5/30/2012

ICC a political tool, not a legal institution

Πηγή: bizcommunity
May 30 2012

Politics is the main hindrance for the International Criminal Court (ICC), was the main conclusion drawn from "Building Restorative International Justice: the ICC of the future". The topical debate took place in London at the Royal Commonwealth Society.

As a concept, the panellists were practically unanimous in favour of an international court that will hold leaders and individuals accountable for their crimes and serve as a deterrent. Donald Deya, CEO of the Pan African Lawyers Union, went further by praising the Court's positive social impact. He argued that the whole discourse surrounding the ICC has ended up triggering attention on issues, and causing motion, that would not otherwise have been there.

The discussions were started by Dr. David Hoile, director of the European Sudanese Council, who stated that the punishment of international crime was one of the noblest aims of the ICC. However, in practice the common analysis was that the ICC as an institution has so far failed to fulfil its purpose.

Court failed self-evaluation

The track record of the ICC was called to question when Dr. Phil Clark of The School for Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) cited the circumstances of the Lubanga trial for crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as an example of how 'flimsy' evidence gathered through intermediaries has lead to weak cases being put forth to the Court. This statement was backed up by barrister, Rodney Dixon of Temple Chamber Gardens, who also stressed on the urgency of the ICC to review the evidence that underpins cases put forward and also criticised the Court's failure to self-evaluate the way in which it operates.

However, it was the ICC's political ties that were the most prominent subject of scrutiny across the panel. Speakers criticised that the Court was being used more as a political tool rather than a legal institution. The influence of ICC Chief Prosecutor and his ability to refer individuals to be tried at the Court was deemed to play a role in the Court's political agenda.

Controversy surrounding Luis Moreno-Ocampo and Libya was brought up as the panel recalled Ocampo's consideration for Libya to try Saif Gaddafi in Libya despite the absence of legal framework in place, as required by the Rome Statute, to prosecute him domestically, whereas a similar request by Kenya, that has a much stronger judiciary system in place was denied.

Victims of own intellectual laziness

The much anticipated question - Is Africa on Trial? - drew mixed opinions from the panel of speakers. Courtney Griffiths, defense lawyer for former Liberian leader Charles Taylor, gave a defiant 'yes' in answer to the question and quoted the late Robin Cook, who infamously declared that "this is not a court set up to bring to book prime ministers of the United Kingdom or presidents of the United States". Professor Hans Köechler, Chair of Political Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, also spoke on the ICC having a predominant focus on Africa and questioned the excessive influence of the UN Security Council on the Court.

Elizabeth Evenson of the Human Rights Watch on the other hand, disagreed that international justice has been exclusively concerned with Africa, though admitted that the ICC has been selective in the cases brought forward. However, she placed blame on international politics rather than that the Court itself. But it was Prof Julius Nyang'oro, previously with the African and Afro-American department, University of North Carolina, who raised eyebrows when he criticised African nations for signing the Rome Statute without scrutinising it thoroughly and becoming victims of their own "intellectual laziness".




Interview with economist Paul Krugman: 'Greece will leave eurozone within 12 months'


Πηγή: The Independent
May 30 2012

At last year’s Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in New York a superhero made his debut. He was a bearded figure called “Krug man”, who set about vanquishing the minions of the evil financial services empire with his fearsome “macro mallet”. The unlikely cartoon champion was based on Paul Krugman, the Nobel Prize winning economist.

In America, Krugman is the closest thing the economics profession has to a household name. His New York Times blog – which he uses to excoriate “austerian” politicians, arrogant European elites and economic folly in general – is one of the most popular sites on the web. Loath him or love him – and Krugman’s take-no-prisoners writing style has as many enemies as admirers · it is impossible to ignore him. And this week “Krug man” brought his battle for economic righteousness to the UK.

Speaking to The Independent today he was as forthright as ever. Krugman said he would be “astonished” if Greece managed to stay in the eurozone for longer than a year. The eurozone crisis was inevitable, he said, from the moment the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992. David Cameron is indulging in “wishful thinking” if he thinks Britain can cut its way back to growth. Oh, and a statue of Gordon Brown should be erected in Trafalgar Square to thank the former prime minister for keeping the UK out of single currency.

Will Greece leave the euro?

Something has to happen and in the end it does have to be a Greek exit. I’d be astonished if they can go more than two years without leaving. I’d be astonished if they could go even one year. The event that will force an exit is when the European Central Bank (ECB) puts a stop to the emergency lending to Greek banks. Nobody wants to do that but at some point the numbers will make that unavoidable. If I was a Greek depositor I’d be trying to shift money out of the banks because there’s a reasonable probability that, after a long weekend, you’ll find out that it has turned into a new drachma account worth 50 or 30 per cent less.

Would Greece actually be better off out?

The possibilities for a recovery are certainly there if Greece leaves. One of their major exports is tourism. Greece could exits creating a very ugly scene for six months or a year, but after that there’s tons of package tours of British lager louts going to the Greek isles. It sounds awful, but compared with 50 per cent youth unemployment, maybe not so bad. But there’s no certainty. Anyone who says I’m highly confident Greece would do well in the three years following devaluation – I don’t know that. But it’s not as if Greece is on a sustainable path now.

Should the rest of us fear the consequences of a Greek exit?

Greece essentially doesn’t matter except in terms of the knock-on effects on the eurozone. If Greece exits then we know that euro membership is non-irreversible. You then have a run on Spanish and Italian banks. That does not have to lead to an immediate crisis so long as the ECB is willing to supply the euros. But that also raises the question: where is the hope for recovery for those countries? They are also in an unsustainable situation unless there’s a change in policy that gives them a reasonable hope of a recovery in a five year period. So there’s a fork in the road. Will we see more ECB lending plus more expansionary fiscal policy and higher inflation targeting? Or will it be a complete eurozone break up? Both alternatives sound impossible but one of them has to happen. What will Germany in the end choose? It’s not Sophie’s Choice, but Germany’s choice.

Who should be held responsible for the eurozone crisis?

I think that the die was cast and the whole thing was pretty much fated from the moment the Maastricht Treaty [which paved the way for the single currency] was signed in 1992. Practically the entire European elite wanted that. There’s no one person who said: “Full speed ahead let’s do this”. Maybe the original sin goes all the way back to the European Coal and Steel Community [the first institution of European unity from 1952]. It was something that kind of had to happen.

David Cameron says austerity vs growth is a false choice. Is he right?

There is a choice. You could have a policy which is for austerity later but expansion now, but that’s not what he’s saying. No; if the Government is going to join in the private sector deleveraging [rapid deficit reduction] that’s going to harm the economy. The notion that you can somehow fudge that is wishful thinking.

Do you support a VAT cut, as Labour recommends?

There is always the problem that temporary tax cuts may be ineffective because they’ll be saved rather than spent. A VAT cut is a little bit funny because it also, in effect, creates the expectation of future inflation, so it might be more effective. But it’s a second best. Last year President Barack Obama pushed for extended payroll tax cuts, which was definitely not what I would have wanted by way of stimulus. But I was supportive of it anyway because it was something. So maybe that’s OK here. The Coalition plans do call for these really dramatic cuts in public investment and infrastructure spending – that almost certainly isn’t a good idea.

Does money printing by the Bank of England really help the economy?

The evidence is really thin. There’s probably something there, but it’s not something you really want to count on. That doesn’t mean don’t do it, but it’s not a guaranteed solution. I still think the prudent policy would be to rely on fiscal stimulus as the primary tool, but backed up by monetary policy. And if you can’t get the fiscal stimulus by all means let’s do the Quantitative Easing and cross our fingers.

Is the UK’s national debt too high?

