettably, it fails to do.
The report which has been largely overlooked raises more questions than it answers.
Who should call the shots?
The Court of Auditors [ECA] set itself three basic objectives in its Special Report 5G Roll-out in the EU. First, to examine how effectively the EU Commission has performed its responsibilities. Second to analyse “aspects related to both the implementation of 5G networks ---- and their security” and third to provide “insights and recommendations” for the deployment of secure 5G networks across the 27 EU member states.
Overall the Court is critical of the general approach taken by the EU Commission on 5G and raises questions as to the Commission’s effectiveness.
The ECA disagrees with the EU Commission's view as to where responsibility for the security of the 5G network should lie. The Auditors advance the highly political view that as 5G security cuts across national and EU competences, it is a shared competence and as should be the subject measures made in Brussels.
It argues that by taking what it refers to as a “narrow interpretation of security” the Commission has restricted itself to playing a supporting role and sidelined itself on the issue of security of 5G networks.
In an EU where the role of Brussels is increasingly resented the line taken by the ECA seems particularly tone-deaf. It is hard to see a Government in Berlin, Paris, or any other capital agreeing to play second fiddle to Brussels on the issue of national security.
The 5G toolbox
The report is critical of the EU’s 5G Toolbox, the measures agreed in 2020 to mitigate security risks arising from the rollout of 5G.
The ECA criticises the pace at which Toolbox is being rolled out. It notes that as of October 2021 only 13 member states had enacted or amended national legislation.
It also notes that as the Toolbox came into effect four years after the launch of the 5G Action Plan after many of Europe’s major network operators had already made contracts for the 5G equipment required to build out their networks – a valid criticism.
The clarity of the criteria for adjudicating as to whether equipment suppliers are “high-risk” is raised. The question of how Internal Market impacts arising from the different approaches being adopted by the member states is also flagged.
The Commission, while ‘noting’ the ECA comments pointed out that Member States viewed its approach “as timely, effective and proportionate”.
The Commission also argued that the collaborative approach adopted involved not only the Commission and Member State authorities but other key stakeholders and by so doing allowed “Member States to adopt measures to their national circumstances”.
Multi-Billion Euro Question not Asked or Answered
The ECA notes that the cost of deploying 5G across all member states could reach €400 billion and that the estimated investment over the period 2121 to 2025 could range between €281 billion and €391bn.
Following on from an intervention by the Trump administration, a central issue in Europe’s 5G debate has been the proposition that equipment supplied by companies based in China should be excluded from the build-out of Europe’s networks.
Despite the centrality of this issue, the ECA notes that the Commission “does not have sufficient information” about the costs of banning such equipment an extraordinary admission.
The ECA cites an Oxford Economics report which suggested that restricting a key vendor from participating in 5G buildout would add €2.4 billion per year over the next decade. It also records an estimate by Danish consultants that put the cost of ripping out and replacing existing equipment from Chinese vendors since 2016 at “about €3 billion”, a figure that looks on the low side given the investment made in 5G across the EU in the last five years.
The failure to compile an independent estimate of the costs that arise from a ‘country of origin’ policy of vendor exclusion, a central issue in the 5G debate, can only be described as disturbing. Making public policy without knowing the full costs makes no sense.
The lack of cost data is all the more extraordinary given the multiple statements by major network operators as to the costs and rollout delays that they would face from restricting their right to deal with leading equipment suppliers with whom they have been dealing for decades.
Myths unchallenged and self harm ignored.
The failure to independently establish the cost implications associated with removing long-established vendors is not the only shortcoming.
There is no in-depth analysis of the delays in 5G rollout that will inevitably arise from limiting equipment suppliers - delays that will particularly hit non-urban populations.
There is, equally, no in-depth analysis of the other long-term implications that arise from limiting the ‘pool’ of suppliers which European MNOs can use, of the vulnerabilities that arise from limiting the capacity of operators the opportunity to spread their bets and of the consequences of preventing them from engaging with the fullest range of evolving technologies.
The ECA also fails to make any critical examination as to the truthfulness of allegations on which the idea of excluding suppliers has been based. Allegations about company ownership, state funding, and intellectual property which have largely been thrown into the mix from the US and which have been swallowed by many in the EU are not examined, even though it would not have been hard for the ECA to establish the facts.
Importantly no effort is made to weigh up warnings, again of US origin, about ‘back doors’, malware, or ‘vulnerabilities against the actual record or to examine the alternative approaches available to address security concerns. The ECA fails to question the false binary peddled by the US that banning specific suppliers is the way to ensure network security. It also ignores the reality that the complexities of global supply chains make the idea of determining Europe’s policy for 5G, the key enabler for digital transformation, on the ‘country of origin’ approach untenable.
The ECA report could and should have objectively and comprehensively reviewed all aspects of the debate that has ranged on 5G over the last few years. Regrettably, it has failed to do so.
Dick Roche is a former minister for European affairs and former minister for environment and local government.
I find your blog spot here from your Twitter account ( if you still remember ), but just want to let you know that your Twitter account might have been hacked, you should check there ( as I was also a victim, just lucky that I can get my account back )
ReplyDelete