It should have been paid down more. I think there is a fair charge that the Tony Blair/Gordon Brown years didn’t use the prosperity well. But it’s not as if they were wildly fiscally irresponsible. And this is the worst financial/economic crisis since the 1930s. It’s not as if we – in the UK or the US – are running these deficits on a whim. They are appropriate given the situation. This will not set the pattern of behaviour forever. All the evidence has been that the politicians are way too eager to reduce the deficit, rather than way too slow. The idea that they will continue to do deeply irresponsible budgeting even after the economy recovers is wrong.

Would Britain have been better off in the eurozone?

Wow! I suppose there’s always some argument people could make, but, my God! Cameron and Osborne love to claim credit for Britain’s low borrowing costs, but in fact those seem to be overwhelmingly the result of the UK not being in the euro. Even now, with everything going on, Spain’s fiscal prospects look no worse and maybe better than Britain’s and yet interest rates there are 6.6 per cent and 1.6 per cent here. I actually think they ought to put up statue to Gordon Brown in Trafalgar Square to thank him for keeping Britain out of the euro. It would have been an utter disaster if Britain had joined.

Did Gordon Brown “save the world” in 2008?

I think it’s arguably right. We now look back in those six months after Lehman Brothers failed [in October 2008] and policymakers did the right things. They did what was necessary to stop a complete financial collapse. We now talk as if that was fated to happen, but maybe not. Clearly it was Gordon Brown who moved first in doing the bank recapitalisation. Without that maybe the people who thought it was great idea to let Lehman fail to eliminate moral hazard might have continued to carry the argument for another couple of months, by which time it might have been irreversible.

Are you worried that, since the crash, many people simply don’t trust economists any more?

I guess I would be more disturbed if my colleagues had actually demonstrated that they deserve the trust! If [some economists] are going to come out in 2009 and predict runaway inflation and show absolutely no reduction in self-confidence three years later when the runaway inflation is showing absolutely no sign of materialising then the public shouldn’t trust economists. They should trust me!



EXCLUSIVE-Glencore, Vitol keep oil flowing to Greece


Πηγή: Reuters
By Julia Payne and Emma FargeMay 30 2012

LONDON, May 30 (Reuters) - Debt-stricken Greece is surviving on oil priced at a premium from trading houses Vitol and Glencore (GLEN.L), who have stepped in as suppliers of last resort after sanctions forced Greece to halt imports from its main supplier Iran.

Greece has been forced to halt Iranian oil purchases because of EU financial sanctions ahead of an oil embargo in effect from July 1.

The timing could hardly have been worse for Athens, which had become dependent on Iranian oil because most oil firms and banks would not extend it credit for fear it would default on its debts.

Trading sources told Reuters that Vitol and Glencore, the world's No.1 and 2 oil traders, have been supplying the bulk of the needs of Greece's top refiner Hellenic (HEPr.AT) in the last two months.

Between them, the two firms have given Greece about 300 million euros ($375 million) in open credit financing, trading sources estimate, allowing Athens to keep buying oil without payment guarantees from banks.

Glencore has given credit for about 200 million euros, Vitol about 100 million, the trade sources said.

That has allowed Greece to avoid a steep slump in oil refining and escape fuel shortages. But the rescue has come at a price because the trading houses are said by traders at rival companies to be charging a hefty risk premium.

Vitol and Glencore declined to comment on their roles in supplying Greece. Hellenic also declined to comment.

"It is all very complicated with Greece. Every deal is separate from the other, for every cargo you have different terms," a trader at one of the two trading houses said.

Because of their deep pockets and their willingness to take risk, Vitol and Glencore are the only firms that have been able to keep large quantities of oil flowing to Greece.

"If I had to deliver to Greece now, I would be feeling very uncomfortable," said a dealer at aRussian trading house who does not supply Greece.

Referring to the risk that the two firms are taking, he added: "An operational hole of $100 million would have killed me. But I guess Glencore or Vitol can afford having it. After all, the Greeks will manage to repay somehow in the future.”

State Iraqi and Saudi oil companies continue to supply small amounts of crude to Greece and some companies, including Shell, continue sporadic shipments.

KEEPING AFLOAT

Iran had been offering generous credit terms to sell its oil amid tightening sanctions, and was willing to overlook Greece's debt problems and sell oil via "open credit" - an industry term meaning payments for oil can be delayed for 60-180 days.

The open credit system is risky as neither party has the support of a bank's letter of credit in case of non-payment.

Last year, Greece turned to Iran as its main supplier despite pressure from Washington and Brussels to end such trade as part of a campaign against Tehran's nuclear program. [ID:nL5E7MA1ZH]

Other European Union countries, including Spain and Italy, are phasing out Iranian imports because of sanctions, but none became as reliant on Iran as Greece.

Greek refiners relied on Iran for more than half of its oil imports during some months last year. Hellenic accounts for around 70 percent of the country's refining capacity with three refineries processing around 310,000 barrels per day.

The Iranian flows to Greece dried up in March when EU banks refused to facilitate payments as a result of financial sanctions. [ID:nL6E8F32Q3]

Then, Vitol and Glencore emerged as willing to enter open credit deals with Hellenic. Other firms shied away from making prolonged links, occasionally selling on a spot basis.

The trading houses are sourcing oil from Russia, Kazakhstan and Libya with Glencore supplying two tankers of Russian Urals crude, two Kazakh Caspian blend cargoes and one with Libyan crude a month.

Vitol is supplying one or two cargoes of Urals taking total monthly volumes of supplies by the two traders to about 150,000 barrels per day valued at about $500 million monthly covering over a half of Hellenic's crude needs.

"NOT FOR THE FAINT-HEARTED"

Traders estimated the potential premium Glencore and Vitol is likely to be charging at 50 cents a barrel or more, which would result in an additional payment of at least $2.2 million per month.

"It’s not for the faint-hearted, given that European banks cancelled letters of credit a while ago," said a trader at another Swiss-based trading house. His firm tried to supply Hellenic but found it impossible to take out insurance on these deliveries.

Both Vitol and Glencore declined to say whether they would continue supplies if Greece defaults and leaves the euro zone.

Both traders have a long history of taking on risk in exchange for hefty premiums when supplying crisis and even war-stricken countries - including Libya last year.

Both Glencore and Vitol have been buying hard assets including refineries and some traders speculate they might be interested in acquiring Hellenic, partly state-owned and slated for privatisation. The companies declined comment on that prospect.

Hellenic generates profits despite falling fuel demand in austerity-hit Greece. [ID:nL5E8GTDAN]

That may not last indefinitely. With European leaders now openly speaking of the possibility that Greece might be forced out of the euro after an inconclusive election on May 6, the risk involved in extending credit lines to Athens is growing.

"Highly indebted deficit nations in the Eurozone are burning oil and gas they cannot afford," Merrill Lynch said last week noting that Greece's oil demand has fallen 21 percent or 91,000 bpd from 2008 compared to a GDP contraction of 13 percent.encore,

"We believe that a Greek euro exit will likely reduce domestic oil demand sharply, as it simply would become unaffordable in a new currency," it said.



5/29/2012

Treaty on the seas is in rough Senate waters


Πηγή: Washington Post
By Walter Pincus
May 29 2012

“Everyone is entitled to his opinion, but not to his own facts,” goes the maxim popularized by Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.).

Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, used it last week in introducing the latest effort to get the Senate to pass the Law of the Sea Convention.

The Law of the Sea Convention, in effect since 1994 and ratified by 160 countries, sets international freedom of navigation rules and the guidelines for the use of deep-sea resources, including mining and fishing. The United States has not ratified the treaty, first completed in 1982. Without signing the agreement, then-President Ronald Reagan announced in 1983 the United States would act “in accordance” with the convention’s traditional uses of the oceans except for the deep-sea mining provisions.

The treaty was amended in 1994 during the Clinton administration to meet the Reagan objections. Both the Clinton White House and George W. Bush’s administration in 2004 and ’07, along with a bipartisan group of senators, supported ratification. Nonetheless it failed to come to a vote.

Why? As then-Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin wrote in a Sept. 17, 2007, letter to her state’s Republican senators, “Ratification has been thwarted by a small group of senators who are concerned about the perceived loss of U.S. sovereignty.”

Today, another small group is at it again, forcing Kerry to postpone any Senate vote on ratification until after the November elections. A two-thirds majority is required.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton testified Wednesday before the foreign relations panel, along with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey. She said it was being raised again because of “security and economic urgency.”

Supporting the latter argument, she said, previously U.S. energy companies weren’t technologically prepared to take advantage of the provisions that allow a country to claim economic sovereignty to 600 nautical miles from its coasts. That’s far beyond the current 200 nautical miles.

“U.S. oil and gas companies are now ready, willing and able to explore this area,” she said, but they need “international legal certainty” from the treaty “before they will or could make the substantial investments . . . needed to extract these far offshore resources.”

Clinton described arguments against the treaty as being “based on ideology and mythology, not in facts, evidence or the consequences of continuing failure to accede to the treaty.”

For example, Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.) raised the prospect that “under this treaty, any country could sue the United States in the International Tribunal Law of the Sea, not in the U.S. courts, or take the U.S. before binding arbitration,” under provisions designed to “reduce and control pollution of the maritime environment.”

Inhofe went on to cite an article by William C.G. Burns which, he said, named the United States as “the most logical state to bring action against.” Burns, however, in his 2006 article, adds that the convention “does not impose an absolute prohibition against pollution” and that it would be difficult to succeed with such legal action.

Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) raised another concern, repeating an argument that the treaty’s language about abating air pollution would enforce the Kyoto Protocol, which the United States has not ratified. “A lot of people believe . . . the administration wants to use this treaty as a way to get America into a regime relating to carbon, since it’s been unsuccessful doing so domestically,” Corker said.

Clinton responded, “It is our legal assessment that there is nothing in the convention that commits the U.S. to implement any commitments on greenhouse gases under any other regime. . . . It doesn’t require adherence to any specific emission policies.

Sen. James E. Risch (R-Idaho) raised one of the critics’ major arguments: money paid to the International Seabed Authority as royalties for extraction of resources from the deep sea are to be distributed by the authority.

“Why do we as Americans, give up our taxing authority, handing money over to the United Nations to develop some kind of formula that we have no idea what it’s going to?” Risch said.

Clinton noted that it’s not a tax but a royalty arrangement, similar to those that exist on land and sea. The royalty doesn’t start for five years, she added, then rises at 1 percent each year until it caps at 7 percent.

One of the 1994 modifications to the convention gives the United States a permanent seat on the Council of 36 signatories that sets the policies for royalties as well as approves their distribution. Those decisions must be made by consensus, meaning unanimous approval.

“We would have a permanent veto power over how the funds are distributed, and we could prevent them from going anywhere we did not want them to go,” Clinton said.

She later added that consensus is necessary to deal with “any decision that would impose an obligation on the United States” or any country.

Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) repeated several criticisms then added that the signatories “also help get to define the rules of engagement for the U.S. Navy all over the world.”

Dempsey diplomatically responded, “Where in the treaty do you see our rules of engagement or our activities limited, because they’re not limited in any way.”

One main selling point, emphasized by Clinton, is that “the largest single portion of the U.S. extended continental shelf is in the Arctic,” where Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark, through its ownership of Greenland, are already establishing their claims.

As Palin wrote in her 2007 letter, “If the U.S. does not ratify the convention, the opportunity to pursue our own claims to offshore areas in the Arctic Ocean might well be lost. As a consequence, our rightful claims to hydrocarbons, minerals, and other natural resources could be ignored.”

Perhaps it’s time for conservative Republicans to listen to Palin on something she knows about firsthand.


Greece: The Unvarnished Truth


Πηγή: Forexpros
By Marc Chandler
May 29 2012

A series of weekend polls in Greece showed some movement in the electorate and put the New Democracy ahead of Syrzia. This is important because which ever party comes in first gets an extra 50 seats in the 300-seat chamber. The polls suggest the New Democracy and PASOK could retain the reins of government.

Yet a false dilemma has been presented. It is most assuredly not Schaeuble's way or the highway. It is not a choice of austerity or leaving monetary union. It is not adherence to the memorandum of understanding or being isolated in Europe.

The fact of the matter is even if New Democracy's Samaras becomes the next prime minister of Greece the terms of its aid must and therefore will be renegotiated. Two recent reports confirm that Greece's trajectory is well off the agreed path.

First, tourist revenues fell 15% year-over-year in Q1 and the news appears even worse in Q2. The controversy following the election saw 50,000 booking canceled, according to press reports. Some are estimating that Q2 tourist revenues may have fallen 20%. Tourism accounts for almost a fifth of Greece's economy.

Second, tax revenue fell 10% in May. This is not simply a function of tax avoidance, but it also reflects the imploding economy. In 2011, some 20% Greece's small and medium sized businesses lost money. This year estimates suggest as much as 60% will lose money.

The memorandum of understanding assumed that more efficient tax gathering efforts would boost revenue. It also assumed tourist revenues would be flat. On both counts, terms need to be adjusted.

Although Tsipras' style may be objectionable, his underlying argument seems correct. Greek officials have played their weak hand poorly. This seems even more true following the PSI that halved the holdings of the private sector. The official sector refused to participate, which, while understandable, complicates the situation.

It means that almost three quarters of the debt Greece owes is to the official sector--ECB, IMF and EU. A unilateral moratorium, which Tsipras reportedly threatened, would hit the Troika hard. The ECB would likely need to be recapitalized. The IMF would find it more difficult to raise fresh funds. The EU would be ridiculed as well as poorer.

Yet it is also true that any effort to reduce Greece's debt burden going forward must focus on the official sector. Of course, a fallout from a Greek exit and a moratorium on its debt servicing would hurt European banks and sovereigns; some due to direct exposure, others indirectly.

One recent poll had nearly two-thirds of Germans opposing keeping Greece in the monetary union. Officials there do have not done a sufficient job explaining the costs Germany would incur if Greece left. Germany frankly does not have a choice of washing its hands of Greece and not putting in good money after bad.

The unvarnished truth is that Greece is going to cost Germany (and others) whether it is in EMU or not. The unvarnished truth is that the decision not to allow Greece a proper default (which would have included the official sector) means it is still not on a sustainable fiscal path. The unvarnished truth is that even if the old elite in Greece is able to put together a new government, its memorandum of understanding needs to be re-crafted.



Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus renamed


Πηγή: Trend
May 29 2012


The Cabinet of Ministers of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus took a decision to rename it to the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, the Milliyet newspaper reported.

The relevant decision was taken by the Cabinet of Ministers on May 23. Also, along with the renaming of the republic, other decisions relating to the country's citizens were taken. By the government's decision, now "the Cypriot Turk" will be written in the column "origin" of citizens' identity cards.

According to the newspaper, the decision was made in response to presidency of the Republic of Cyprus (Greek) in the European Union, which started from July 1.



5/28/2012

Whether Greece should leave the Euro


Πηγή: Midterm: Greece Debt Crisis
By Getting Nashty

Greece’s choice of whether or not to leave the European Monetary System (i.e. the Euro) and return to its own national currency is a difficult one. To a certain extent, remaining part of the Euro benefits the country by facilitating cross-border transactions within the Euro zone. However, to a larger extent, it burdens Greece by shackling its monetary policy in a time of economic crisis. In contrast, French and German interests are less conflicted and are strongly in favor of keeping Greece in the Euro zone.

The single currency facilitates cross-border transactions within the Euro zone by eliminating the need for, and the costs of, foreign exchange and hedging foreign currency exposure. However, at a time when the country would like to reduce its short-term interest rates to the lowest possible level so as to stimulate borrowing and investment, by having delegated its authority over monetary policy to the European Central Bank, it is forced to compromise with other ECB member countries, such as Germany and France. Those countries fear inflation in their own economies more than they fear recession in the Greek economy and therefore prefer to keep interest rates higher. Furthermore, because the French and German economies are more developed than the Greek economy, the latter is unable to compete with the former, absent lower wages. Though it’s possible for Greece to reduce wages in nominal terms (e.g. by cutting salaries in the public sector), it is politically difficult to do so. By contrast, if Greece were to return to its own currency, the country would allow that currency to fall in value relative to where it stood when Greece first adopted the Euro. The resulting pain of devaluation would then be spread evenly across the Greek economy, instead of disproportionately on public sector employees. This action would be politically more palatable. Going forward, the country would then regain the authority to set its own interest rates and to further devalue its currency, as necessary to remain competitive. To some extent, the risks Greece faces from unilaterally abandoning the Euro weigh against these benefits. Since the real burden of Greece’s existing Euro-denominated debt would rise as the exchange rate of its currency falls, any Greek withdrawal from the Euro would almost certainly coincide with, or follow, a default on that debt. While default would eliminate a significant burden on Greece, it’s likely the country would then be locked out of the capital markets for some time, putting additional pressure on public finances. It would also cause a crisis of confidence and the flight of capital out of Greece to countries that are more likely to maintain the values of their own currencies going forward.

However, since it’s almost inevitable that after the government defaults on its debts there would be a
run on Greek banks anyway, any concurrent / follow-on decision by the government to abandon the
Euro and devalue its currency would have little marginal cost and remain a net positive decision for the
country.

In contrast, France and Germany face significant risks if Greece were to abandon the Euro. To begin with, a default and devaluation by Greece is likely to encourage similar actions by other heavily indebted European countries, such as Portugal and Spain, whose economies are also less efficient than those of France and Germany. In addition to the losses that French and German banks would suffer as a result of holding much of those countries’ debts, the economies of France and Germany would lose their competitive edge within Europe. This is because as Greece and the other countries that follow it out of the Euro devalue their currencies, their purchasing power in Euro terms would also decline. Demand in those countries for what would then be more expensive French and German goods would decline as well. Conversely, France and Germany would consume greater amounts of what would then be cheaper goods from Greece and the other countries that follow it out of the Euro. This could lead to a renewed recession in France and Germany, whose economies are highly dependent on exports to the less efficient Euro zone members.

Assuming that (A) France / Germany are otherwise indifferent between (i) doing nothing and having Greece default but stay in the Euro and (ii) bailing out Greece but having it leave the Euro and devalue its currency, while (B) Greece is similarly indifferent between (i) defaulting but not leaving the Euro / not devaluing its currency and (ii) being bailed out and leaving the Euro / devaluing its currency, the payoffs to Greece on the one hand and to France / Germany on the other are as follows:


It thus seems that a Nash Equilibrium exists in the lower right corner (Bailout / Don’t Devalue). Clearly all parties would benefit the most by ending up in the lower right corner (Bailout / Don’t Devalue), but if France / Germany believe that Greece will devalue and/or Greece believes that France / Germany will not bail it out, the parties will end up in one of the other corners instead. To avoid this problem, the parties will need to negotiate carefully and build trust, so as to best coordinate their actions for the good of all concerned.



Christine Lagarde's "tough love" is an insult to Greece


Πηγή: New Statesman
By ALEX ANDREOU
May 27 2012

By urging Greeks to pay up without whingeing the IMF chief has revealed her deep historical and cultural ignorance.

You are crossing the road, a little absent-minded. About two-thirds of the way, you become aware of oncoming traffic. And right then, in that moment of panic, instead of speeding up to the safety of the near pavement, you freeze. Or, even worse, you try to turn and go back to where you came.

It is an illogical reaction to a simple, urgent problem. We’ve all done it. But when the head of the International Monetary Fund behaves in such a way, faced with the oncoming juggernaut of economic crisis, it is a source of deep concern.

In an interview for the Guardian, Christine Lagarde did exactly that. She chose to tell Greece it was payback time. “That’s right”, she said calmly, “Yeah.” She chose to talk about starving babies in sub-Saharan Africa to strengthen her call to Greece to stop whingeing and pay up. She chose to pinpoint tax evasion by a fraction of the population of a country which accounts for less than 0.5% of the world’s GDP as the sole source of the world’s economic woes. She chose to bury her head in the sand.

But, while her argument has been loudly lauded as “tough love” in many a luxurious Northern European dinner-party, over a glass of cheeky Beaujolais Nouveau, the most rudimentary scrutiny reveals it to be strategically, economically and intellectually flawed.

Her stance shows a complete misunderstanding of the psychology of a nation which has suffered nearly five years of recession and the severest of austerity cuts; a nation which is increasingly and vocally rejecting foreign interference and which is being pushed to political extremes in the upcoming election.

What was the idea, strategically, behind such a statement? If anyone seriously believed that having a representative of the IMF – the Grand Protector of the financial status quo – tell Greece to put up and shut up, would have the effect of encouraging people to vote for centrist pro-austerity parties, then they understand the mood there even less than I thought.

There are very few ways one could make such a move even more cack-handed. One could choose, as the vessel of such sentiments, an ex-Finance Minister of a Eurozone country; perhaps someone who left France with its highest deficit in 60 years. One could choose someone currently under investigation for not just one but two cases of fraud in shady financial deals. One could even accompany this interview with a pictorial which showed her dispensing thrift advice, while displaying a deep tropical tan, heavy jewellery and expensively tailored clothes.

And from such a throne of non-credibility, came the attractively packaged but intellectually hollow arguments.

First, the insidious idea that the misery engulfing the people of any nation is to be ignored, on the basis that there is even worse misery elsewhere. That in some way helping Greece – a member of the European Union for thirty years – is a direct alternative to helping “little kids from a school in a little village in Niger”. There is no such proposed programme to help little kids in Niger, you understand. This is a fictional programme, part of the IMF’s varied portfolio of fictional charitable work, that could, possibly, maybe happen, if only Greeks stopped being so selfish.

The hollow nonsense continued to flow freely. Faced with the question of women without access to a midwife when they give birth, patients dying without access to drugs, the elderly dying alone for lack of care and children starving, Lagarde’s response is simply to say that it is very easy for them to help themselves. How? "By all paying their tax. Yeah."

That’s right. Because, plainly, it is the same mothers without access to midwives, the elderly without care, the sick who cannot afford the newly introduced €5 hospital admission fee, the children without food, who have hoards of taxable income and are busily trying to send it to banks in Switzerland, while starving. Greece as one homogenous, tax-dodging mass responsible for its own downfall.

Which all enforces the grand illusion that all this is nothing to do with a global financial crisis, brought about by the very interests that the IMF represents. Instead, it was a Greek time-bomb waiting to explode. This, however, creates some difficulty in explaining the IMF’s assessment of Greece in May 2008. It boasted headlines like; “The Greek economy has been buoyant for several years and growth is expected to remain robust for some time”; “The Greek banking sector appears to be sound and has thus far remained largely unaffected by the financial market turmoil”; and “in view of Greece’s membership in the EMU, the availability of financing for the external deficit is not a concern”.

Presumably, what is implicit in Lagarde’s comments is: We got it wrong then, but you should take our advice now. We’re definitely, definitely right this time. The IMF is, after all, the forensic scientist of the world’s financial woes. “It's not either austerity or growth, that's just a false debate”, Lagarde explains. “Nobody could argue against growth. And no one could argue against having to repay your debts. The question and the difficulty is how do you reconcile the two, and in which order do you take them? I would argue that you do it on a country by country case.”

I invite Christine Lagarde to name one example, one country, one case where the IMF decided that repaying a debt came second to growth.

It certainly was not Malawi – ordered by the IMF to sell its grain reserves in 2001 to private companies in order to repay a debt with 56% interest (which it had been advised to take by the IMF); a move which directly caused hundreds of people to die the next year.

It certainly was not Argentina which, having been the busty centrefold of IMF policies throughout the 1990′s sticking religiously to all IMF advice – privatising everything but their anthem, liberalising industries, lowering corporation taxes while tightening public spending, suffered one of the most catastrophic economic collapses in 2001. The IMF demanded it got paid first and actively lobbied against discounts to creditors.

As a matter of fact, there appears to be not a single example of the IMF’sStructural Adjustment policies applied to a crisis situation where they haven’t brought more misery and stagnation. Its obsession with austerity hasrecently been described as “dangerous” for European recovery, by the OECD.

Nobel-winning Joseph Stiglitz, put it at its bluntest: “When the IMF arrives in a country, they are interested in only one thing. How do we make sure the banks and financial institutions are paid?... It is the IMF that keeps the speculators in business. They’re not interested in development, or what helps a country to get out of poverty.”

So, should we simply discount Christine Lagarde’s noisy drivel? Should we ignore the IMF’s advice altogether? That would be a mistake. This is, for instance, what they said about the UK economy: “The financial sector is strong and well supervised with a principle-based approach. The fiscal framework is good, and the mission focused on how to build fiscal cushions needed to respond to adverse shocks.”

They said this in 2007, a year before the entire house of cards collapsed on our heads – a collapse for which our children’s children will be paying, for many decades to come. The conclusion, therefore, must be that one should never ignore the IMF’s advice. One should study carefully what is being advocated, then do precisely the opposite.

Many Greek voters certainly plan to. That’s right. Yeah.



5/25/2012

Greece a 'corrupt, failed state'

A woman walks past a wall covered with graffiti in Athens today.

Πηγή: Irish Times
By Bloomberg
May 25 2012

The incoming co-chief executive officer of Deutsche Bank today described Greece as a "corrupt" and "failed" state.

"Greece is the only country, I feel, where we can say 'it's a failed state,' it is a corrupt state, corrupt as far as its political leadership is concerned, and obviously other people had to be willing to support this," Juergen Fitschen, who takes up his post next week, said in a speech at a conference in Berlin.

Mr Fitschen travelled to Athens yesterday to meet executives from the banking, shipping and industrial sectors.

"I asked my counterparts, 'where are the people that you would trust to lead the country into a new era where you have open confidence that it can be a valued member of the euro zone?'" Mr Fitschen said. "Unfortunately, the number of names was very limited; you wouldn't find even a handful of names that are trusted political leadership candidates today."

"It is very unfortunate and the country has paid a very high price," said Mr Fitschen. "The political elite is totally isolated from the rest of the country. No country can be governed properly if there is no dialogue between the business elite and the social elite and the political elite," Mr Fitschen said.

The prospect of Greece leaving the 17-nation euro region increased after parties opposed to the terms of the country's second bailout by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund won most of the votes in May 6th elections.

A fresh round of voting will be held June 17 after politicians failed to form a government. For the first time since the crisis began in November 2009, European leaders and central bankers are speaking openly of Greece abandoning the currency union.

His comments contrast with a statement the bank's CEO, Josef Ackermann, made in June 2010. Mr Ackermann said at the time that he was confident Greece could repay its debt because the nation was committed to reform. Greece has since restructured its debt, asking private investors to take losses on their bonds.

The foregone conclusion that Greece will leave the euro area made by some leaders and market participants is "dangerous," said Mr Fitschen, who takes over as Deutsche Bank co-CEO with investment bank chief Anshu Jain at the end of the month.

"We should not talk so much about the exit, but we should talk more about how we can make sure that this event comes to an end and we focus all our attention, all our interest on how to maintain Greece as a member of the euro zone because, I believe, that would change the whole debate very fundamentally," he said.

"People are just not seeing the light at the end of the tunnel," said Mr Fitschen at the conference hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Berlin. "They accept that they have to go through painful adjustment processes, but where's the carrot that can guide them to accept it and cheerfully wait for better times to come?

"The moment that the public would feel that the momentum has returned, it becomes much easier."




Bank of Greece Poised to Reveal Crucial Data


Πηγή: cnbc
May 24 2012

This is the most important data point coming in the next few days:

The Bank of Greece is due to update its website (here's the English version) any day now with an Excel spreadsheet revealing the aggregate balance sheets of Greece's monetary and financial institutions. It will be the clearest indicator yet of the health — or lack thereof — of Greece's banking system.

Greece's central bank releases the data with an almost 2-month time lag. The latest round of available data shows balance sheets from March 2012. It was made public in late April.

March's data is not much use. Just a few months ago, it seemed like the situation in Greece had been brought under control. The can had been kicked down the road.

April's data could be more telling. Will we see a dramatic decline in the assets of Greece's banks? Will domestic depositors withdraw funds?

Of course, the most important data would be for May, following the Greek elections that threw the country's financial and monetary future into doubt. We won't have May data, however, until the end of June.

And by that point, things may well have changed so much in Greece that no one will care what was going on in May.



5/24/2012

Turkey: The golden goose for geopolitical defence strategy


Πηγή: DefenceiQ
By Robert Knapp
May 21 2012

Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s Foreign Minister since 2009, is currently attracting much greater attention from the Western media than would normally be expected. For all the clichéd talk of Turkey being the ‘bridge between East and West,’ it is a country that has for many decades not exercised the diplomatic weight that it should, in either the Middle East or Europe. A country of 74 million people, with an economy that has largely shrugged off the effects of the global economic crisis, and with the second largest military in NATO, Turkey has always been a ‘sleeping giant’ of European politics. However, that is a situation that is now rapidly changing due a combination of the shifting domestic dynamics of the Turkish state and the continuing reverberations of the Arab Spring. Turkey’s time on the side-lines looks set to be coming to a close.

The sword of the state

In recent years the Turkish armed forces have been focused upon changing from a Cold War standpoint to one in which they are much more suited the meet the challenges Turkey faces in the first decades of the 21st Century. The key objective has been to make the military more flexible and mobile so that it can respond to the greater range of roles that are now expected of it – many of which are expected to extend far beyond Turkey’s borders. With Turkey spending roughly $17.5 billion on defence (2.4% of GDP) she has the 6th highest defence budget in Europe, and this is only likely to rise as countries like Italy cut back their defence funding.

With an arsenal of over 400,000 men, over 2,000 front line main battle tanks (a mixture of Leopard 1s, 2s, M60s, elderly M48s and the new domestically produced Altay) and 7,000 artillery pieces the army is one of the most capable old fashioned heavy mechanised armoured forces in Europe. Now this is being combined with an increase in the amount of rapidly deployable air-mobile forces available to it. Experience gained from the on-going insurgency in the south against the PKK and the deployment of an infantry brigade to Afghanistan have led to a military that is increasingly skilled and competent.

The air force is the service that is currently receiving the greatest degree of equipment modernisation with the on-going introduction of B-737 AWACS planes and the imminent arrival of the first A400M aerial transport greatly expanding the capabilities of the Turkish air force. It already possesses a well trained and highly valued fast jet fleet (a mixture of F-16 variants and F-4 Phantoms) that is set to receive a significant number of F-35 JSFs at the end of the decade and one of the largest aerial tanking fleets in Europe (7 Stratotankers). The whole force is highly regarded throughout NATO due to the quality of training and equipment that its pilots and ground crews possess.

The navy is the smallest of the three services but the fleet of 14 diesel electric submarines and 18 frigates, plus numerous smaller corvettes and patrol boats is a substantial force by regional standards. The deployment of vessels to Somalia and Libya has shown it more than able to operate as part of multinational flotillas.

A military castrated

Since the creation of the modern secular Turkish state by Kemal Ataturk the Turkish military has proudly regarded itself as the guardian of this secularism. This has extended to numerous military coups; the most recent of which occurred in only 1997 when Turkey’s first Islamist government was forced to give up power. Since Turkey’s main moderate Islamist party – the Justice and Development Party (AK) – came to power in 2002 its Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has been steadily moving to limit the military and ensure that it keeps its nose out of politics. With the recent trial and imprisonment of multiple former senior military officers, including the former Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug, over the planning of an alleged coup against the AK, Mr Erdogan’s position and the solidity of AK in government seems secure. However, it must be made clear that these moves have not been universally supported in Turkey, with the secular opposition and many liberal intellectuals questioning the coup claims; many allege that it is a politically motivated campaign of vengeance by Mr Erdogan and other senior members of the government. This situation of limiting the military’s domestic political power is only likely to continue with the planned re-writing of the 1980 constitution. The hope is that the army will from now on stay in its barracks.

The castrating of the Turkish military in the political sphere has coincided with a sharp increase in the internal and external challenges that are facing it. The on-going Kurdish insurgency, the brewing civil war over the border in Syria and the continued concerns about the effects of an Israeli military attack on Iran are all issues that are increasingly coming to the fore. This is all at a time when Turkey is at a point in which it is increasingly attempting to re-orientate its foreign policy in a more multi-directional way beyond its traditional alliances with the United States and Israel.

Unwanted conflicts

The greatest of these challenges is the continuing unrest in Syria that has arguably already fallen into a state of virtual civil war. At the time of writing the Kofi Annan-brokered UN cease-fire is just about holding stable but there is the very real risk that the conflict between the Syrian opposition and the government of Bashar al-Assad will spill over into Turkey. There are already tens of thousands of refugees sheltering on the Syrian side of the border with allegations being made that the Syrian Free Army is being allowed to shelter and launch operations from bases within Turkey. Having previously enjoyed friendly relations with Assad’s government, Mr Erdogan has publicly called for regime change and it is a strongly held belief by many Western diplomats that the coming summer will see direct intervention by Turkey in the form of safe zones and enclaves being set up on the Syrian side of the border; the only thing currently stopping this occurring is American opposition to direct military intervention but as the ceasefire continues to tremble, the U.S.’s position is likely to relent.

The greatest on-going security challenge for the Turkish military is its prolonged counter-insurgency operations against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). This decades old conflict was at its most intense between 1984 and 1999 when there was virtually open warfare in the south of the country, but in the past two years the situation has destabilised once more, as Prime Minister Erdogan’s peace initiative have fallen by the wayside. This has included the mass arrest and detainment of thousands of civilians on often dubious charges of being members of the PKK and its political front the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party. The existence in Iraq of the autonomously governing Iraqi Kurdistan and a further 2 million Kurds in already destabilised Syria are only increasing the importance that is attached to resolving Turkeys Kurdish problem. The most likely current attempt with be for Mr Erdogan to use the imminent writing a new constitution to attempt to push through some reforms for Turkish Kurds, but for the time being the bombs of an airstrike seem the favoured solution.

Turkey is a country that is expected to take an increasingly assertive and important role in the international community over the coming decade. This can be seen through its leading role in promoting Turkish-style Islamist democracy in the Middle East, its key role in attempts to find a negotiated solution to Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons programme, and the recent break from Israel over its assault on the Gaza aid flotilla in 2008. Turkey, led by a popular and charismatic Prime Minister, has every chance of taking on an increasingly senior role in the Middle East, providing it can navigate the challenges in its neighbourhood that have sprung up this year. The talk of a new Ottoman Empire may be overblown but the return of an independent and powerful Turkey is not.



5/23/2012

Israel: If this is the game Turkey wants, we'll play


Πηγή: Ynetnews
By Attila Somfalvi
May 12 2012

Diplomatic sources stressed Wednesday that no official information had been received about an announcement by Turkey that it planned to indict former IDF commanders over the Marmara affair, but said "If it's true, this won't bring us to a good place. We will need to weigh our steps."
 
"We also have ways to bother them in the international arena. If this is the path they want, we also know what to do. They have plenty of Achilles' heels. We don't want escalation, but if this is the game – we'll play," the sources said.


Taking More Responsibility for Its Own Defense, Korea Holds Lessons for U.S. Policy in Iraq and Afghanistan

South Korean honour guards hoist the national flag to celebrate the recapture of its capital from North Korea in a ceremony marking the 60th anniversary of the 1950-53 Korean War at the Gyeongbok palace of the Joseon Dynasty in Seoul on September 28, 2010. Lee said his military will try to play a bigger role in global security and peace as part of efforts to repay the international community for its help in the fight against the North Korean invasion six decades ago.

Πηγή: Forbes
By James K. Glassman
May 23 2012

As America winds down involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, we should look closely at the lessons of Korea, which is now preparing to take on a larger share of its own defense, both on the ground and in the air.

The globe is still littered with unfinished business from both world wars, which established new nations and artificial divides that have threatened security for nearly a century in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia. The good news is that we haven’t had another world war; the bad news is that keeping the peace requires discipline, imagination and perseverance – the kind we are at risk of abandoning in the Middle East and South Asia.

South Korean honour guards hoist the national flag to celebrate the recapture of its capital from North Korea in a ceremony marking the 60th anniversary of the 1950-53 Korean War at the Gyeongbok palace of the Joseon Dynasty in Seoul on September 28, 2010. Lee said his military will try to play a bigger role in global security and peace as part of efforts to repay the international community for its help in the fight against the North Korean invasion six decades ago. (Image credit: AFP via @daylife)

Throughout its long history, Korea suffered invasions and indignity at the hands of its neighbor, Japan. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea and stole its sovereignty. Then, with Japan’s defeat in World War II, Korea won its freedom again – sort of. Like Germany, the peninsula, which today has a combined population of about 72 million, was divided under Soviet control in the north and American control in the south. The division was supposed to be only temporary, but it persisted. Then in June 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the south, igniting a war that lasted three years.

Since then, North Korea has become the last of the hermetically sealed communist states, along with Cuba. Its economy is in shambles, with an estimated GDP per capita of just $1,800, lower than Chad and Senegal. By contrast, South Korea, which started in roughly the same place, has a GDP per capita of $31,700, ahead of Italy and Israel.

A visitor to Seoul, the South’s capital, with a population of 11 million, is continually reminded that the border with the belligerent North is only 35 miles away. The North has the largest artillery forcein the world, and there’s an ominous feeling as you walk around the cosmopolitan city, bustling around the clock, that a shell could land any second.

Although the war ended 59 years ago, the United States keeps 28,500 troops in the South, in part as a reminder to the North that an attack on the South would literally be an attack on America. But the threat of North Korea now extends far beyond South Korea. Unlike Iran, North Korea is frank about developing weapons of mass destruction.

It is moving toward a third nuclear test, perhaps, as Reuters reports, “using highly enriched uranium for the first time.” Just last week, the North resumed work on a light-water reactor that would accelerate its ability to build weapons. And while a rocket launch on May 11 failed, the attempt underlined the North’s desire to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile that could carry a nuclear warhead.

The Korean peninsula, poised between Japan and China, remains a very dangerous place, so it’s heartening that, starting in 2007, the South Koreans began planning to take a greater role in their own defense – and, by extension, the defense of Western democracies like the United States.

At first, the impetus was sovereignty – the leaders of the Republic of Korea (ROK), at the time leaning well to left, complained that they wanted to run their own show, without what some of them viewed as U.S. domination. But with the election of the Lee Myung-bak government, with a more clear-eyed view of the North Korean threat, the shift gained a stronger justification – close coordination and burden-sharing with the U.S. as a critical ally.

The new changes were set in a plan called Strategic Alliance 2015, established at a meeting of U.S. and ROK foreign and defense ministers last July. The Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, a project of the Asia Foundation, reported some of the conclusions:

South Korea needs a single ground component command that is able to coordinate closely with air and sea components. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff will lead warfighting while the U.S. Korea Command [American troops] will become a supporting command, and the current U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command will disappear.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta assured the South Koreans that U.S. troops won’t be reduced “as long as it takes to protect the Republic of Korea.” But don’t miss the importance of the crossroads that has now been reached. The ROK is assuming a far greater role in its own defense. Perhaps even more dramatic than the change in troop leadership is the fact that South Korea will assume responsibility for airborne operations in and around the peninsula by 2015.

This move fits into South Korea’s overall strategy, embodied in what is called Defense Reform Plan 2020. Like practically every other government in the world, the ROK is trying to find ways to hold down its defense costs. The solution in this case is to reduce troop levels – in part out of necessity, as birth rates drop – and to make this smaller fighting force more efficient through strategic, capital investments in defense.

Specifically, South Korea wants to compensate for fewer troops by procuring advanced fighter and surveillance aircraft, naval platforms, and ground combat vehicles. The 2020 plan calls for “replacing nearly every outdated major weapon” and “transition[ing] to a more professional force with a smaller fraction of draftees.”


A US F-16 fighter jet releases flares during a joint gunnery exercise at a military firing range in Pocheon, near the heavily-fortified border with North Korea, on April 15, 2010. The Korean peninsula is the world's last Cold War frontier as Stalinst North Korea and pro-Western South Korea have been technically at war since the 1950-53 conflict. (Image credit: AFP via @daylife)
As an example, the ROK Air Force is upgrading its fleet of F-16 fighters. These jets were introduced in 1978 by a division of General Dynamics that is now owned byLockheed Martin. With consistent upgrades, more than 4,500 of them are deployed by 25 governments. South Korea has a total of 180 F-16C/D aircraft, and, to handle its new role in air defense, it wants to acquire new radars and more modern avionics and computers.

“With these upgrades,” saysDefense Industry Daily, “the aircraft will be able to carry GPS-guided weapons, AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles, and other new equipment.”

The new radar – called an active electronically scanned array (AESA) system — appears to be essential. It can track multiple targets horizontally and vertically, with a wider range and greater accuracy than current systems. A U.S. company, Raytheon, has developed the only combat-proven AESA radar systems that are already in production. They have been retrofitted to several hundred U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft.

The Korean Air Force is also looking to acquire advanced cruise missiles from such U.S. manufacturers as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon. The missiles “would give South Korea a way of striking even North Korea’s most heavily defended targets if necessary, while remaining out of range of the North’s air defenses.”

Gen. James Thurman, who commands U.S. forces in Korea, put the situation well last October: “There’s one thing I’ve learned: When we try to predict the future we get it wrong.” As a result, both the ROK and the U.S. have to “have the equipment, organization, and training in place to lead the joint-combined fight.” South Korea needs “persistent surveillance; interoperable joint command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems; anti-submarine and counter-mine warfare naval capabilities; and capabilities to offset asymmetric threats.”

South Korea did not gain its current prosperity and security by having the U.S. cut and run. We have been at it across seven decades, carefully calibrating our own role and that of our ally. It hasn’t been easy, but, in a dangerous part of the world, the South Korea-U.S. relationship is a true success story, with important lessons to heed for U.S. policy in the Middle East and South Asia.



Pakistan hands 33-year sentence to doctor who helped CIA track bin Laden

Dr Shakil Afridi sentenced for US spying. 

Πηγή: The State
By SAEED SHAH
May 23 2012

ISLAMABAD — The Pakistani doctor who helped the CIA in the hunt for Osama bin Laden was sentenced to 33 years in prison for treason Wednesday, officials said, in a further blow to relations between Islamabad and Washington.

The United States had been negotiating behind the scenes to win freedom for Dr. Shakil Afridi, who was detained by Pakistani intelligence agents after the May 2, 2011, U.S. special forces raid that found and killed the al-Qaida founder in the northern town of Abbottabad.

Word that Afridi had been tried in a tribal court, rather than in a regular Pakistani one, came just after Pakistan and the United States failed to come to an agreement at the NATO summit held in Chicago on reopening a land route through Pakistan for supplies to coalition troops in landlocked Afghanistan.

The Afridi case illustrates the stark differences between the two countries on anti-terrorism issues. Afridi is regarded as a hero by American officials but as a traitor in Pakistan.

McClatchy Newspapers revealed in July last year that Afridi had set up a fake health program in Abbottabad, sending health workers door to door to vaccinate residents for Hepatitis B, in an effort to get DNA samples from the house where the CIA suspected that bin Laden lived.

American officials were never sure that bin Laden was present in the home, to which they had traced a key al-Qaida courier. The work by Afridi was carried out in the weeks leading up to the raid and was an important part of the CIA's attempts to verify that bin Laden was in the Abbottabad house before mounting a risky operation in another country's territory to kill him. It remains unclear whether Afridi's efforts gained any useful information.

After the bin Laden raid, Afridi remained in Pakistan, where he was arrested three weeks later by agents of the military's Inter-Services Intelligence agency. U.S. officials believe he has been tortured in custody, a claim angrily denied by Pakistani military officials.

Afridi's case was heard under colonial-era tribal laws that give the local administration in Pakistan's tribal area sweeping powers to jail people, even though his alleged offense was committed in Abbottabad, where tribal laws do not apply. However, Afridi officially was employed to work in the tribal area, in the part known as Khyber agency. He is also a member of one of the tribes of the area.

News reports in Pakistan said Afridi was sent Wednesday to the central jail in Peshawar, the main city in the northwest of the country. The local nurses and other health officials in Abbottabad who cooperated unwittingly with Afridi have been fired.

In January, U.S. Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, had gone public with Washington's concerns about Afridi.

"I am very concerned about what the Pakistanis did with this individual. This was an individual who, in fact, helped provide intelligence that was very helpful with regard to this operation," Panetta said during an interview aired by CBS's "60 Minutes." "He was not in any way treasonous towards Pakistan. He was not in any way doing anything that would have undermined Pakistan."

However, Pakistan regarded the bin Laden raid as a national humiliation, and the cooperation of one of its citizens angered many here. Panetta's remarks had confirmed on the record that Afridi had worked for the CIA. Under the laws in Pakistan, and many other countries, including the United States, working for a foreign intelligence agency is a crime.

U.S-Pakistan relations disintegrated last year over a series of clashes, including the bin Laden raid, culminating in a "friendly fire" episode in November in which American aircraft attacked two Pakistani border outposts, killing 24 soldiers. In response, Pakistan stopped NATO supplies to Afghanistan passing through its territory.





Russia to join OECD Nuclear Energy Agency



Πηγή: Power Engineering
May 23 2012

An exchange of letters took place between Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Secretary-General Angel Gurría, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrey Denisov, and Deputy Director-General of Rosatom Nikolay Spasskiy on May 23 to formalize the accession of the Russian Federation to the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) effective as of January 1, 2013. Russia will become the 31st member country of the NEA.

“With Russia, the NEA will have additional strength when it comes to nuclear energy, nuclear safety, waste management or economics,” said OECD Secretary-General, Angel Gurría.

Russia has the fourth largest civilian nuclear program in the world after the U.S., France and Japan. Currently, around 18 percent of the country’s electricity is produced by 33 nuclear reactors. Russia is steadily moving towards an expanded role of nuclear energy, with 11 reactors under construction and plans for nearly doubling output by 2020.

The NEA is a specialized agency within the OECD, an intergovernmental organization of industrialized countries based in Paris, France. The mission of the NEA is to assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international cooperation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.




As Greece Turns Leftward, Its Tycoons Stay in Background

Andreas C. Dracopoulos, co-president of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation.

Πηγή: New York Times
By LANDON THOMAS Jr. and ELENI VARVITSIOTI
May 23 2012

ATHENS — While money pours out of Greek banks, and Europe debates whether Greece deserves its next handout, the people potentially in the best position to help shore up the nation’s finances are mainly keeping their heads down.

They are among the wealthiest Greeks — whether shipping magnates, whose tax-free status is enshrined in the constitution, or the so-called oligarchs who have accumulated vast wealth via their dominance in core areas of the economy like oil, gas, media, banking and even cement.

Astute investors, they have been reluctant to lend a hand to the Greek treasury through the risky proposition of buying government bonds. But they have also been slow to dispense funds to philanthropies trying to combat the mounting social ills that their nation’s economic collapse has wrought — drawing a sharp rebuke from the head of a foundation created from Greek shipping wealth, that has become Greece’s largest charitable donor in recent years.Mainly, though, they have done what Greeks from the richest to those of modest means have traditionally done: pay as little as they can in the way of taxes.

Many economists say the oligarchs are a big part of Greece’s economic problem, because they have capitalized on the insular, quasi-monopolistic approach to business that is one reason their nation has long lagged the far more competitive economies of many other euro zone nations.

The moneyed elite in Greece has always been secretive in nature, especially when it comes to its fortunes. Assessing the ultimate value of Greek private sector wealth is a near impossible task, because much of the money exists offshore, secreted away in Swiss bank accounts or invested in real estate in London and Monaco. And now with the country’s top vote-getter, the leftist firebrand Alexis Tsipras, talking more and more about nationalizing companies and industries and, in the words of his top economic adviser, “taxing the rich,” there is even more incentive to lie low.

Of course, the left is not alone in this view.

“Let’s be frank — the well-off need to pay their fair share of taxes,” Bob Traa, the International Monetary Fund’s representative in Greece, said in a speech last year in Athens.

Last year alone, an estimated 8 billion euros ($10.2 billion) in collectible taxes were in arrears — nearly half of the country’s budget deficit.

The nation’s tycoons have every incentive to keep their country in the euro currency union. The question is, are they willing to bear the cost of doing so?

“The oligarchs want to keep the euro — largely because of the banks which are so deeply integrated in the euro system,” said Costas Lapavitsas, an economist at the University of London. “But they are keeping quiet about it.”

But as children go hungry in Greek schools because their parents can no longer afford to feed them and the streets of Athens become home to growing numbers of desperate, jobless people, pressure is mounting on the country’s rich to do what the state can no longer effectively do: write checks.

After all, philanthropy is a Greek word. But with many wealthy Greeks still fearful of showing their financial hand, private giving to date has been relatively meager.

“I get the sense that almost nothing is being done,” said Andreas Dracopoulos, co-president of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation which was set up in the 1990s to put to charitable use the winnings of its shipping tycoon founder. “Everyone is saying let someone else do it, and so far I am seeing little action.”

This January, the Niarchos foundation, which describes itself as an international charity with offices in Athens, New York and Monaco, said it would donate 100 million euros to a series of projects aimed at helping Greeks cope with the economic crisis. They include an effort to give food vouchers to help destitute parents feed their children, as well as programs to attack the growing epidemic of homelessness in big cities like Athens and Piraeus.

Shipping analysts guess that the value of Greek shipping assets alone is about $85 billion — although they hasten to add that those assets underpin a substantial debt burden of around 300 billion euros ($380 billion) for the industry, which is heavily dependent on financing vessels that can cost hundreds of millions of euros each. And in the slack global economy, shipping — and shipping magnates — are feeling the pinch.

Thanassis Martinos, a second-generation shipping heir, said his company, Eastern Mediterranean, was having one of its worst years on record and was likely to lose money in 2012.

Still, he and some other shipping billionaires say they are doing their part. In addition to philanthropic giving, Mr. Martinos said it was important that the wealthier Greeks contribute by providing jobs for the country’s increasingly rootless youth, among whom employment is above 50 percent. That is why, despite the slump in his business, he said he had refrained from laying off workers.

“The biggest problem is not feeding young people,” he said. “It is giving them jobs.”

Another rich shipper, who insisted on not being identified because he did not want to draw attention to himself, said that he was providing thousands of free meals to families in and around his ancestral village.

Several shippers said they had also donated to a nascent campaign that is being organized by the trade group that represents Greek shipowners in Athens — although its president, Theodoros Veniamis, declined to say how much money they hoped to raise.

What the shipping magnates are not doing, though, is paying taxes. As with all shipping companies here, for example, Mr. Martinos’s fleet of tankers is based offshore, although the administrative offices are in Athens.

Greece’s income tax revenue is 7.3 percent of gross domestic product, well below the 11 percent average for euro zone countries, according to Eurostat. Even so, there has been little talk by recent governments or even by Greece’s financial backers about imposing taxes on shippers — a move, it is assumed, that would prompt them to take their business elsewhere.

That is a blow Greece would have trouble absorbing. The shipping industry employs about 200,000 people. And it brought in 13 billion euros in foreign exchange in 2010, making it the country’s top single foreign-exchange earner.

Would shipping’s special tax exclusion change under a left-wing government? It is hard to say. Euclid Tsakalotos, a top economic adviser to Mr. Tsipras said in an interview last week that the first thing Mr. Tsipras would do was to “tax the people that past governments have been afraid of taxing.”

Mr. Martinos says such an outcome is unlikely, given shipping’s vital role in the economy. Greek shippers are also some of the country’s largest investors, owning large tracts of real estate and interests in tourism, banking and media.

“I don’t think the policy will change,” he said. “Shipping is a net profit for Greece.”

Many shipowners and other wealthy Greeks are said to take the long view, arguing that Greeks will come to their senses in the next election and not vote in large numbers for Mr. Tsipras if they become convinced that it means a forced march out of the euro zone.

But privately, they cannot ignore the increasingly grim economic and social environment — which is why some have bolstered their already tight security forces by hiring more bodyguards.

Peter Nomikos, a 33-year-old shipping scion, has started a campaign to raise money from Greek businesses and individuals and then, through a foundation he set up in the United States, use those funds to buy back as many of Greece’s deeply discounted bonds on the open market as possible. The plan would be to retire them to help bring down the country’s staggering debt burden, which is now 350 billion euros — 165 percent of the nation’s G.D.P.

Mr. Nomikos is also building a microbrewery on Santorini, the island of his shipping forefathers. He says that he hopes to create a few jobs in the community and that he plans to contribute 50 percent of the profit to the foundation.

“No single person is rich enough to bail out Greece — not least myself,” said Mr. Nomikos, who through his beer company has already bought 100,000 euros worth of bonds at current rock bottom prices of around 15 euro cents on the euro.






5/21/2012

Turkish Report: Israel to Deploy '20,000 Commandos' to Cyprus

Cypriot President Demetris Christofias

Πηγή: Israel National News
By Rachel Hirshfeld
May 21 2012

Israel plans to deploy approximately 20,000 troops in Greek Cyprus to protect its energy projects in the region, Turkish news agency claims.

Israel plans to deploy no less than 20,000 'commandos' in Greek Cyprus in order to protect its energy projects in the region, the Anatolian News Agency reported Sunday.

The report, which appears somewhat doubtful to observers familiar with the size of Israel's military, adds that at least 30,000 Israeli workers and their families will move to Limassol to work on planned joint Israeli-Cypriot projects.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu met with Cypriot Prime Minister Dimitris Christofias on February 16 to discuss the countries’ joint interests.

The Anatolian News Agency claims that although the content of the meeting remains confidential, it has learned new details about the meeting, quoting a senior Cypriot source who claims that Christofias president asked Netanyahu to persuade Israeli businessmen to suspend investment in the Turkish-controlled part of the island.

Only Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Netanyahu also reportedly offered to undertake all expenses needed to extract natural gas found in the Mediterranean. In exchange for his offer, the prime minister asked that all of the 10,000 personnel that would work at the plant be brought in from Israel with their families, increasing the number of Israeli citizens in the area to nearly 30,000.

To meet the security arrangements created by such a large number of Israelis, Netanyahu proposed that 20,000 soldiers would protect the civilians and energy facilities. "The Israelis are coming, and they are here to stay," the Anatolian News Agency quoted the official as saying.

Editor's note: Israel have denied this claims.